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# Public Administration Review

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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
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# Staffing Democracy's Top Side

By JOHN A. PERKINS

*President, University of Delaware*

AS PROFESSIONAL students of government, there is a temptation to quarrel with the half-truth expressed in Alexander Pope's much-quoted couplet,

For forms of government let fools contest;  
Whate'er is best administered is best:

It is best to abjure the quarrel and concede the element of truth in the rhyme. Our democratic republic is threatened, as are all forms of government, by the seemingly inevitable Polybian cycle wherein an inherent weakness of one form of government causes transition to another: monarchies become tyrannies and are succeeded by aristocracies, which, in turn, become oligarchies, *ad infinitum*. A Biblical lifetime ago Woodrow Wilson declared, "It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one." Events in the seventy-year interval have indicated that democracy, instead of becoming an inevitable and universal form of government, seems to have come to special jeopardy.

Certainly, if we are long to enjoy our self-governing republic, it must be well administered. Without minimizing organization, methods, and other elements, the prime requisite of good administration is competent staff, particularly top-level staff. Furthermore, the very integrity of any form of government, be it monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, depends upon the important functionaries competently performing in behalf of the constitutional holders of power—in our government, the people. While this paper is concerned primarily with means, the ends cannot be lost sight of.

To discuss the staffing of our democratic

government is hazardous. No one individual can command all the essential facts concerning the two main aspects of the problem—staffing the civil service and staffing the political offices. Much more investigation is needed of both types of staff. Their interrelations should not be neglected either. In the present state of knowledge one can do little more than hazard an hypothesis or two.

## *Present Shortcomings*

THE first is: our democratic-republican government is not so well staffed as it should be to maintain itself in view of its present responsibilities at home and abroad in this technologically complex era. Several competent observers support this view. "I think we have too much mediocrity in the business of running the government of the country," the former mayor of Philadelphia, Joseph S. Clark, Jr. (now United States senator), wrote recently, "and it troubles me that this should be so at a time of such complexity and crisis."<sup>1</sup> Commentator James Reston, during the congressional campaign of 1954, wrote:

... though there are, of course, exceptions—both parties have nominated an astonishing number of bush-league candidates who could not possibly represent the best qualities of the American people. No man can go across the country from one political meeting to another without being disturbed by the mediocrity of the candidates. . . .<sup>2</sup>

William S. White, analyzing the incumbent administration at the onset of the 1956 campaign, recalled President Eisenhower's promise of 1952 to bring to Washington the best brains in the country, regardless of party affiliation. White wrote:

<sup>1</sup> "Wanted: Better Politicians," *Atlantic Monthly* 44 (July, 1955).

<sup>2</sup> *New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1954.

NOTE: This paper is principally a public lecture delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, October 12, 1956.

It seems quite clear on detached observation that this has not been done. The "team" has been devoted and worked with orderly mutuality. It has, however, in no sense been intellectually creative.<sup>3</sup>

Many leading members of the administration are men well on in years. They became available for public service because they were on the verge of retirement, if not actually in retirement. Many appointments of younger men have been temporary appointments. Some of these people have left government service after one, two, or three years. A few examples are H. Chapman Rose, Under Secretary of the Treasury; Roger M. Kyes and Robert B. Anderson, top men in the Department of Defense; Joseph M. Dodge, director of the budget, and his successor, Rowland R. Hughes. As of February 12, 1954, nine of the twelve top-flight officials on the Eisenhower "farm team" had resigned from the Department of Agriculture. Tacked onto their parting expressions of good will were statements that they had been in Washington on a "temporary basis." A similar exodus for like reasons is imminent in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

While partisans might like to attribute personnel difficulties to Republicans, political scientists should not dismiss the matter on such grounds. The Truman administration had similar difficulties. In 1950 the situation became so desperate that the Carnegie Corporation was moved to subsidize a study by John J. Corson which resulted in the publication of *Executives for the Federal Service; A Program of Action in Time of Crisis*.<sup>4</sup>

State governments, regardless of the dominant party, have similar problems. In Michigan the top appointive post in administration was filled four times by university professors on leave. None of the appointees were particularly potent politicians; in fact, two might be classified as independents. Owing to a paucity of other candidates with adequate knowledge and interests, they were recruited by Governors out of necessity. Often, it is impossible to find capable men who will surrender more lucrative posts for positions of great responsibility in state service under a Governor who can promise tenure only during his two-year term.

Undoubtedly, the manpower shortage is now more acute than it was during the first three decades of the twentieth century. There was, however, a shortage of talent for high political offices then, too. Calvin Coolidge's *Autobiography* refers to individuals with what he calls "the political mind." He wrote, "they are a great comfort to every President and a great service to their country but they are not sufficient in number so that the public business can be transacted like a private business."<sup>5</sup>

#### *The Economic System and the Scarcity of Talent for Government*

A SECOND hypothesis as to why staffing of our democracy is so difficult is: the economic system seems to work against the political system. Several characteristics of our economic system support this suggestion.

The organization of society in the United States is no longer highly individualistic as it was when our governments were taking their basic forms. Today our social organization is a highly interdependent affair reminding one of the corporate character of medieval feudalism. Instead of the feudal "political contract" guaranteeing protection, justice, and other services in exchange for military service and other feudal dues, we now have the labor contract and the career commitment of the white collar man insuring, on the one hand, labor supply to the corporate employer and, on the other, livelihood and protection of family and old age to the employee.

Today, four out of five employed citizens work for someone else, usually a large corporate employer. One hundred years ago, four out of five men were self-employed, privileged to control their own time. Many of them were able to serve in governmental capacities for both long and short periods. They could leave their family-sized farms and owner-operated stores to hired men and clerks while attending to quickly-comprehensible administrative jobs and not-too-difficult policy responsibilities in the county seat, the state capital, or even Washington, D. C. Congressional service was not such an all-consuming occupation as it is today. Accepting civil appointment in the exec-

<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, July 23, 1956.

<sup>4</sup> Columbia University Press, 1952.

<sup>5</sup> *The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge* (Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929).

utive branch, whether at the Cabinet or lower levels of responsibility, posed few problems for the incumbent upon returning to private life.

Professional life and business affiliation formerly were far more fluid than they are today. In pioneer times a modest capital, new interest, ambition, and a willingness to learn enabled a man during a single lifetime to prosper in a number of careers in as many separate communities. One's economic betterment did not depend so much upon years of service and constant attention to the duties of a complex technical industry with a hierarchical ladder to be climbed. Security past forty did not depend upon continued service to one employer, stock bonuses in the prosperous years, and company-connected retirement benefits. Financial independence—and employment—were individual matters in the nineteenth century. The widespread ownership of land and the simpler requirements for independent self-sufficiency in a predominantly rural civilization made for less preoccupation with security. By 1950, the man who wanted to provide for his family upon retirement needed savings of more than \$80,000—even at 6 per cent interest—to provide the same standard of living that an investment of \$25,000 provided in 1900.<sup>8</sup> He would need even more now owing to price changes in the last seven years.

Since World Wars I and II and the depression, we have developed a great measure of economic democracy in the United States. This development followed almost inevitably upon the growth of political democracy. For as Harold Laski wrote: "Economic power is regarded as the parent of political power. To make the diffusion of the latter effective, the former also must be widely diffused."<sup>9</sup> The income tax and the inheritance tax—not to mention wage and hour and other social legislation of recent decades—have left their mark upon our economic system.

Worthy of the political scientist's study is how this change has affected and will affect political democracy with particular reference to its staffing problems. One need only read

Frederick Lewis Allen's several volumes of twentieth century social history to contrast the amassing of wealth and to compare the circumstances of the rich in 1900 and today.<sup>8</sup> Early in this century the United States Senate, because of the wealth of many of its members, was often referred to as the "millionaires club." To a considerable extent the so-called "fat cats" financing both major political parties today and a good number of outstanding contemporary officeholders and candidates are the legacies of fortunes built in those not-so-long-ago days of political democracy and economic aristocracy. Examples are the du Pont family in Delaware, the Lodges and Herters in Massachusetts, and the Alger and Cousins families in Michigan, all Republicans. Among the Democrats are the Kennedys of Massachusetts, the Harrimans in New York, Williams in Michigan, and the Bayards of Delaware. You can think of others.

Prosperity and governmentally-supported full employment are further pertinent characteristics of the present-day economic system. Prosperity is a large factor in the scarcity of talent for government service.<sup>9</sup> On August 8, 1956, the government reported a record high of 66.7 million Americans at work, with every aspect of the employment record showing strength in the economy. On the same day, an announcement was made that an all-time record was set in July of dollar-volume of new construction contracts, some \$4.2 billion. Two days later common stock averages reached historic heights. Neither the Democratic nor the Republican administrations since 1946 have had available anything like the talent that was available in Washington during the depression. It is inevitable that the greater portion of talented manpower clings to the lucrative posts in private enterprise.

Other changes in our economic order are quite possibly making it more difficult for citizens to be public officeholders. Consider the so-called "common man"—the laborer and the farmer. Increasingly, American laborers have found it economically advantageous to become organized. Organized labor holds to seniority

<sup>8</sup> 28 *U.S. News & World Report* 12 No. 3 (Jan. 20, 1950).

<sup>9</sup> "Democracy," 3 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* 77 (Macmillan Co., 1937).

<sup>8</sup> See especially, *The Big Change: America Transforms Itself: 1900-1950*, Harper and Brothers, 1952. 308 p.

<sup>9</sup> James B. Reston, *New York Times*, April 15, 1956.



as a basic tenet. To maintain it, a man cannot quit a job to chance a short tenure of public office. Few, bereft of seniority, can afford to start over again in a few years with a new employer. Fringe benefits (such as supplementary pension rights and longer vacations, which increase with length of service) cause men to weigh carefully switching jobs, even for more prestige and better pay.

Labor's leadership, it might be expected, could now be drawn into both appointive and elective positions at all levels of government. At least indirectly the laboring man would thus hold office. But in organized labor, as in business, large-scale organization and progress within it demand constant attention to duties. The Taft-Hartley Act caused the late Martin Durkin's principal trouble as Secretary of Labor; competition for his vacated post as President of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe-Fitting Industry, A. F. of L., reputedly also made him uneasy in the secretaryship. In the Department of Labor an assistant secretary's position reserved for a unionist has long been vacant.<sup>10</sup> Purportedly, top-level labor leaders cannot be detached for such a long assignment. The businessman's high compensation in private employment has made him reluctant to take public office; labor leaders may be reluctant for the same reason. Dave Beck, to cite one good example, receiving a \$50,000 a year salary and such perquisites as a rent-free, tax-free home purchased by his teamsters, might understandably shy from public service with its modest monetary return.

The American farmer has long been a ubiquitous figure in public office. The owner of a family-sized farm upon reaching a degree of prosperity "eased up" at about fifty years of age. He often devoted his leisure to the county board or state legislature. Occasionally, he attained a statewide executive office or went to Congress. Changes are taking place in agriculture which may cause a drought in this wellspring of democratic staffing. Individual farms, according to the United States Census, are 20 per cent fewer than in 1920 and their decline in number continues. Farming becomes ever more a large-scale enterprise. Since 1920 there has been

more than a 45 per cent increase in the size of the average farm. The owner or manager of a large farming operation is as tied to daily duties as is his managerial counterpart in the city. Employees on such farms are no more free to come and go in response to the demands of public service than are industrial workers. It is not wise to generalize too much from limited observation. However, indications are that farmer officeholders are coming to be the marginal variety of farmers. They often live on poor land, own a comparatively small acreage, and are little interested in scientific farming. Such farmers are happy to augment slender incomes by serving in government jobs. The successful agriculturalist is not so available for public office as he once was.

Our economic system, with its high degree of organization, the interdependence of its workers, and the desire of the individual for security and the difficulty of attaining it on one's own, makes attending to private affairs and, at the same time, taking a hand in public business ever more difficult in the United States. It is little wonder that the Second Hoover Commission strongly concurred with its Task Force's conclusion that "... we have not as a people maintained public service as an attractive or even a durable pursuit."

#### *Government Staffing Not a New Problem*

**F**OR self-governing people this problem is not a new one. Pericles discussed it in the "Funeral Oration." Citizens in ancient Greece did not constitute a true leisure class. They worked and lived on a narrow margin. Yet they had more leisure than we do for several reasons: first, they took it; second, their economic machine was not so tightly geared; and third, they paid for it with a lower standard of living. Participation in government, nevertheless, was difficult for them. Pericles' chief domestic enactments brought about payments from the public treasury to citizens for state services. Thus, the great Greek statesman made possible participation in governmental office by the whole community of the Athenian people. This he believed was essential if Athenians were to be truly self-governing and were to govern with wisdom. His measures to remunerate the people for public service were criticized as appealing to the baser instincts of the

<sup>10</sup> Joseph A. Loftus, *New York Times*, July 25, 1956.

mob, although the criticism is entirely out of keeping with all that is known of Pericles. Plato and Aristotle, without being spokesmen of any class, in confronting the conundrum presented by self-governing people who must at the same time earn a living, moved toward advocacy of an aristocracy. They made citizenship more and more explicitly a privilege, a prerogative of those who had property and the leisure to enjoy the luxury of political position.

In Rome, there was no very effective democratic participation in the Republic. The important public offices were held by people who were sufficiently wealthy that they did not need to engage in business. Senators were specifically precluded from participating in business. Governors of the provinces were chosen from among the rich senators. Many other offices which were prerequisite to a senatorship, such as dictator, consul, praetor, and quaestor, evidently were held by men of wealth, too, since these jobs were steppingstones to the Senate. Jurors and tax-gatherers were drawn from a class of people called equites who originally were aristocrats. Eventually, this class came to include plebians who had become rich. Some authorities attribute the ascendancy of the Senate in the Republic largely to the fact that senators could devote their capacity and their time to public affairs. Of course, all citizens could vote and citizenship was gradually extended. While there was no question about the right of all the people to govern, they seldom did so.

In staffing their self-government, the ancients had one great advantage that the United States has never had. The state for them was supreme among human institutions. To govern was to be godlike, and political service was the crown of human blessedness. From its inception our government has placed emphasis upon the individual's self-realization. Admittedly, some of our founding fathers, steeped as they were in the classics, had some Ciceronian spirit. John Adams even communicated it to his descendants. After the Civil War the rush for money, lands, minerals, and any form of control that would lead to power for the individual even overwhelmed the Adamsons. Henry decided "his world was dead." Brooks chided his countrymen to no avail in an essay entitled "The Revolt of Modern Democracy against Standards

of Duty." But Americans had so far rebelled against individual self-sacrifice that they deeply resented being reminded of it.

Brooks Adams' conclusion was confirmed by the historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, who wrote,

... in all this flux and freedom and novelty and vast spaces, the pioneer did not sufficiently consider the need of disciplined devotion to the government which he himself created and operated.<sup>11</sup>

Turner also wrote,

Individualism in America has allowed a laxity in regard to governmental affairs which has rendered possible the spoils system and all the manifest evils that follow from the lack of a highly-developed civic spirit.<sup>12</sup>

#### *Political and Career Executives*

AS THE national government actually was plagued by job seekers before civil service reform, obviously the problem of staffing the government must have been more a matter of quality than quantity. It still is with respect to the level of positions that are the concern of this discussion. (Of course, it is always difficult to assess quality in people and particularly so in one era as contrasted with another.) From a reading of current studies, such as Robert J. Donovan's *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*,<sup>13</sup> this impression is confirmed. Congressmen and the Republican National Committee were demanding more jobs for the party faithful while members of the Cabinet were at a loss to find competent top-side recruits for positions that no one would have manned by civil servants. In filling these positions, according to Donovan's account, competency was sought first and political affiliation was cleared later, all too late for the satisfaction of Republican National Chairman, Leonard Hall, and some members of Congress. On one day Hall was asked to clear with local leaders five appointees. To his dismay all five were Democrats!

In spite of Chairman Hall's predicament "on one day," there is no doubt that on other days he and his predecessors in both parties have

<sup>11</sup> *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1948), p. 356.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> Harper, 1956.

paid many political debts by filling offices of great responsibility with party faithful with little by way of talent to recommend them. This is easier to do when talent is scarce. When political officeholders lack the full capacity that their jobs require, further problems in staffing democracy arise. For then, higher civil servants depart from functions proper to them. They not only come to formulate policy clandestinely, but to advocate it openly. Under these circumstances, civil servants often are elevated to positions which have to deal so largely with policy as to be entirely inappropriate for careerists.

Fortunately, several developments have awakened all concerned to the fact that manpower shortages have contributed to the blurring of the inevitable shadowland between policy and administration. First, the publication of Paul H. Appleby's seminal book, *Policy and Administration*,<sup>14</sup> brought home to many how policy and administration are inevitably intermingled in all governmental jobs. Second, there was a change of administration in Washington. As a consequence, a number of officials who thought of themselves as higher civil servants were considered to be Democratic politicians. Third, the Hoover Commission's *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service*<sup>15</sup> (ignoring Appleby's subtle truth) pragmatically emphasized the need to increase the supply of experienced political executives (although it didn't say how this was to be done) and admonished career administrators to keep out of political activities (although this is easier said than done). It also recommended a senior civil service with career status instead of job status, a recommendation yet to be accomplished. The Hoover Commission itself emphatically called for a clearer division between noncareer executives and career administrators.<sup>16</sup>

The confusion into which thinking had fallen about the relationship between policy and administration should have been clarified by these developments. The problem of staffing democracy top side, however, has not been

brought much nearer solution. This is not to depreciate the idea of a senior civil service and other improvements in the national civil service that have been advocated. Important as is a career service open to talents for governmental employees in a democracy, it will always be only a partial answer to staffing democracy. There must be capable political executives as well. Civil service is neither reserved to democracy nor original with it. Vigorous monarchs in Prussia and France inaugurated civil service. The staffing of government with expertness will always be associated with such names as Frederick Wilhelm I, Richelieu, and Louis XIV.

So much for the thought that government in the United States is not so well staffed as it should be. So much too for the further hypothesis that owing to the directions in which our economic system has developed, the problem of staffing our political democracy has become more difficult. Is this situation truly a dilemma or are there good and simple solutions?

#### *Toward a Solution of the Staffing Problem*

**I**N A democracy the people are by definition to be the functionaries. If they are not, the whole concept of democratic government is defeated. They must therefore in some way be induced to run the government. The Hoover Commission's *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service* said the most practical thing that can be done and done quickly for such inducement would be to lessen the gap between federal and private pay. Congress has kept federal pay scales competitive for clerical work, the trades, and other routine jobs. But in remunerating political officeholders and people in the upper ranks of the civil service, the national government has not even kept abreast of more progressive cities and state governments, not to mention private employment. This is true in spite of recent increases for federal judges and congressmen and still more recent raises for top policy executives. In view of the economic circumstances of the country, particularly the compensation of top management in industry, and, indeed, of even middle management people, labor leaders, and hourly-rated employees, recent governmental salary

<sup>14</sup> University of Alabama Press, 1949.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

<sup>16</sup> Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Personnel and Civil Service* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 30-34.



improvement on the strategic top level might be characterized as too late and too little.

The inadequacy is suggested by the departure from the government of the directors of the Public Health Service and the United States Office of Education within a fortnight of the last general salary increase. The former went to private industry at an increase in compensation of over \$40,000 a year; the latter went to another public jurisdiction, a metropolitan school district, at double his salary in the nation's capital.

In terms of budget and personnel, the federal government is the nation's biggest enterprise. Its administration is managed by some 1,500 top executives, exclusive of the foreign service. Compensation for these executives ranges from \$25,000 for the heads of the ten executive departments to \$16,000 for the chiefs of major bureaus; only the President and Supreme Court Justices receive more.

Of the 1,515 people in this group, 838 are political appointees and 677 are in the civil service. The top executive group includes the heads of federal departments and executive agencies, members of independent boards and commissions, under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and general counsels of departments, presidential aides, chiefs of major bureaus, and the top administrative posts in the civil service.

In approaching salary improvements for key governmental jobs, Congress, out of political wisdom, is coy. Salaries have to become so patently inadequate that the press and enlightened public opinion virtually demand that pay boosts be made. Only then is action taken. This situation prevails with respect to revising congressional salaries and produces an undesirable secondary effect; Congress is reluctant to revise salaries in the executive branch above its own. Before criticizing congressional caution in this matter, it must be recalled that the members are experts in judging what the public will tolerate. The sentiment that the best government is the least government still has its adherents among businessmen and individualists in rural areas, small towns, and elsewhere. Low salaries for officials is a corollary of this philosophy. Furthermore, to the man with a modest income, congressmen and Cabinet officers, however inadequately paid in view of their responsibilities and uncertain futures,

seem to be well compensated. Those that might be expected to enlighten the public upon this governmental shortcoming, as upon others, are themselves serving in notably poorly-paid professions. Professors and publicists are not so sensitive as they might be to this particular weakness in our governmental system.

In the spring of 1956, the National Planning Association conducted a poll on compensation of top executives in the federal government.<sup>17</sup> It questioned its trustees, members of its committees, and its National Council—purportedly a cross section of leaders from the fields of agriculture, business, labor, and the professions. The results were revealing. Virtually all the NPA group thought federal executives should have a competence on the same level or of a greater level than those in private enterprise. Inconsistently, only 71 per cent of the respondents thought federal executives received too little compensation, 24 per cent thought they received the right amount. This was before the July, 1956 salary increase. From this sampling of the so-called leaders of America, indications are that more is expected of government officials but that that more is expected to be had for less. Admittedly, the NPA group, especially business leaders, were in general for considerably higher salaries. Labor and agricultural respondents were somewhat less generous. When asked to list the salary which would be "most appropriate" for five different executive positions graded from Cabinet officers to chiefs of important bureaus, the respondents ranged from a low of \$10,000 to a high of \$100,000. Seventy-six per cent favored salaries above \$25,000 for heads of executive departments; 52 per cent were in favor of salaries in excess of \$25,000 for all five positions.

Serving democracy should never become a road to riches. But, narrowing the differences between public and private salaries might reduce the number of career executives who leave Washington for higher paying jobs in private employment. Better pay might make it possible for some persons to accept government employment who cannot afford to do so now. Unsatisfactory alternatives aside from less than adequate staffing are too great dependence upon men retired or approaching retirement or upon

<sup>17</sup> 4 *Looking Ahead* No. 5, 5-6 (June 1956).

temporary appointees from education, industry, and labor. Both alternatives, and especially the latter, create great likelihood of conflict of interest charges.

Because of conflict of interest statutes, the prospect of the national government borrowing either retired or active businessmen in great numbers for the executive branch is not good. After the experiences of Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, former Deputy Secretary Roger M. Kyes, and former Service Secretaries Harold E. Talbott and Robert T. Stevens, other businessmen with stockholdings in corporations doing business with the government will undoubtedly be more reluctant than ever to accept federal assignments. These men had to dispose of their stocks at considerable tax disadvantage before the Senate would confirm them. That they were forced to do so by a Republican controlled Congress indicates the degree of political sensitivity in conflict of interest situations. This is further emphasized by the resignation of Secretary Talbott in August, 1955, because of embarrassment to the Eisenhower administration arising out of a Senate-approved, half-severed business connection. Four days before accepting Talbott's resignation President Eisenhower told a news conference that he did not believe any man could "properly hold public office merely because he is not guilty of an illegal act." "Actions of a public servant must be 'impeccable, both from the standpoint of law and from the standpoint of ethics.'"

Approximately one out of every ten adults in the wage-earning years from 21 to 65 in the United States is a stockholder. This statistic indicates at least one possible limiting effect upon topside recruitment if we are to carry strict interpretation of the conflict of interest statutes to the ultimate.

About conflict of interest statutes Congress is ambivalent. It cannot resist the political opportunities to challenge executive officers of the government, especially if they are of the opposite party. Demands for a tighter law are heard frequently. At the same time, Congress recognizes the importance of businessmen recruits and is tempted to liberalize the statutes. In renewing the Defense Production Act, it authorized a new executive reserve corps. The contributions of without-compensation em-

ployees are sometimes lauded in the halls of Congress.<sup>18</sup>

In 1954, after making a survey of business executives in twenty major cities, *Fortune Magazine* concluded that it is not easy "even for an administration that is pro-business in sentiment" to get business executives to come to Washington. This is particularly true of industry men who lack independent means. The Hoover Commission in its report on *Personnel and Civil Service*, which considered the requirements for disposal of personal holdings, concluded conflict of interest statutes constituted a "particular obstacle to attracting competent men." The commission recommended a review of existing laws to determine whether their intent could be "better achieved by . . . more positive means which would encourage rather than discourage entry of competent men into public life." So much for the suggestion of another "way out," albeit one a bit vague.

The United States might exploit further the possibilities of nonmonetary and nonmaterial satisfactions to attract capable men and women into the government. Undoubtedly, men are drawn to government service by considerations of patriotism, power, influence, and prestige. While these motivations may help in the recruitment of Cabinet officers,\* congressional candidates, and Governors, at the level of service just below these officials they are more apt to make appeal to people with great egos than to people with great talents. Because of our constitutional provision against giving "titles of nobility," one incentive found helpful in the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere is barred.

The so-called fringe benefits bill passed by the Eighty-third Congress took a significant step in the right direction. Now a federal employee may receive both awards of honor and monetary awards up to \$25,000 for exceptional service, superior performance, or for making improvements in the operation of the government. Otherwise there is nothing in our official

<sup>18</sup> See *Congressional Record, Proceedings & Debates of the Senate*, July 19, 1955, pp. 9362 ff. and Aug. 2, 1955, pp. 11053 ff.; Senator Kefauver's Judiciary Subcommittee, Aug. 22, 1955, *New York Times*, and Hearings on "Defense Production Act Amendments of 1955," before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session, June 21, 22, & 27, 1955.

system, at present, based specifically on the premise that a civilian may work for honor instead of for cash. The Legion of Merit, now limited to civilians for giving outstanding service in wartime, suggests that something similar be done in peacetime.

Finally, education might provide a way out. When there is a problem in our national life, it is a common practice either to blame education or to call upon it for help. Sometimes both things are done and with justification. In keeping with this tradition, higher education might be looked to for more help in solving the problem of staffing democracy top side. Citizenship clearing houses and programs of training for public administration need to be empha-

sized. Great universities, especially publicly-supported universities—and particularly their departments of political science—have a definite obligation with respect to both these approaches.

But, at bottom, the responsibility of the universities is not to be discharged by one discipline alone or by institutions of the public variety acting alone. *All* universities and *all* disciplines must inculcate in *all* students an awareness of the inescapably personal character of governmental responsibility in a democracy. They must also develop an abiding conscience with respect to that responsibility and to what Walter Lippman has so aptly designated "The Public Philosophy."

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#### Public Personnel Administration of the Future

The public personnel administration of the next generation will be characterized by several developments. The first thing that will happen will be the obliteration of the ideological and psychological barriers which have separated central personnel agencies and line management. This will come about naturally as personnel practices become more mature. As our political culture assumes a higher moral and ethical level, the need for the old protective, negative type of civil service will tend to disappear. Furthermore, if more professionally trained people get into personnel jobs their scientific curiosity will goad them into asking how well they are doing.

Public personnel administration will give more attention to making the administrative machine a dynamic and productive instrumentality. This will be a problem of personnel administration because it is primarily a matter of human motivation. The personnel departments of the future will find greater staffs for training, placement, guidance, and research.

Public management in America is just beginning to enter mature manhood. Its first period of young adulthood, up to now, has been prologue. The scientific background for a profession of public personnel administration has not existed until now. The new research oriented social sciences are beginning to achieve that maturity which medicine began to achieve 75 years ago. The public personnel administration of tomorrow will be grounded in these social sciences just as the medicine of today is grounded in bacteriology, biochemistry, and biophysics.

—John M. Pfiffner, "The Personnel Function in Government," 17 *Public Personnel Review* 181 (October, 1956). This issue of the *Review* is titled "Perspective in Public Personnel Administration; A Collection of Essays Commemorating the Golden Anniversary of the Civil Service Assembly, 1906-1956."

# Disclosure of Information: A Coin with Two Sides

By LEONARD M. FRIEDMAN

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**M**Y EXPERIENCE with the delicate and controversial field of public information has been that of a public lawyer who is called upon to advise state agencies on (1) what information they must disclose; (2) what information they may not disclose; and (3) what information they need not disclose.

## *The Ground Rules*

**T**HE basic approach of California law is that the papers, files, and records in the hands of public agencies are available for public inspection and disclosure. This approach is subject to two exceptions: cases where the Legislature has expressly prohibited disclosure (e.g., income tax returns) and cases where a vaguely defined concept called "public policy" imposes limitations on disclosure.

To place government information in the large category of compulsory disclosure is an easy and popular decision to make. I would be gilding the lily to extol the virtues of disclosure. Everyone knows its virtues. A decision in favor of disclosure is regarded as a democratic decision and evokes the acclaim of press and public alike. The people who seek the information are pleased. The press is pleased because its access to news sources is maintained. The public is pleased because, very rightly, it identifies secret government with dictatorial government.

The first exception to the general rule—where disclosure is prohibited by express statute—does not cause much trouble. The admin-

istrator is untroubled because he is not called upon to make an unpleasant decision. The legislature has made it for him. The press is not troubled because—in the usual case—it agrees with the legislature's decision. Nobody, private citizen, legislator, or newspaper publisher, wants to give the rest of the public a look at his personal income tax return.

Then we come to the third class of cases—those in which the records need not be divulged, or at least need be divulged only to persons who can demonstrate a legitimate interest. Here is where all the shooting starts. At this point the administrator is pushed into some painful soul-searching. Will indiscriminate publicity harm the mission or function of his agency? Will it injure private citizens whose information he possesses? At this point, the press is alerted to keep this particular news channel open and to forestall the possibility of other clogged channels. The legislature too is concerned, lest this instance of nondisclosure tend toward an arrogation of power by officials of the executive branch. Finally, the public is, or should be, alerted to prevent the silent spread of governmental secrecy.

In this third situation—where the right of access is restricted or qualified—the administrator, or his legal adviser, or the court which is reviewing their decision turns to the standard provided by law. Unfortunately, the standard now stated by the California statutes is so skimpy and so flexible that it amounts to only a vague statement of attitude rather than a ground rule by which concrete decisions may be made. The basic statute is Section 1227 of the *California Government Code*, which states: "The public records and other matters in the

NOTE: This paper was given at a meeting of the Western Governmental Research Association at Sacramento, California, October 19, 1956.

office of any officer, except as otherwise provided, are at all times during office hours open to inspection of any citizen of the State." The California courts have said that not every writing in the possession of a public agency is a public record, that the "other matters" are matters in which the entire public has an interest.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the courts have said that public policy imposes a confidential character upon certain communications and documents even though they are in the hands of a public agency.<sup>2</sup>

"Public policy," considered as a standard by which to make specific decisions, is itself a vague concept. It permits subjective judgments to guide the decision. Your idea of the requirements of public policy may differ from mine, and that of the courts' may differ from ours. Subjective judgments are apt to be shaped by considerations of personal interest. The few instances which have come before the California courts and the more frequent situations which have been passed upon in the published opinions of the Attorney General reveal a fairly pragmatic case-by-case approach.

I suppose they can be summarized by two rough rules of thumb. First, if the information reveals what actions public officers have taken and how they have been administering the public's business, then public policy does not deny, and usually demands, its disclosure. Second, if the information concerns the lives and the personal affairs of private persons, then public policy sometimes demands that its disclosure be limited to those whose objective is connected with the public purpose which required the collection of the information in the first instance.

#### *Some Further Questions*

IT WOULD be very comfortable to complete this discussion by mentioning some specific disclosure problems. It seems to me, however, that discussions such as the present one have little value if we fear to tackle some sanctified fetishes. I feel constrained, in all humility, to

venture out into the field of ideas and to raise a few contentious questions. These questions may not be popular with those who crusade for what they call "the people's right to know." They are palpable questions, however, and should not be ignored. And since some of my observations are open to misinterpretation, I want to announce a temporary divorce from my employer, the Attorney General, and to absolve him from any responsibility for these remarks.

One of the war cries in this field is "secrecy in government." When documents in the hands of government agencies reveal what actions public officials have taken and how they have been running the public's business, such documents fall into a class which the law calls "the written acts or records of the acts" of public officers. It is at this point that secrecy in government is acutely involved. At the state and local levels, where national security is a negligible or absent factor, the decision is rarely in favor of secrecy.

This same slogan, "secrecy in government," is also applied to private information which the government has collected. Public agencies are now in possession of a monumental assortment of data concerning the personal lives and affairs of individual citizens. There is hardly an adult citizen who has not deposited some detail of his personal life in the vast impersonal file cabinets of government agencies. Certainly the slogan "secrecy in government" has much less validity as applied to that kind of information. Non-governmental demands for this type of personal information are usually made for commercial purposes. Those who seek it have a very human tendency to wrap themselves in the American flag instead of standing squarely and unhyphenally on their economic interests.

Let us take an easy example. When I applied to the state for a vehicle operator's license, I did not give the state my address for the sake of a collection agency which seeks me to dun me for a bill. The bill may be a legitimate debt. If, however, I want to hide out from my creditors, that is between my creditors and me. It is no affair of the State Department of Motor Vehicles, which is engaged in a totally different business. The point of the matter is that, as a price for the privilege of driving my auto-

<sup>1</sup> *Whelan v. Superior Court*, 114 Cal. 548, 46 Pac. 468; *Coldwell v. Board of Public Works*, 187 Cal. 510, 202 Pac. 879.

<sup>2</sup> *Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms*, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 Pac. 2d 101.



mobile, I have been forced by law to provide the government with information which other private persons may use for their own commercial advantage. If the government keeps my income tax return out of the hands of the collection agent, by what logic does it hand him my address?

Private information in the hands of government may be used for a variety of commercial purposes completely unrelated to the public need which impelled the collection of the information. Several years ago, for example, a food firm requested the State Department of Public Health to arrange office space for an indefinite period for thirty-five of its employees who would examine vital statistics records for direct mail solicitation purposes.

When I refer to business firms who demand access to private information in public offices for commercial use, I am including the newspapers. I feel a bit sour when I hear spokesmen for the press insist upon "the people's right to know." The subconscious process by which newspaper publishing corporations identify themselves with "the people" is only slightly less illogical than the mental processes by which some newspapers identify the right of discovery with freedom of the press. Certainly when the documents reveal the actions of public officers, representatives of the press, no less than other citizens, may insist on full disclosure. But when they consist of private revelations collected for governmental purposes, then the right of the press to know is just as limited as that of other citizens.

The motivation which leads publishing firms to identify themselves with popular liberties may be uncovered without training in psychoanalysis. These slogans of "secrecy in government" and "the people's right to know" keep news channels open. Access to news is worth money. At this point, also, there is a certain tendency to hide economic motivations in the cloak of patriotic slogans.

A particularly distasteful example of indiscriminate disclosure occurred a year or two ago, when Senator Langer handed to the press a communication from a private citizen concerning the qualifications of Earl Warren, whose confirmation as Chief Justice of the United States was then pending before Senator Langer's committee. The communication was a

scurrilous, unfounded, false attack upon a man of acknowledged personal integrity. These scandalous, unsupported utterances were splashed in headlines from coast to coast. An even more flagrant example was the recent Weinberger kidnapping case, where one newspaper's insistence upon printing police information may have resulted in the child's murder.

How does it happen that the press can insist on its right, nay its duty, to publish hearsay accusations or information of a personal nature submitted to the government, and yet refuse publication of the names of juvenile offenders? Is not this an insistence on the transfer of the selective function—call it censorship power if you will—out of the hands of the government, which bears a legal responsibility to the public, and into the hands of the newspaper publisher, who has no such responsibility?

Now I am not advocating an increased degree of nondisclosure. I am not arguing for discretionary suppression powers on the part of public officials. They should not be censors and usually they do not want to be. What I am pointing out is that the outcry for disclosure is a coin with two sides. Secret government is one of the hallmarks of the super state. Another hallmark of totalitarianism is the complete subjection of the personal life and the personal affairs of the private individual to the totality. The growing complexity of social needs has called for public programs and laws which draw into government files an ever-increasing mass of personal information which, in a more individualistic age, was regarded as strictly private business. In weighing the disclosure problem as applied to this growing mass of personal-public information, let us not resort to glib slogans. And let us not confuse economic motivations with civil liberties. We should not hasten the day when Big Brother will have his telescreen in every room of the house.

If the decision for or against disclosure is basically a decision of public policy, then the administrative officer should be guided by standards provided by the arbiter of public policy, the legislature. Our present vague laws simply put the administrators on the spot. I have worked with government administrators at the state level long enough to know that they

do not like to be cast in the role of censor and would be much happier with a set of well-conceived statutory guides.

Much of the misunderstanding surrounding problems of disclosure and nondisclosure of information may be attributed to the failure to distinguish between information that records the actions of public officers and that which,

although collected for governmental purposes, reveals the personal affairs of private citizens. An unfortunate tendency to apply the same slogans to both types of information has generated much of the heat and obscured the light needed for a clearer appraisal of official action in giving or withholding information to the public.

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#### Solid Center—Active Circumference

A concluding thought. A few years ago a friend of mine was shown a draft of an essay I was preparing on the development of administrative theory and said that it should be entitled "The Evaporation of Administrative Theory." His point was that public administration had grown so broad, and so involved at the periphery with a multitude of other activities and disciplines, that it was in danger of disappearing completely as a recognizable focus of study. At the time, the worry of my friend—let's call him Fritz Morstein Marx—struck me as misplaced. And of course the emphasis in these lectures has been upon the desirability of expanding the range of our professional concerns. I still think this is desirable. But I have a nagging worry of late, a fear that all is not as healthy as it should be at the center of the discipline. Partly what I sense is lower morale or élan, stemming from the fact that the past ten years have not been notable ones for the growth of public service personnel or prestige. Beyond that is a softening of fiber associated with the decay of old, confidence-inspiring orthodoxies. I would not trade the present situation for one of greater self-confidence based upon dogmatic belief in a professional creed. I do suggest the need for the hardest sort of intellectual work at the center of our discipline. Synthesis and integration should accompany exploration and discovery. A healthy discipline has a solid center as well as an active circumference.

—Dwight Waldo, *Perspectives on Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1956), pp. 136-37.

# Applying Work Measurement to Personnel Administration

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FEDERAL agencies have evidenced an increasing interest since the end of World War II in effective planning, coordination, and control for personnel administration. Similar interest has been voiced by congressional committees. Congress has been of the opinion that since personnel administration in the executive branch of the government is based primarily on legislation and Civil Service Commission regulations, a valid common denominator is available for evaluating the relative efficiency with which this function is performed by individual agencies.

Federal agencies have recognized that the basic objective of personnel administration in the executive branch of the government is to contribute to effective management. However, many agencies have been of the opinion that the scope of personnel programs and the personnel staff required to accomplish this broad objective vary not only with the number of employees administered but with certain basic factors which affect the scope of personnel programs required to meet the responsibilities of individual agencies. The attention of these agencies has been focused increasingly on the establishment of a definitive basis for determining manpower requirements for personnel administration which will recognize their individual characteristics.

## *Major Factors Affecting Manpower Requirements*

THE agencies have been of the opinion that several factors bear particularly on the size of the personnel staff.

*Mission of the Agency.* The functions administered by federal agencies vary from a relatively small number of simple nature to a large number of highly complex nature. They range from largely clerical to highly technical and scientific. The wide range of work performed by agencies is paralleled by extreme variation in the personnel programs and the personnel office work load required to recruit, classify positions, and train the work force.

*Scope of Field Activities.* The functions of some federal agencies are performed completely in Washington; the functions of others are performed largely by activities located outside of Washington. In many instances a majority of the decentralized activities of an agency may be large enough to be administered by personnel offices under the jurisdiction of these activities. In some instances, however, the size of these personnel offices may preclude the efficiency of operation and economy of staffing which is attainable by larger personnel offices. In certain instances, it may be more economical for larger nearby activities which maintain personnel offices to provide personnel services to the small activities of an agency.

Although a decentralized arrangement may be the most economical, in view of an agency's field activities, travel requirements will result in additional work for the central personnel office. Agencies whose field activities are widely dispersed geographically, particularly if they vary in size and mission, also find it necessary to provide comprehensive regulatory and procedural instructions and to establish a system for



evaluating compliance with these instructions and the quality of personnel programs.

*Stability of Agency Programs.* In a new agency persons responsible for personnel administration are faced with the problem of establishing and staffing personnel offices and concurrently recruiting a work force and developing a personnel program. In these circumstances it is more difficult to achieve efficiency and economy of personnel administration than in an established program. Major expansions and contractions of the work force and frequent changes in organization and physical location of activities also have a direct effect on personnel office work load.

#### *The Interagency Study*

As a result of agency interest, the Bureau of the Budget agreed to sponsor a work measurement study in personnel administration in 1949. The objective of this study was to ascertain whether personnel office staff requirements could be determined on the basis of work load experience. Under Bureau of the Budget sponsorship, the Army, Navy, and Air Force participated in a joint work measurement study during the period July-September 1949. The major functions of personnel administration were reviewed and their component operations defined. All operations were identified as measurable either in terms of a work unit count or, because of their basic characteristics, in terms of time spent in performing them.

Each of the three agencies used statistical sampling techniques to select a group of its personnel offices for participation in the study. The sample was designed to insure that these offices were representative of agency characteristics of size range, quality of program, mission, and geographic dispersion. The Air Force sample included 21 personnel offices administering approximately 60 per cent of its work force. The number of employees administered by these offices ranged from 300 to 21,000. The Air Force missions represented included aircraft procurement, supply and maintenance, research and development, military training, and base support for the various operational air commands. The personnel program at each sample installation was average or better in

quality as evidenced by on-the-spot evaluations of Headquarters USAF survey teams.

The availability of this type of information resulted in its use by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the development of performance-type budget estimates for personnel administration for the fiscal year 1951. The analysis used in developing these budget estimates demonstrated conclusively that the time spent on personnel programs and operations could be measured. The analysis also substantiated the view that it was possible to establish a valid relationship between personnel office staffing requirements and work output.

The "work measurement package" used in the study was reviewed in 1953 by a work group consisting of representatives of the Civil Service Commission and other federal agencies. It was revised specifically to reflect the composite characteristics of federalwide personnel programs and operations and was made available to federal agencies.

Air Force objectives in participating in the joint project included use of the results of the work measurement study to establish a continuing program for staffing for personnel administration. The plan to implement this objective included the development and use of staffing guides to determine manpower requirements for personnel office staffing and the use of work measurement to effect management improvement in personnel office operations.

#### *The Air Force Staffing Program*

It was evident that the development and validation of agencywide staffing guides would require information on work load experience throughout the Air Force to supplement data obtained during the work measurement study. An agencywide work load and staffing reporting system was therefore established in January 1950. This system required only the reporting of work units accomplished in those operations measured during the work measurement study. Data collected during the three-month work measurement study were analyzed through the use of statistical regression techniques. This analysis resulted in the establishment of time factors for each operation included in the study. These tentative staffing guides were used throughout the Air Force in

staffing new or expanding existing personnel offices during the Korean emergency.

The Air Force staffing program for personnel administration was established formally in July 1951. The program is based on the application of agencywide staffing guides to the work load accomplished by each personnel office. The staffing guides relate (1) given quantities of work units to the amount of time needed for their completion and (2) the amount of time needed for the remainder of the personnel program in proportion to the computed time required for operations measured in terms of work units.

Several of the more significant characteristics of the staffing guides are believed of particular interest. The guides when applied to individual personnel offices reflect average staffing requirements. These requirements represent "weighted averages" since they change in value with the volume of work produced. Since the time factors provided by the guides represent average allowances, they are not applied rigidly in individual instances. The actual staffing of each personnel office must also take account of the quality and scope of its personnel program and characteristics of activities administered. The guides are generally quantitative, but they are qualitative to the extent that they reflect the composite experience of all types of personnel offices in the Air Force operating under many varying conditions.

#### *Assignment of Responsibilities*

THE Air Force recognized that, to be successful, an agencywide staffing program must be a cooperative effort in which the respective responsibilities of field installations, major commands, and Headquarters USAF are delineated specifically. It recognized also that continuing Headquarters USAF review of the operation of the program and guidance to commands and installations were essential to the success of the program.

Headquarters USAF reviews quarterly the reported work load throughout the Air Force in relation to the staffing guides in order to determine the staffing position of each major command and its installations. The results of these analyses, including information concerning a typical work load reported and trends in the

functional distribution of staff, are furnished to each major command. These analyses furnish Headquarters USAF with information necessary for ascertaining the over-all Air Force position and insure the ready availability of this information for use in program planning. Data are also available for congressional committees upon request. Headquarters USAF survey teams make staffing recommendations during their periodic evaluation of individual personnel office programs by applying the staffing guides to the work load experience of the installations, taking into account such factors as quality of program, scope of activities, and characteristics specific to each installation.

Major commands are responsible for review of and action on the staffing of their installations. They are assisted in meeting these responsibilities by the periodic analyses furnished by Headquarters USAF and reports of

#### *Placement and Employee Relations*

<i>Work Unit:</i>	<i>Average Monthly Workload</i>	<i>Staffing Allowance (Man-years)</i>	<i>Actual Staff (Man-years)</i>
Number of outside applicants screened	425	4.1	
Number of employees considered for internal placement	1,687		
Number of basic positions serviced	4,090		
Number of separation cases considered	157	0.4	
Number of test sessions	584	3.2	
Number of contacts with supervisors	358	1.0	
Number of employees counseled	307	0.7	
Assigned strength	13,387	1.2	
Number of personal contacts	159	0.2	
Subtotal		10.8	
<i>Other Related Operations:</i>			
Staff services and clerical and stenographic services		14.1	
Total		24.9	26.0

examination of installation programs by Headquarters USAF survey teams and the Civil Service Commission. These analyses furnish an Air Forcewide frame of reference for intercommand comparisons and also provide data on each command.

Personnel officers at the installations are responsible for determining their staffing needs through application of the staffing guides to work load experience, supplemented by consideration of information on projected plans, recommendations and action taken by major commands, recommendations of Headquarters USAF survey teams, and local problems. Personnel officers also use the staffing program for program planning and evaluation and for continuing review of personnel office operations to achieve management improvement.

The Air Force has developed a work load and staffing report form to assist personnel officers in determining their staffing needs. An example of the use of the form in the area of placement and employee relations is shown on page 16.

#### *Workload Relationship Tables*

**T**HE total plan for the staffing program included the analysis of the reported work load of the entire Air Force for a period of sufficient length to insure that it was representative and valid. This analysis furnished the basis for the development of workload relationship tables as supplements to the staffing guides. These tables provide:

1. Identification of interrelated personnel office work load areas and the extent of their interrelationship.
2. Average work load data for use in work load comparison and program planning.
3. Factual criteria for projecting work load.
4. A basis for determining future staffing requirements by relating projected work load to the staffing guides.

This phase of the staffing program was completed in December 1953. The tables have been used in conjunction with the staffing guides and information concerning organizational plans and programs to predict future work load and staffing requirements by installations, commands, and Headquarters USAF and to identify specifically where and how personnel man-

power is being utilized. A typical use of these tables is to predict the number of applicants that it will be necessary to interview in filling a vacant position. Similar projections of work load can be made for all personnel office operations.

#### *Keeping the Program Up To Date*

**T**HE Air Force recognized that the continued effectiveness of its staffing program would depend primarily on how well the staffing guides reflected current personnel program and procedural requirements. A maintenance system was therefore established as an integral part of the staffing program. A major purpose of the periodic analyses by Headquarters USAF has been to ascertain the validity of the time allowances reflected in the staffing guides, related to changes in personnel program requirements, and the need for a total work remeasurement study in one or more operations.

Plans for the conduct of the first work remeasurement study since establishment of the staffing program were formulated early in 1954. Views and recommendations were solicited throughout the Air Force and they were carefully analyzed to insure that the study would recognize to the maximum extent possible personnel office experience in use of the guides.

The plan as developed was designed to accomplish two basic objectives: (1) to identify changes in program and operational requirements which had occurred since the original study and to remeasure the time expended in performing personnel office operations, and (2) to identify factors which analyses of operation under the current guides indicated needed further study. These factors will vary with the conditions prevailing at the time of each remeasurement study.

To insure measurement of all activities performed by personnel offices and to develop work cycles representing the component operations of each function, the major functions of the personnel program were identified and defined as follows:

1. Direction and administration of the personnel program.
2. Placement and employee relations.
3. Employee and career development.
4. Classification and wage administration.

Function	Operations	Work Units
Employee and Career Development	Supervisory Assistance	Number of contacts with supervisors
		Number of supervision and management training sessions conducted
		Number of orientation training courses completed
	Training Courses	Number of clerical training sessions conducted
		Number of specialized training sessions conducted
		Number of other training sessions conducted
	Follow-up and Evaluation	Number of follow-up and evaluation contacts
	Staff Services and Clerical and Stenographic Services	Allowance based on related areas

5. Processing of records and reports.
6. Local boards of civilian service examiners.
7. Other related operations. (Includes activities performed by some, but not all, personnel offices, i.e., overseas recruiting and processing.)
8. Allowance for travel.
9. Allowance for leave.

An example of the operations encompassed in the function of employee and career development is shown above.

#### *The Sample Used in Remeasuring*

THE Air Force recognized that the validity of the remeasurement study would depend, as had the original measurement study, on the representativeness of the personnel offices included in the sample. The major characteristics used in selecting the sample were: (1) mission of activities administered as reflected by major command jurisdiction, (2) differences of mission within commands, and (3) size of the installation administered. It was believed that these factors would furnish the bases for developing staffing guides which would most effectively reflect wide differences in operating requirements.

One-third of all Air Force personnel offices were included in the remeasurement study. The sample was selected by grouping all personnel offices by major command jurisdiction. Subgroups were established where there were significant differences in mission within a major command. Separate groups were established also to recognize other significant program characteristics. A random selection of

every third personnel office within each group resulted in the initial selection of installations to participate in the study. Where necessary, adjustments were made to insure recognition of the following factors both in the individual major command and in the Air Force as a whole:

1. Quality of the personnel program.
2. Scope of the personnel program.
3. Dispersion of activities administered.
4. Administration of activities of more than one major command.
5. Geographical location of installations.
6. Current staffing position in relation to allowances provided by the staffing guides.

Of the 125 Air Force personnel offices in operation at the time, 47 were included in the final sample. The number of employees administered by these offices ranged from 203 to 19,821; they represented each major command. Total number of employees administered was 122,770, or 48 per cent of the Air Force employees in the continental United States.

The work remeasurement study was conducted during September-November 1954. The results of the study have been used to effect necessary revisions in operations, work units, and staffing guides. Significant accomplishments of the study may be summarized as follows:

1. The data obtained through use of a comprehensive sample have resulted in the development of staffing guides which recognize the wide range and scope of Air Force missions and operations. The identification of installations by size grouping, on which the original guides

were based, has been eliminated, thus providing greater flexibility in the use of the staffing guides.

2. The work units produced provide allowances for many more operations than previously. As a result, time allowances for fewer operations are based on derived relationships.

3. The revised staffing guides are applicable to all personnel offices, regardless of size.

4. The significant development of the personnel program since 1951 has been recognized in the operations upon which the revised staffing guides are based. The revised guides also take into account the complexity of organizations administered in terms of occupational and grade structure.

5. Supplemental data obtained during the study will be analyzed and made available throughout the Air Force as an aid in management. These data will also be of assistance to Headquarters USAF in program planning and analysis.

#### *A Summary of Program Results*

A SUMMARY of what the program has accomplished since its establishment in 1951 will indicate the extent to which work measurement can be applied to personnel administration and its potential contribution to program effectiveness and economy and efficiency of operation.

1. There has been quantitative improvement in personnel office staffing. If the Air Force ratio of personnel office workers to the number of employees administered at March 31, 1950 had continued, 373 more personnel office employees would have been required than were reported on March 31, 1956. If the average annual salary

of an Air Force personnel office employee is applied to this number for a six-year period, savings of \$7,087,400.00 are shown. These savings have been made concurrently with the establishment of new personnel programs, the expansion of many existing programs, and a general improvement in the quality and scope of personnel programs. This improvement is substantiated by reports of examinations made by the Civil Service Commission and Headquarters USAF survey teams.

2. The program has resulted in awareness throughout the Air Force of the need for continuing analyses of the use of personnel office staffs.

3. A uniform frame of reference has been established in the Air Force through definition of the functions and operations of the personnel program. This uniform frame of reference has been a significant factor in determining personnel office staffing requirements and in program planning and evaluation.

4. The general availability of information on the functional distribution of staff and the staffing positions of commands and installations has enabled personnel officers to compare their operations with those of other personnel offices of like size and mission.

5. The staffing program has demonstrated that Air Forcewide improvement in the staffing of personnel offices is possible through the application of sound management practices.

6. The program has been of assistance in activating new personnel offices and in meeting requirements arising from major expansions of the work force, reorganizations, and transfers of responsibilities for personnel administration.



# Changing Problems of United States Representation Abroad

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THE character and functioning of United States representation abroad is becoming an increasingly vital area for study.<sup>1</sup> The world in which the United States now conducts its foreign affairs is drastically different from that which existed before World War II. The role of the United States in the affairs of that world is incomparably more preeminent than ever before. And the kinds of things the United States is doing abroad are different in nature as well as in degree and extensiveness. This paper poses the question of whether the machinery and functioning of our overseas representation are adequate to the newer and heavier tasks involved in American foreign policy execution. My own conviction is that they are not.

This inadequacy derives from several factors. First, we have not fully accepted the long-term, if not permanent, character of our involvement in the affairs of nations and peoples all over the globe. Second, we have not sufficiently recognized the changed character and magnitude of the activities in which we will continue to be engaged overseas. And third, we have not faced the problem of recasting our overseas machinery to fit these needs.

Most recent studies in this general area have

<sup>1</sup> I am using the term "representation" in its broadest sense to include the effectuation of all our policies abroad. While I recognize that tourists, private businessmen, and indeed all American citizens abroad participate, in a sense, in this representation, I am focusing on public or publicly-sponsored agencies and groups in this discussion. I am also concerned mainly in this paper with civilian representation. The present article is drawn largely from a paper read at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., September 1956.

focused on the organization of the Department of State, or on the problems of the Foreign Service as such, while treating agencies and activities outside these areas of emphasis as temporary or as of marginal significance. Henry M. Wriston, author of the now famous Wriston Report, was limited by his terms of reference to the personnel problems of the Foreign Service and the State Department.<sup>2</sup> In his capacity as director of the American Assembly of Columbia University, however, he has recently sponsored a preliminary study of broader problems. I participated in that project, and I am drawing freely on the papers and discussions of the Assembly in the observations which follow.<sup>3</sup>

## *Change in Magnitude and Character of Our Overseas Activities*

THE conventional functions of negotiation, intelligence, official representation, and the discharge of consular duties have grown tremendously in size and scope in recent years, and particularly since the war. With the major exception of top-level negotiations, which are increasingly taken from the individual chief of mission and handled in multilateral conferences or directly by heads of government, each of these areas has shown a large increase in the burden overseas. And in the field of negotiation

<sup>2</sup> *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service, Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954) Department of State Publication No. 5458. Dr. Wriston was chairman of this committee, and the report has come to be known generally as "The Wriston Report."

<sup>3</sup> *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, published by the American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, June, 1956.

below the top policy level, the volume handled by the missions abroad has greatly expanded. Reporting and intelligence operations now involve detailed information on every phase of every country's political and economic life, as well as its military, commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural activities. Effective representation can no longer be limited primarily to the foreign office and the various diplomatic communities in the capital to which the mission is assigned. It must also include regular and assiduous contacts with almost every governmental office, as well as with various influential individuals and groups in business, labor, journalism, education, and religion, to mention only a few of the most important. Effective policy-making in the United States more and more demands this greatly expanded discharge of the conventional and traditional functions of a diplomatic mission abroad.

But even more significant in recent years has been the addition of functions which are essentially new in character. These are the operating functions directly administered abroad by our special program agencies. They flow from the widespread establishment of United States military bases abroad, from the military assistance programs involving defense equipment and training, from the economic aid and technical assistance programs, and from the programs dealing with overseas information and cultural and educational exchange. These programs, essentially new in themselves, have been given an added dimension of complexity by the growth of international organizations in which the United States has come to play an active and leading role. Each of these programs has raised new problems in its own sphere; and together they have raised to a new level of difficulty the old problem of effective coordination and execution. An index of the magnitude of these problems may be found in the expansion of civilian governmental employment abroad from 4,600 at the beginning of World War II to almost 30,000 by the beginning of 1956, of whom more than 10,000 were United States citizens—and this figure excludes the Department of Defense, the Veterans Administration, and related agencies.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Lincoln Gordon, "The Development of United States Representation Overseas," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

#### *Increasing Importance of the Newer Problems*

AT THE time of the Rogers Act of 1924 it was assumed that the responsibilities of the Foreign Service should be the conventional diplomatic and consular functions. Problems were soon presented by the growth of foreign activities in other major departments of the government. In 1927 the Foreign Commerce Service was created in the Department of Commerce, and in 1930 a Foreign Agricultural Service was set up in the Department of Agriculture. The Treasury began to send specialists abroad, known as Treasury attachés. Some time later arrangements were made for the Department of the Interior to send minerals specialists to some overseas posts. These various officers were attached to the embassy in the country to which they were assigned, but they worked in practice as overseas representatives of their own departments.

In 1939, the President, under authority of the Reorganization Act, consolidated the Foreign Commerce and Agricultural Services into the Foreign Service, on the theory that a unified Foreign Service should handle all overseas civilian representation for the government. The advent of World War II prevented any adequate test of the idea of a unified Foreign Service; the emergency civilian agencies in the economic, intelligence, and information activities during the war far overshadowed the regular diplomatic missions and often disregarded them. After the war these agencies, such as the Office of War Information, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Foreign Economic Administration, were dissolved and their functions transferred to old-line agencies including State, Commerce, and Agriculture. It seemed to be generally assumed that the rebuilding and expansion of the Foreign Service on prewar lines could achieve a unified service capable of handling the vast bulk of United States civilian representation overseas.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was to provide the basic pattern of normal, long-run organization and operation. It reaffirmed the doctrine of a unified service, administered by the Department of State but geared to the needs of all civilian agencies, and staffed in such a way as to provide the needed special skills alongside the traditional "generalist." Separate

representation by other agencies abroad was to disappear, although the Treasury was to continue its own system at least temporarily.

This theory was destroyed by two facts in the postwar period. The first was that the Foreign Service was never able to perform its overseas tasks to the satisfaction of the other old-line agencies. Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor thought that their needs were inadequately fulfilled, either because of the lack of specialized skills or because the assignment of priorities put their needs on a lower scale than those of the State Department. Treasury representation remained outside the Foreign Service. In 1954 Agriculture broke away through a provision in the Agricultural Act of that year, and other departments have been pressing similar claims.

The other fact was probably even more important. It was that the wartime operating programs dealing with economic assistance and information activities could not be brought to an end after the war. The agencies which had administered them had been broken up and their functions dispersed among the regular departments. But almost immediately the requirements of the postwar emergency led to the reestablishment of similar overseas operating programs. The cold war brought about the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, which set the pattern of special aid missions independent of the embassy. The legislation setting up the Marshall Plan, which followed shortly, established an independent Economic Cooperation Administration with an administrator of Cabinet rank. The special missions in the field were under the nominal authority of the ambassador to the extent of assuring consistency with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, but differences irreconcilable at the country level could be referred to Washington for settlement, where the ECA Administrator was in effect an equal partner with the Secretary of State. Subsequent legislation dealing with the economic aid activities under the Mutual Security Administration, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the present International Cooperation Administration tended to bring these activities back into a close subordination to the State Department. Even today, however, the ICA as a semi-independent unit of the State Department retains a high degree of organizational autonomy.

The foreign information, cultural, and educational exchange programs presented a similar problem. They, too, were largely a function of the cold war situation, although there had been programs for scientific and cultural cooperation with the Latin American countries before World War II. Beginning with the war these programs became a major official activity all over the globe. The wartime agency, the OWI, was consolidated with the State Department at the close of the war. The U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 set up a broad program within the Department of State, to be administered through the embassies abroad. But with the intensification of the cold war there came a growing conviction that State could not effectively discharge the operating responsibilities of such a massive program. By 1953 it was decided that while the State Department should provide policy leadership, it ought to be divorced from foreign operations as such. In that year, by Executive order, the information and library functions established by the Act of 1948 were transferred to a new independent agency, the United States Information Agency.

#### *Economic Aid and Technical Assistance*

THE problems of economic representation also reflect the new dimensions of difficulty. In the first place, the traditional functions of economic reporting, and of government-to-government negotiating in an attempt to influence economic policy, have become considerably more complicated in the postwar world. And in the second place, the United States continues to pursue the newer economic aid and technical assistance programs which require it to engage in far-flung daily operations involving highly specialized staffs and unprecedented problems of execution. Together, these functions engage the attention of large numbers of overseas personnel. The best estimate is that by early 1956 some 5,000 people were performing economic tasks overseas for the government of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

The position of leadership which the United States has assumed since World War II has fun-

<sup>5</sup> John Lindeman, "Economic Representation Overseas," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, op. cit., p. 46.



damentally changed the role of our economic representatives overseas. Before the war, our foreign economic policy was such that the major function of the overseas staff was to act for and to promote particular domestic economic interests of the United States. For the most part, the job was to provide information for the use of American businessmen who wanted to know about economic conditions abroad, and to negotiate favorable conditions for American investors and exporters.

Since the war, however, our conception of our national interest has required us to adopt a much broader view. The general welfare of the United States now seems inevitably to involve, among other considerations, the economic welfare of other peoples and nations. Whether this is primarily for military or political reasons, or whether it flows also from a broader conception of our own economic welfare over the long term, the fact is that we now give much effort to advancing economic stability and progress in countries other than our own. This is a most significant change in outlook. Of course, we continue to promote the particular domestic economic interests of Americans abroad; but that function must now be performed within the framework of policy which may require the subordination of these particular interests to our broader concern with another country's over-all economic strength and stability. Resulting conflicts of policy are difficult to resolve, and their resolution may be made more difficult because separate overseas staffs are committed to different approaches in dealing with them. A familiar example of this kind of conflict arises in the administration of programs for the disposal of agricultural surplus abroad.

Another aspect of the problem of foreign economic representation is that the execution of the large foreign aid programs, and especially the grants, has tended to dominate the scene. These have been, indeed, the most dramatic of our operations since the war. And yet concentration on them has served to obscure and to some extent to distort other features of the problem. For example, we have tended to have our strongest and best economic personnel concentrated in the countries which were receiving large amounts of grant aid, and have tended to reduce the numbers and skills of

these personnel as the grant programs tapered off. Yet the need for a grant aid program may have only the most coincidental relationship to the question of whether we need strong economic representation in a given country. Indeed, as grant aid diminishes, the negotiating skills required to influence a country's economic policy along lines the United States wishes become more important rather than less. And since these skills are most effectively employed in dealing with persons of economic competence and background, it is not surprising that they can best be brought to bear by negotiators for whose professional competence there is considerable respect. For the most part, however, such skills have been supplied in the postwar period by the special economic missions sent abroad under the Marshall Plan and successor programs, and they are tending to be lost as the special missions are retrenching or closing out their operations.

The whole question of the special mission has been one of the more important problems to arise out of our economic programs. In the early postwar period, given the relative weakness of our regular diplomatic establishment in these specialized spheres, there was a great deal to be said for the special missions. I believe the Marshall Plan was successful largely because there was a high level of professional competence in the missions which did not exist in the economic sections of the embassies, and because the missions were left relatively free to carry out their functions. There were conflicts and there was some confusion, varying widely from one country to another, but on the whole the special mission system worked well in the Marshall Plan period. It certainly brought into the service of the American people overseas a level of professional skill which was not there before in these particular specialties. Moreover, it made possible a freshness of approach and a vigor in execution which might not have been forthcoming from the regular diplomatic establishment. But the question remains whether, if we are to engage in economic operations and in the broader kind of economic representation over an indefinite future, the special mission is the best way of organizing our efforts overseas.

There is not only the confusion of general economic representation with the particular functions of an economic mission to administer

grant aid, and therefore the tendency to overlook the importance of that representation when the aid programs diminish. There is the more important problem of the coordination of U. S. economic policy abroad. The economic operations and activities we undertake in one country are bound to have direct consequences in other countries. If by our aid programs we dispose of agricultural surplus in one country, we inevitably affect other countries who are suppliers of that commodity. If we condition our assistance in a given country by the requirement that it limit its imports of certain items in order to reduce a balance of payments deficit, we may create a balance of payments problem for the countries who depend on exporting that commodity. If we advise a country to adopt certain fiscal or monetary policies, or to alter its exchange rate, we are pursuing a course which will have important consequences for other countries. Yet these are the very kinds of activity our present-day economic representation abroad often involves. We must have people with skills to evaluate the related consequences, and the machinery to coordinate policies, so that sound decisions taking account of all important collateral consequences can be made. Autonomy of the economic mission may make this kind of coordination difficult.

The use of the special mission device may also render more difficult another kind of needed coordination. That is the over-all harmony of economic representation with what is being done in various other fields overseas—the political, the military, the informational. The activities in these various fields should reinforce and strengthen each other; for each to follow its separate way tends to inhibit the effectiveness of the other and to weaken the general execution of United States foreign policy. Strong ambassadorial leadership can minimize these dangers even if there are nominally independent missions at work. But the question remains whether the organization itself ought to enhance or diminish such potential difficulties.

The problems of economic representation have been less clearly seen, paradoxically, precisely because we have had a system of strong economic missions overseas. The level of our economic representation has been high, and its achievements have been notable. The embassies have benefited in many ways from the ex-

istence of the economic staffs of the special missions, and have successfully integrated their better personnel into embassy operations. Without these resources, the embassy problems in economic staffing would have been more evident, and perhaps would have received more adequate attention. Even with this considerable reinforcement, our economic representation abroad is dangerously thin. And in the absence of new legislation facilitating the lateral entry of some of these professionals into the Foreign Service, it is likely to get even thinner.

Proposals to develop the necessary skills through training at the Foreign Service Institute or at leading universities during an officer's career are laudable, but fall far short of the needs. During 1955 only 5 per cent of those who passed their entrance examinations for Class VI had as much as an undergraduate major in economics.<sup>6</sup> It is not possible to make a skilled professional economist with a couple of years of training at scattered points in midcareer.<sup>7</sup> Already 10 per cent of the posts in the Foreign Service are classified as economic, and this does not cover the range of assignments which would be involved if there were to be a unified service performing all overseas economic functions for the United States. Unless the Foreign Service can be supplied with an increasing number of persons who are qualified professionally in this technical and difficult field, any programs requiring these skills are likely to be set up outside the State Department and to draw on personnel outside the Foreign Service.

#### *Information and Cultural Representation*

THE desire to make our ideals and our way of life known to other countries is by no means new, but it is only since World War II, and as a consequence of our position in world affairs which flowed from it, that we have come to accept this as a continuing part of our overseas activity. We have come to see the importance of the "battle for men's minds" in the broader setting of the cold war. Although there is much

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>7</sup> A stimulating recent discussion of the problems of training for the Foreign Service is found in John Gange, *Report of a Conference of Teachers and Administrators Concerned with the U. S. Foreign Service* (University of Virginia, March 24-26, 1955) mimeographed.

difference of opinion as to how this activity should be carried out—ranging from an emphasis almost solely on “deeds” to a belief in virtually disembodied Madison Avenue techniques—there is general acceptance of the proposition that it must be done.

The independence of the USIA has raised questions as to the relationship of information activities to the other programs of the government in the foreign field. The agency has generally rejected the idea that information activities can be handled in a vacuum; it has stressed the fact that psychological strategy cannot exist apart from official policies and actions in other spheres. Certainly our information line cannot take one direction while our official operating policies and actions seem to take a contrary one. Hence problems of coordination remain pressing and difficult, even though responsibility for foreign policy is squarely placed on the Secretary of State and on the ambassadors in each country.

Information activities have become a massive operation. The USIA in fiscal 1956 had a headquarters strength of about 2,500 people and about 8,600 employees abroad.\* Nearly half of the agency's funds are allocated to the overseas missions, which operate under the policy guidance of the ambassador: \$38 million of a total of \$87 million in fiscal 1956, with larger figures in prospect for 1957. The USIA overseas staff serves in nearly 200 posts, and operates in 80 countries. Adding the cultural exchange programs operated directly by the State Department gives a total of something over \$100 million in fiscal 1956 being expended on information and cultural relations activities. In addition, there are widespread private American activities in these fields which are being encouraged and aided by the government in a variety of ways.

The magnitude and long-term character of the problem serve to emphasize here also the need to build an effective career service. There is no career service for USIA employees at the present time. They are appointed under temporary authority granted by the President's Executive order of 1953, authorizing the use of a

personnel system based on the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 with respect to Foreign Service Reserve, staff, and alien personnel. This arrangement will make possible a smooth transition if the USIA is eventually brought into the State Department as the economic programs have been, but there are no immediate prospects of general legislation to provide for an overseas career service to staff all American operations abroad.

In the absence of a broad study of the needs of overseas civilian personnel, and of legislation aimed at systematizing their status, the information and cultural relations programs risk the loss of their best people. The shifting emphasis on these activities, the organizational fluctuations, and the career uncertainties have cost the United States heavily through high turnover and wavering morale. It seems little short of a miracle that such a high level of capability has thus far been maintained despite these adverse circumstances.

#### *Representation to International and Multilateral Organizations*

ANOTHER new dimension is added to our problem of overseas representation through the large number of international organizations and multilateral specialized agencies to which the United States belongs or in which it is closely interested. The period following World War II has seen our unprecedented involvement in such agencies. Not only are we more widely concerned than ever before, but our international position requires that, like it or not, we are cast in a leading role.

The United States is currently a member of forty-six international organizations, and maintains a close interest in the affairs of some twenty-six others.<sup>8</sup> They range from the almost worldwide United Nations to three-power treaty organizations like ANZUS. Their purposes vary widely, from the broad scope of the UN down to specific technical agreements such as that setting up the International Telecommunication Union. Some of them are primarily concerned with security and defense, like

\* Howland H. Sargeant, "Information and Cultural Representation Overseas," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

<sup>8</sup> Ben T. Moore, "United States Overseas Representation to International and Multilateral Organizations," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, op. cit., pp. 155-58.

NATO and SEATO, while others have to do broadly with educational and scientific matters, like UNESCO. The number and scope of these agencies have increased tremendously since World War II; the problem of providing effective United States representation to such organizations is essentially new in magnitude if not in character.

In some of these organizations, such as the UN and its specialized agencies, the United States has had to deal with the special problems occasioned by Soviet participation. In others, such as NATO and OEEC, the problem has been one of dealing simultaneously with friends and allies of varying views and capacities. In still others, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, the problem has been to influence the actions of the members in an organization to which the United States does not officially belong. In all of them, the multilateral nature of the operation has introduced certain characteristic problems for United States representation which have not been fully solved.

The basic fact is that the United States representative to such an organization is negotiating with more than one country at a time. Effective action requires a broad range of knowledge about the various countries concerned and experience with techniques peculiar to this kind of negotiation. The fact that the United States is in a leading role, and is therefore a leading target, in any international organization further emphasizes the need for skill and experience.

Productive collaboration with the international secretariats is a key technique not readily mastered. Effectiveness in group drafting is another. A feel for the proper timing of a statement, sometimes no less important than its substance, is an important quality that is likely to come only after considerable experience in such multilateral operations. The increasingly complex problems dealt with in international organizations require technical skills similar to those needed in modern embassies. Here again the multilateral nature of the operation introduces differences of degree that become almost differences in kind. An economic counselor who is fairly successful in a particular country may be poorly equipped as a member of a delegation to an international body with a long technical

history of its own. Moreover, the responsibility of such a delegation to several departments in Washington involves special techniques in coming up with a coordinated position in negotiations of this kind. On-the-spot decisions must often be made in a context quite different from that of the normal embassy operation.

This range of problems is likely to remain with us. While the nature of future activities in the international organizations is not clear, we shall no doubt continue to be intimately involved. It seems evident that the importance of the purely technical organizations will continue to increase. The staffing of these delegations with persons of the requisite skills and experience is a continuing problem which has not, as yet, been squarely faced.

One great difficulty is that the technically skilled personnel required for such assignments do not have adequate career incentives. Officers with the requisite economic, military, legal, and information skills are likely to feel that they do not have the same opportunities for career advancement as officers in the political or diplomatic fields. Moreover, assignments to represent the United States at international organizations are often considered to have a hampering effect on the career of an officer, whether military or civilian.<sup>10</sup> Good performances on these assignments do not seem to have been adequately rewarded in career terms. So long as these circumstances continue, it will be difficult to get and keep personnel with the necessary skills and personal qualities on these assignments.

#### *Coordination Overseas*

**T**HIS rapid growth of overseas representation has greatly multiplied the possibilities of duplication, conflict, and working at cross-purposes. Problems of coordination have become crucial. While coordination is not an end in itself, and may if carried to excess serve to deaden initiative and vigor, it must nevertheless reach the point of eliminating mutual frustration among our several overseas activities. Effective coordination can proceed only on the basis of clearly defined policy, promptly and

<sup>10</sup> On this and other important aspects of military representation, see William T. R. Fox, "Military Representation Abroad," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, op. cit., pp. 120-53.



unambiguously communicated to the operating units. But even if this problem is reasonably well solved, various points of potential conflict remain under our present arrangements.

There are several departments and agencies of government concerned with overseas activities. In addition to the Department of State and the special agencies dealing with economic aid, technical assistance, and foreign information programs, whose primary concern is with such affairs, there are many agencies whose primary concerns are domestic but which have important overseas interests. These include Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, among others. A chronic problem is whether each such agency should have its own representation abroad, or whether the State Department can serve them all. Related to this is the question whether there can be a single Foreign Service, whether operated by the State Department or on some other basis, which will provide a professional staff on a career basis for all these needs. From the point of view of a given post, the question also involves the role of special missions or semi-autonomous groups and their relationship to the regular embassy organization.

As the problem has evolved in the postwar period, it has become increasingly clear that the responsibility for coordination at the level of a given country lies with the ambassador. His task has been multiplied many fold by the newer operating responsibilities of the special programs in economic aid, technical assistance, military aid, and information and cultural activities. The variety and complexity of these functions have added greatly to the difficulties of obtaining a harmonious execution of policy at the post. The ambassador, as personal representative of the President, is charged with the performance of this function. Moreover, he is given special authority in this field by an Executive order of 1954 which directs that he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the various programs in the country to which he is assigned. Even so, the ambassador has no authority to command. Conflicts involving representatives with different departmental homes in Washington may be appealed for resolution among the departments concerned. The ambassador's ambiguous position no doubt derives in part

from the fact that he is in practice regarded as a representative of the State Department, rather than of the President, and that he is served by a Foreign Service organization thought of as an arm of the State Department. When other departments of coordinate rank in Washington are involved, their representatives abroad are not likely to accept without question a controversial decision made by those regarded as the representatives of one department, even if it is the State Department.

Hence, though the ambassador has a specific duty to coordinate, he has no final authority to command, and he must achieve the bulk of this work by persuasion and personal leadership. In practice, a strong ambassador can do much in these terms if he acts for the government as a whole rather than for the special interests of the State Department, and if he convinces his staff that that is their function. But the career Foreign Service officer, whose professional prospects are in the hands of the State Department, does not readily adopt such an attitude; and if he does adopt it, it is not easy to convince other departments that he has. One of the great advantages of a broadened Foreign Service whose responsibilities extended into the newer spheres of foreign representation is that it would help facilitate the acceptance of this attitude. If it were possible for the Foreign Service to function effectively for the whole range of civilian interests abroad, it might more nearly become the civilian overseas arm of the entire government.

#### *Coordination in Washington*

THE effective representation of the United States overseas has necessary implications for the Washington organization of agencies concerned with foreign activities. Our representation abroad could clearly be more effective if it were not set up to reflect so many and, sometimes at least, such discordant voices at home. Why should not the State Department, which is our major foreign affairs department, simply be given responsibility for the whole range of our overseas activities?

Although this approach has sometimes been suggested, it could not very well be carried out. In the first place, the military services could not be included, yet many of their activities overseas are political and diplomatic almost

as much as they are military. Moreover, it probably would not be desirable to consolidate in State the foreign affairs interests of the major domestic departments such as Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. Their foreign interests are directly linked to their major domestic responsibilities; they have the technical knowledge and experience; a forced separation in the interest of a single Washington home for all overseas interests, no matter how closely linked to major domestic operations, would probably create more difficult problems than it would solve.

A more feasible solution would be the creation of a new Department of Foreign Affairs into which would be brought all agencies now concerned essentially with foreign activities.<sup>11</sup> This action would mean completing the integration of the economic aid functions begun in 1955 and adding the intelligence and foreign information functions which are now in independent agencies. The suggestion has been made that such a superdepartment might function along the lines of the Department of Defense, with sub-Cabinet units operating in the political and diplomatic field (present State Department), the economic field (present ICA), and the field of information and cultural activities (present USIA). Policy guidance would be given at the top level and operations would be carried out by the respective subdivisions.

A lot can be said on both sides of this proposal. Whether better coordination would automatically appear is questionable. The experience of the Defense Department is not wholly encouraging, even if the analogy were an exact one. In any case, for the immediate future, the burden of coordination in Washington is likely to continue to lie with interagency cooperation under the leadership of the State Department and with the emerging agencies of policy direction in the Executive Office of the President.

The State Department has been able to do

a good deal through interagency committees in which it provided the basic leadership. In some cases, however, other agencies have refused to accept the State Department's primacy. The cumulative result has been the rise of coordinating devices in the Office of the President. The most important of these, the National Security Council, with the President as chairman, has become the focus for policy-making in the foreign field. It has been able to give a general coherence to policy and to provide effective coordination on the broadest kinds of policy conflicts, but it has been less successful in getting these broad policies translated into operations.

Here again, it would seem that the real coordination of operating policy overseas would be greatly aided by a unified civilian foreign affairs service. Whether such a service should have its administrative home in Washington at the Department of State or, as has been suggested, in the Executive Office of the President is an interesting question. There are manifest advantages in keeping it in the Department of State if the other agencies which such a service must satisfy can be persuaded that it is functioning effectively and equitably as the overseas machinery for all civilian governmental functions.

#### Summary and Conclusions

THE experience of the postwar years indicates that the apparatus of American overseas representation needs to be adjusted to the broadened role of the United States in world affairs.

The organization, staffing, and administering of overseas functions have not adequately reflected either the long-range nature of the problems or the importance of their effective handling in the field. Aid programs and informational and cultural activities can no longer be treated as emergency operations, to be administered on a provisional basis, nor can they be successfully administered from Washington without a skilled, professional field staff, recruited on a career basis, and effectively coordinated in the pursuit of United States policy objectives.

It seems evident that the quality and skills of the people involved will decisively affect questions of organization, delegation of authority,

<sup>11</sup> A persuasive discussion of this type of proposal is found in Arthur W. Macmahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (University of Alabama Press, 1953), ch. 2. The volume also throws much light on the broader problems of coordination and staffing. A more strictly descriptive treatment is found in James L. McCamy, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs* (A. A. Knopf, 1950).

methods of coordination, and the like. A strong overseas staff for the multifarious activities we now handle abroad will require a considerable broadening of the traditional Foreign Service concept. Recruitment policies will need to take account of the requirement for advanced professional skills on a career basis. Promotion policies will need to provide a road for advancement to top posts for such professionals, alongside the more customary road of specialization in political work as the preferred route to the most responsible assignments. In-service training programs will need to be geared to the rigorous requirements of mastery of professional skills, rather than to general refresher courses. A Foreign Service officer corps with a higher proportion of the professional experts required for the operating programs, and with a career open to the talents in these fields on a long-term basis, could provide in fact the heart of a unified overseas service adequate to the demands of the many-faceted activities in which we are engaged.

This does not mean that all technicians needed at any given time would be folded into the permanent service. There would still be a significant place for a type of Foreign Service reserve in which technicians could be utilized on a term basis for specific jobs or functions, and would move in and out of the service as required and desirable from the points of view of the service and of the individual technician. Occasionally such a technician might exhibit the qualities and interests that would make him a valuable addition to the permanent service, and might wish to move out of his area of technical specialization into broader responsibilities. The service should be set up so that it could draw readily on such people.

Those already in the career service with advanced professional and technical skills should find the way as open for advancement to top policy-level posts on the political or administrative side as it is for those with less specialized skills and more general background in their earlier careers. It should be possible to reach positions of importance and prestige within any particular professional category, and it should also be possible to aspire to, and for the service to offer, positions of over-all responsibility to qualified officers—whether their major background and experience have

been in political work or in professional fields connected with the newer functions of overseas representation.

Whether a more unified and flexible career service overseas can be rapidly achieved or not, the effectiveness of our operations abroad requires a further clarification and strengthening of the role of the ambassador. He needs to be, in fact as well as in name, the head of what has become in many posts a large operating agency of the United States government. This means, internally, that he and his top advisers take broad responsibility for "operations" as well as "policy," and that the degree of autonomy exercised in individual program operations becomes a matter of administrative convenience and necessity rather than of competing jurisdictional rights. It means, externally, that the ambassador becomes in fact the representative of the President rather than of one department (the State Department) that shares with other departments and their representatives the task of pursuing United States foreign policy objectives. Since, at the larger posts, the ambassador cannot physically discharge these diverse responsibilities himself, it means that the top level of the career service must be equipped to function at what might be called the "presidential" level in coordinating and giving proper weight to the various operations under the ambassador's authority and guidance.

Either the State Department should be broadened to bring clearly and permanently within its structure the various aid programs, informational and cultural operations, and related functions, with its staffing and personnel policies adapted to reflect this continuing responsibility, or a new over-all Department of Foreign Affairs should be created in which State would continue to pursue essentially its traditional functions alongside a Department of Foreign Economic Operations and a Department of Foreign Information Operations. Either of these solutions might provide a satisfactory framework from the point of view of facilitating the tasks of United States representation abroad. But a superdepartment will not, of itself, solve the problems of coordination, and it might well introduce others which would constitute a high price to pay for the outward appearance of coordination.

President Eisenhower's emphasis on the long-run nature of our economic and information programs, and of our participation in regional organizations and multilateral agencies, serves to sharpen the need for translating this recognition into organizational terms. Our postwar experience in these fields has been characterized by a considerable degree of stability in the goals and objectives of United States foreign policy and by a bewildering *ad hoc* improvisation on the organizational side. As we come fully to see the shape of our continuing responsibilities in these areas, it becomes increasingly necessary to put our overseas machinery and our Washington policy-making process on a sounder and more lasting organizational footing.

When in 1953 the President set up the USIA by Executive order, he authorized it to establish a separate personnel system based on the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. This

action was designed to facilitate any future merging of the two systems. The President said of these arrangements at the time, "I do not consider them permanently suitable. There is need for a critical analysis of the various systems of employment and compensation for United States Government overseas civilian personnel. I am directing that this entire matter be studied with a view toward recommending appropriate legislation."

In the interests of more effective representation of the United States abroad, the time for such action is at hand. It is imperative that we gear our overseas mechanism to the long and demanding global competition which seems to be the pattern of the future for the United States. Whatever the detailed solutions, there are few problems which should compel more vigorous and searching study and resolution by the administration, the Congress, and the American people.

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#### Dividing Line

"Cut the red tape," they said,  
 "The petty tyranny of the bureaucrat,  
 The long delays, the forms in triplicate,  
 The reference on the phone from branch to branch,  
 The slow unwilling yielding inch by inch,  
 The endless questionnaire,  
 The *cordon sanitaire*  
 Against a decision, the letter suavely writ  
 Answering all questions but the question put.  
     Cut the red tape," they said.  
     So far, so good.

"Cut through all forms," they said,  
 "The tedious Parliamentary scrutiny,  
 The independence of the judiciary,  
 The sanctity of the home against inspection  
 Without a warrant, the citizen's own selection  
 Of minister and doctor. Latin phrases  
 Like *Habeas corpus*, old moth-eaten clauses  
 Of *Magna Carta*, questions by a Member,  
 Courts of Appeal, the check by Second Chamber.  
 All these impede and harm  
 The cause of quick reform.  
     Cut through them all," they said.  
     And cut off freedom's head.

—Peter Henniker Heaton, *Punch*, August 16, 1950.



# Sharing "Policy in Prospect": ECA's Weekly Digest

By DAVID S. BROWN

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THE problems of bureaucratic bigness are today apparent to business and government alike. Even so, there is no ready solution to them, nor any real possibility of returning to the "good old days" of limited, or locally contained, operations. The need for large-scale organization cannot, of course, be challenged. What remains is the exploration of ways and means of decentralizing more effectively.

In general, decentralization is being accomplished more successfully in the operational than in the policy-forming areas. The theory of administration, however, has for some time recognized the importance of broadening the base of participation in the policy-forming process. If practice has generally lagged behind, this lag can be laid in part to the lack of methods and devices for increasing the participation of those outside of headquarters.

The problem becomes particularly difficult where there is a formal field office structure to be dealt with. Headquarters has constantly been reminded that if it gives the field office authority, it must respect this delegation. Unfortunately, there has often been a reluctance to provide the leadership and guidance that both the field office and the lesser units beneath it need.

Changed thinking has already begun to have effects. Traditionally, home office representatives went out to tell field people what policy was. Now they are likely to approach field situations with a more flexible view. The increasing convenience of travel permits field people to be included in discussions of program and sometimes organization issues. More and more, headquarters officers are listening to regional

views and soliciting advice before firming up policy.

The simple fact that both in government and in industry field and headquarters personnel see more of each other than they once did means that management is enriched by a greater give-and-take of ideas. Written communications have made similar progress. The written "reg"—once the forgotten stepchild of management—is now considered basic to effective control and standardized operation. These directives are often implemented by less formal papers, such as "interim notices" and "circular letters," designed to provide amplification or background information. House organs, too, have made forward strides. The best of them now offer a skillful mixture of social news and company or agency policy.

Valuable though these improvements in communication are, they are still largely outside the problem-haunted area of policy making. Few business firms or government agencies have ventured into this dynamic center, for all their allegiance to the concept of participative management.

## *Establishing the Digest*

THE Economic Cooperation Administration and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency, offered a dramatic exception to this rule in a two-and-one-half-year period from 1950 to 1953. Through a remarkable small publication originating in the administrator's office, the *Weekly Digest*, the headquarters high command attempted to keep its field offices informed of something beyond established policy: policy in prospect.

The *Digest* was the brain child of a man with a keen awareness of the importance of communication to an agency as fast moving as the Marshall Plan organization. Gordon E. Reckord, a permanent civil servant who was director of the ECA secretariat, was impressed by the fact that many of the top policy people were not aware of developments in parts of the agency other than their own which, sooner or later, were certain to affect them. Much of the agency's policy information passed over Reckord's desk in one way or another.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes it appeared in letters and memorandums over Administrator Paul G. Hoffman's signature; sometimes in orders, directives, and other types of instructions; and sometimes in minutes of committees and conferences which Hoffman and his aides attended or in speeches that they made. Reckord began to look for ways and means of bringing pertinent parts of this information to the attention of others.

He found that it fell basically into two categories: approved policy and policy in prospect. He could do little about the first. Another division was responsible for the agencywide issuance of policy directives. So Reckord turned his attention to prepolicy materials.

For several weeks he and his staff produced in his office a dummy digest, made up largely from materials passing over his desk. There were draft copies of policy papers; cable discussions with the field offices; summaries of internal meetings; reports on the status of budgetary talks; and a large volume of materials Reckord called "policy indicators" because, to him, they showed the trends of developing agency policy. When he was satisfied that this information could be put into meaningful form, he took his product to the administrator.

Paul Hoffman was a progressive and energetic executive who had made a success of the presidency of the Studebaker Corporation before taking on the challenging assignment of dispensing nearly \$15 billion to some twenty foreign countries under the Marshall Plan. He had made tremendous personal adjustments in moving from the relative orderliness at South Bend, Indiana, to the larger, more complex and

frustrating milieu he encountered in Washington. Hoffman was sufficiently daring to be willing to try out Reckord's proposal. He authorized circulation of the material on a weekly basis to the ten top administrative people in the agency in Washington.

When Hoffman's successor, William C. Foster, entered the picture the *Digest* was less than four months old, but he had seen enough of it to realize its potentialities as a means of communication with the field. By sending it to the chief of each ECA mission in the countries receiving aid and to the top personnel in the big Paris regional office, its circulation was increased to approximately fifty copies. Thus, both the field headquarters and the offices below them received it. Both Foster and Reckord recognized the dangers of their device. Although the *Digest* bore a security classification, Foster cautioned that its distribution must be kept "to the absolute minimum." He wrote to each person who received it:

The purpose of the *Digest* is to serve as an instrument of information for officials on current policy developments in ECA, primarily in Washington. Its contents are to be regarded not so much as official statements of finalized policy, unless so identified, but rather as "policy indicators" or developments which may shed light on current thinking [here] and in some instances [in the Paris regional headquarters]. We hope that it will help to keep you currently informed on trends and events of major significance to ECA.

Foster also urged that no issue be retained longer than a few days "to prevent its being accepted as a final statement of agency policy." His idea was that it should be destroyed after reading, and a notation that it should be was placed on the cover.

The *Digest* was an immediate success with the field. The comments of mission personnel, which, unsolicited, began to come in, made it clear why this was so. One called it "the most useful single document received in the Mission," and another wrote after receiving it a year:

The *Digest* has served a definitely useful purpose for it has provided the Mission with a continuous flow of information concerning formulation, modification and refinement of basic MSA policy, and, in addition, has been an authoritative source of in-

<sup>1</sup> The Central Secretariat provided a functional switching yard of agency policy as a result of its position astride executive communications and its many other staff contacts throughout the agency.

formation regarding integration of MSA policies with the basic policies of other U.S. Government agencies, particularly the Departments of State and Defense.

Why he felt it so important was summed up by the Chief of Mission to Portugal in these words:

Not the least advantage is the feeling of coming closer together. If we fully understand the reason for your policy decisions in advance, it makes the job of carrying them out much easier. . . . Out here in the field with no complete information at our disposal, I often feel very much at a loss to understand and interpret what is going on and why. The Digest will help to bridge the "communications gap."

The Paris regional office, owing to its position between Washington and the missions, was more cautious in accepting the *Digest*. Nevertheless, it came to be one of its major supporters, and there is no evidence that the presence of the document compromised its administrative control over the European country offices.

#### *Digest Context and Use*

THE *Digest* contained from five to ten articles a week on a wide variety of subjects, but always limited to those of interest to the top policy staff. They might include stories on the policy line being proposed for the granting of aid in Europe; proposals for a longer range aid program in Asia; the development of criteria for determining eligibility for overseas developmental loans; the desirability of import promotion activities; technical assistance policy; plans for implementing the production assistance program; or any of the dozens of issues that were troubling the policy planning groups in Washington and Paris. There might also be items calling attention to the issuance of significant policy statements and notes of major personnel changes.

Generally the *Digest* tried to stay out of the area of individual country problems. It was Reckord's feeling that these were largely a matter of concern to the chiefs of mission, the Paris office, and the Washington country desks and, save in the instance of the larger countries, not of consequence to all. Neither did he use the *Digest* as a vehicle for actual policy issuances.

It helped to provide policy background but it was not a policy manual.

The *Digest* stayed clear also of jurisdictional problems. Occasionally, ECA was in disagreement over policy with other agencies of government, chief among them the Department of State. Hoffman and Foster believed that these affairs should be settled by the agencies concerned with as little incident as possible. Also, the *Digest* attempted to avoid the pitfalls attending the Washington-Paris argument over direction of the country posts.

Besides the usual sources of information, several alert members of the headquarters staff saw it as an important new communications device and sent notes or reports the editor's way. On a number of occasions it was used for internal trial balloons. The friendships of members of the secretariat staff with persons in other offices produced some materials. It was Reckord's hope in establishing the *Digest* that it would be possible to secure one or two "roundup" pieces for each issue that would assimilate a variety of information on a particular subject. Thus, it would be possible each week to treat in detail some important policy problems. This objective was never fully achieved for the reason that there was never the staff available to do the kind of continuing analysis that it required.

The editor of the *Digest*, Miss Alice May, was a former management specialist who was also well practiced in secretariat skills. Almost singlehandedly she put together the stories making up the bulk of *Digest* material. Although the rest of the staff contributed both documents and ideas, she was responsible for summarizing and evaluating them. Thursday was her usual day for composing the magazine. On Friday it was stenciled, reproduced, and sent by air pouch all over the world. Most mission chiefs had it by the following Monday morning. Thus, the news was rarely much over a week old when received.

Most of the missions followed Foster's instructions scrupulously, permitting distribution to only one or two persons in the mission. There were a few occasions, however, when *Digest* stories "leaked" within the government, but these leaks were generally inconsequential.

The cost of the *Digest*, judged by the cost of other communications devices, was minor. Sal-

aries and all other expenses involved in producing it amounted to not more than \$13,000 a year. Thus, the single copy, on the basis of fifty subscribers, ran about \$5.00, or less than the cost of a two-page cable.

The *Digest* was continued through 1952 by W. Averell Harriman as Director for Mutual Security, but was discontinued by his successor, Harold E. Stassen. Stassen's action was probably largely a reflection of his own administrative habits. As director of the agency, his practice was to make a large number of decisions himself and to delegate infrequently. In these circumstances, much of the source material of the *Digest* disappeared entirely or lost its significance. The document was eventually replaced by an unclassified, widely circulated magazine containing only public statements of policy and information. This was a useful device, but it did not contain the "policy in prospect" which had made the *Digest* unique.

#### Evaluation

THERE is considerable evidence of the contribution of the *Digest* to effective administration. Its value was apparent in at least four ways:

1. It alerted the field to forthcoming agency policy. There is no question that this was one of its most important functions.
2. It provided mission personnel with an opportunity to participate in the policy-making process. The *Digest* was not begun with this end in mind, but by informing field officials of what those in Washington were thinking, it gave them the opportunity to be heard on it. The significance of this two-way communication should not be overlooked.
3. It provided the administrator with a direct, recognized, regular, continuing line of communication with his top field officials. Through the *Digest* he spoke directly with his mission chiefs. This was particularly important in a situation where other agencies of government (notably the State Department) controlled most of the lines of communication.
4. Finally, it resulted in a more closely knit, homogeneous organization. The varying country-by-country needs for aid, the concern over the growing schism between East and West, and the threat of a cessation of aid had increased the problems of the country chiefs. In this situation, the *Digest* was a reminder of the need for speaking as a single agency and national voice.

It is significant also that at no time in the two and one-half years that it was used did the *Digest* appear to embarrass or hamper Marshall Plan administration. There was objection occasionally over the manner of handling a particular subject, but most of the letters written to the administrator concerning *Digest* reports included an appreciation of what it was doing.

The chief complaints were directed more to what it was not. Many thought that there should also be a journal summarizing, or "lassoing" as one put it, all of the agency's policy issuances as they appeared. This observation was ordinarily combined with a recommendation that the circulation of such a document be enlarged so that it would reach the "working levels" that the *Digest* could not reach. But by suggesting a "poor man's *Digest*," field personnel did not suggest that the original should be discontinued.

There were some instances where headquarters action was slowed down or halted by reason of a *Digest* story. Sometimes as the result of field reactions management was convinced that it was wrong, that the policy it proposed should not be issued; sometimes it continued with its action; and sometimes there was compromise.

It is difficult to evaluate the role the *Digest* played in such incidents. For example, where a controversial policy was not issued because the *Digest* alerted the field and management reconsidered, the difficulties in carrying it out had it been issued might have contributed to its eventual defeat.

In retrospect, it is clear that many of the dangers that could arise out of this type of issuance can be avoided if it is conducted properly. Had the editors been less discreet, the *Digest* would probably have failed its purpose and have been halted at an early date. The fact that it *did* succeed is an argument that the field can be trusted with more information than it ordinarily gets. But, coincidentally, it must be willing to assume responsibilities in the use of prepolicy information.

#### Potentialities of a Prepolicy Digest

WHAT are the possibilities of using a prepolicy digest in other administrative areas? Was it adapted only to the ECA-MSA type of operation, or can it be used elsewhere?

What are its potentialities in private business organizations? There is probably no clear-cut answer to these questions. Only additional experimentation can tell.

There are many imponderables. Whether security on sensitive subjects could be maintained, for example, in relations between the Civil Aeronautics Administration and its field offices, or between the Eureka Manufacturing Corporation and its subsidiary installations, is open to question. The fact that the CAA might be contemplating a regulation that would cost the airlines many thousands of dollars, or Eureka a new retailing "gimmick," are both closely guarded secrets that wary administrators might well not want to commit to paper for distribution to the field.

Most relationships between headquarters and field establishments are less sensitive, however. They deal with more mundane matters—routine methods of increasing sales, statements of contemplated goals, quality of performance

data, and the like. Much of the information on these subjects already goes out to the field, albeit in a fragmentary and haphazard fashion.

Some organizations, such as the U. S. Forest Service, already circulate the field with drafts of prospective regulations. Others make use of periodic conferences where such information is imparted and reactions are solicited. These organizations do not seem to fear greatly the possible dangers of disclosure. By the time competitors or interested publics would learn of what was afoot, the initial jump would already have been gained.

A publication like the *Digest* is not a substitute for the orderly issuance of regulations and instructions. It is a supplement to such issuances. Its real significance, perhaps, is as a unique method of spreading the policy-making function downward while improving policy coordination and communication. As such it has something to offer any far-flung, complex, large organization.

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#### Administrative Leadership the Key

Harold L. Plummer, chairman of the Wisconsin State Highway Commission, declared that: "Administrative leadership is the key to successful modern administration. Only the top officials can supply the leadership and direction needed to create an organization and staff and provide the training for developing personnel to get the job done. This is as true for the small county as it is for the largest state. The administrator is responsible for making effective the efforts of the organization and its performance depends largely upon his example and stimulation. Since he deals largely with people, the administrator must be conscious of personnel problems and be particularly able in handling them. In fact, if he can attract to himself the right kind of people, his job is essentially done."

—"Engineering Management in County Highway Operations," 26 *Public Roads* 26 (October, 1956).



# Military Budgeting and Financial Control

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SEVERAL writers have recently proposed schemes for the reform of budgeting and financial control in the United States federal government, and especially in the National Military Establishment.<sup>1</sup> The proposals are intended to improve both accountability to Congress and managerial efficiency in the armed forces. The purpose of this essay is to point out that some of the methods which they propose have been tried in other countries and to consider how far this experience is relevant to current American problems. Two cases will be presented—the financial system of the former German Army and the experimental system of the British Army in the years 1919-25. The discussion will be confined to the administration of military finance in peacetime.

There are many similarities between the methods of financial control used in Britain (except in wartime and the period 1919-25) and those used in the United States before 1950. These "conventional" methods, which have attracted similar criticisms in both countries, will be briefly considered in this section. But first some constitutional factors must be noted which produce fundamental differences between American and British military finance.

The main points are these: (1) Congress can modify requests for appropriations without overthrowing the government, but Parliament cannot. (2) In Britain a strong financial control is exercised by the Treasury, and within the

War Office by financial officials who are attached to departments but have a separate financial responsibility to the accounting officer (i.e., the official, usually the Permanent Under-Secretary, who is accountable for funds voted by Parliament). In the United States, financial control by the Budget Bureau is relatively less stringent, and in the Department of the Army the comptrollers do not form a separate financial hierarchy. (3) The authority conferred by appropriation acts differs in the two countries. Congressional authority must be obtained before obligations are incurred, whereas detailed parliamentary approval is needed only for cash payments to be made during the financial year. Thus, in the United States interest centers on the budget estimates, whereas in Britain parliamentary control is exercised mainly through the appropriation accounts.

## *The Main Issues*

SUBJECT to these differences, there are five main issues in both countries.

1. *The Classification of Estimates and Accounts.* Conventional estimates and accounts are classified to show the cost, in each period, of each main type of resources or "inputs" (e.g., labor, stores, buildings, and transport); but they do not reveal either the cost of the main "programs" of military activity (e.g., training, education, and medical services) or the cost of an army's main "outputs" (namely, the formations, units, and establishments maintained).<sup>2</sup>

This method has been criticized for two reasons. First, it does not focus the attention of the

NOTE: My thanks are due to D. W. King, of the War Office Library, without whose help I could not have assembled the material presented in this paper.

<sup>1</sup> See especially Frederick C. Mosher, *Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice with Particular Reference to the U.S. Department of the Army* (Public Administration Service, 1954); and Arthur Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955).

<sup>2</sup> Classifications of expenditure by inputs and outputs are known in the British literature as "subjective" and "objective" classifications respectively. These terms are avoided here because American writers mean by objects what British writers call subjects.

legislature on the costs of military activities and policies, but directs it to administrative detail. Second, since each main category of inputs forms a separate appropriation, the restrictions on the transfer of funds hamper administration without ensuring that policies desired by the legislature are pursued.

Some critics have therefore suggested that information classified by programs or outputs should be appended to estimates and accounts. Others have advocated a change in the classification of the appropriations themselves, which would however present constitutional difficulties in some countries and would require the use of more elaborate and expensive methods of accounting.

2. *Commercial Accounting.* Commercial accounts generally show the value of the resources actually consumed during a year, whereas conventional appropriation accounts show only the sums obligated or paid out. Once resources are acquired, they do not appear in these accounts again. Therefore records of inventories and issues of stores and other property generally show only physical quantities, not values. To measure the annual costs of programs or outputs would involve "tracing" the value of all resources to the purposes and the years for whose service they were expended. Rough estimates, for each major program or formation, of the value of stores issued (less returns), of the rental charge for durable property used, and of the cost of personnel might be obtained quite inexpensively. But some critics would establish complete commercial accounts, including income and expenditure accounts and balance sheets, for all programs or units and for depots. The appropriation accounts would then show the values of resources actually used up during the year in each part of the service. The unit accounts would also be required for the scheme of delegation which is proposed (see below). The main objection to a complex system is the cost of keeping the accounts.

3. *The Number of Separate Appropriations.* Critics argue that if legislative control were increased by the provision of full and properly classified information it would be possible to reduce the number of appropriations or allow more freedom to transfer funds. They maintain that detailed appropriation is no longer necessary in order to prevent deliberate misapplica-

tion of funds and that it diverts attention from flexible and economical administration to conformity with regulations, or to the search for means of evasion.

4. *Free Issues and Financial Decentralization.* The conventional method of allocating resources within the army is the free issue system. Specialist regulating departments, each responsible for a group of inputs, draft most of the budget, estimate requirements for the whole army, and draw up establishments of personnel and scales of issue of supplies and stores for each class of unit or activity. Resources are issued in kind in accordance with these scales, without any accounting transaction expressed in terms of money. Financial administration tends to be centralized, especially in Britain. Projects involving expenditure are generally scrutinized closely at the War Office and in many cases at the Treasury. Where authority is delegated it is generally given to the regulating departments and their depots rather than to formation or unit commanders.

This system is criticized for three main reasons. First, the requirements of units of any class are likely to vary, so that a uniform scale of issue will lead to waste or to shortages. Second, the money value of resources used in each unit or program is not recorded, so that economy goes unrewarded, waste unnoticed. Third, the goal of economical administration is "displaced" in favor of attempts to keep within the regulations.

It has therefore been proposed that the system of free issues be abolished, at least for some resources; that formation, establishment, and unit commanders be given money grants with which to "buy" resources from the central departments, or even from competing civilian sources; that they have some liberty to transfer savings from one head to another; and that commercial accounts, including cost accounts, be introduced in order to enforce financial responsibility. Technical standards could be safeguarded by inspections and exercises. The specialist departments could then act as purveyors instead of regulators. They would operate revolving funds, recouping their costs in their selling prices. The estimates, classified by programs or outputs, would be prepared by the operating departments with specialist advice and coordination. Criticisms of such a scheme

will be considered below, in connection with the British experiment.

5. *Length of the Budgetary Process.* American writers have complained of the length of the interval between the time when work starts on a detailed financial plan and the time when its execution is completed. However, this problem has not been so serious either in Germany or Britain, and therefore will not be discussed in detail. In Britain detailed estimates are not approved by Parliament until the financial year has started, and they generally relate to current cash payments and not to the details of advance commitments.

#### *The German System Prior to 1914*

**I**N CONTRAST with the conventional British and American methods, the former German system of military finance was characterized by weak legislative control and highly decentralized administration. The details of the description which follows relate to the period before 1914, when German practice exercised great influence on British military thought; but the administrative system used after 1933, when the German Army was again placed on a war footing, was substantially the same, allowing for the effects of constitutional, technical, and economic change.<sup>3</sup>

First the constitutional position must be briefly described. The King of Prussia was also the German Emperor, and in peacetime he commanded all German armies except that of Bavaria, which only became subordinate to him in war. Some other states had a degree of administrative autonomy, but Prussian methods were used throughout and liaison was close. There was a Prussian and a German constitution, and the budget for all the armies was voted by the Reichstag, or Parliament. Nevertheless, the main power in the state rested with the monarch. The broad classification of military expenditure enacted by the budget law was supposed to be binding, but the executive possessed considerable freedom, as there was no

treasury control and no independent parliamentary auditor, and deviations were merely reported to the Reichstag after the event. The classification of the budget was mainly by programs and by inputs—it showed separately the costs of such programs as medical services, chaplains, artillery, and engineers and listed the various types of personnel and material costs in each case. In addition, estimates and accounts for the payments made by Army Corps and lower formations were drawn up. Since Army Corps were largely autonomous financially, the cost of maintaining each one was indicated quite accurately. In general, accounts were kept on a cash, not a commercial, basis.

While decentralization was not prevented by the demands of parliamentary control over finance, it was strongly promoted by the strict functional specialization and the wide span of control at the head of the Army. Command was exercised by the generals of twenty Army Corps, administration was in the hands of the War Minister, and planning was the duty of the Chief of the General Staff. Interference by administrators or planners with command functions was not tolerated. These twenty-two persons, among others, were the direct subordinates of the Emperor, and for this reason alone they enjoyed considerable autonomy.

The War Minister delegated most of his administrative powers, and his department devoted its attention to questions of high policy and coordination. Warlike stores, ammunition, and land service stores were procured, administered, and distributed (on the free issue system) by a central department, the Ordnance (*Feldzeugmeisterei*). On the other hand, responsibility for a large proportion of cash payments, for procurement of supplies (food, fodder, fuel) and of barrack and medical stores, for production of clothing and personal equipment, and for quartering, the supervision of buildings and hospitals, and the authorization of new buildings up to 30,000 marks was delegated to the Army Corps level. Each Army Corps (except the Guard Corps) occupied a province (*Bezirk*) and was responsible for the local procurement of most of its requirements.

It has been said that the German Army was run as "a number of separate business establishments." The business manager was a mili-

<sup>3</sup>The following account is based mainly on L. Meyer, "Grundzüge der deutschen Militärverwaltung", Berlin 1901. Other sources are British Army Manuals and articles in *Army Review* for the decade before 1914. German army manuals provide information for the period after 1933. Allied intelligence documents for this period are still restricted.

tary official, called the intendant, who held a dual position as a staff officer to the Army Corps commander and as the official representative of the War Minister responsible for the enforcement of his regulations. Delegation did not stop at Corps level. Corps were divided, again on a territorial basis, into divisions, but these had only subsidiary administrative functions and did not stand in the direct line of communication between Corps authorities and units such as regiments, depots, and hospitals. The financial powers of the commander of an infantry regiment will be considered as an example.

The administration of unit funds and stores was the responsibility of the commander, but it was mainly carried out by a uniformed official, the paymaster (*Zahlmeister*). The financial functions of the unit included the following:

1. Disbursement of pay and allowances, which were regulated by the War Ministry.
2. Administration of messing funds. Bread was normally the only free issue to a static unit in peacetime, all other food being bought from the Corps magazines or from local sources. Small savings could be accumulated and used for specified purposes connected with messing. Like most unit funds, they could be carried forward from year to year but not diverted to extraneous purposes. Fodder for horses, fuel, and cleaning materials were normally drawn in kind according to a scale of issue.
3. Administration of funds for clothing and personal equipment. As long as authorized stocks were complete and all personnel equipped, considerable discretion could be exercised in deciding which items to acquire. Clothing and equipment were largely made in unit workshops, but many items were bought from Corps depots which operated as purveyors. Certain savings could be accumulated and used for the improvement of unit clothing.
4. Each unit had several other funds under its own administration. The purpose of the system was to encourage the accumulation of savings, which could be used to improve the living conditions or training of the troops. In some cases the system was voluntary, in others compulsory. There were separate funds for whitewashing, for painting stoves, for glass and

earthenware utensils, for cutlery, for glass fittings, and for the purchase of fuel for stables from the proceeds of the sale of manure. Savings in these funds were used to improve barracks. Other funds were available for the maintenance of weapons, of training equipment, and of musical instruments; for shoeing and doctoring horses; for unit education, practice ammunition, and various training costs; and for general expenses. In these cases diversion of savings was not generally allowed, but every effort was made to give unit commanders discretion in their spending. In the one case of office expenditure, the "spoils" system was still in use. The head of each office received a small monthly sum for the purchase of such items as stationery; he could dispose of savings as he saw fit, but he had to meet excess spending from his private means.

Although financial administration was decentralized, units did not simply do as they liked. First, there were thorough, rigorous inspections. Second, while there was great freedom in the method of spending funds, detailed regulations laid down the purposes to be achieved, and very little diversion of funds among major categories of expenditure was allowed at any administrative level without reference to higher authority.

Decentralized administration in peacetime was traditional in the German Army and was reintroduced between the wars. It was facilitated by the relative preponderance of the executive over the legislature, and of the military over the civil power, and by the relatively static territorial organization of formations. The absence of these conditions in the British Army was to make imitation difficult.

#### *The British Experiment, 1919-25*

BRITISH committees made various recommendations for financial decentralization and the reform of accounts about the turn of the century; but the first unified scheme of which I am aware was presented in 1907 in a lecture on Army finance at the Army Staff College by Mr. (later Sir) Charles Harris of the Finance Branch of the War Office.<sup>4</sup> The author considered the detailed structure of appropriation

<sup>4</sup> Published in the *Army Review*, vol. I, 1911.



archaic; advocated classification of expenditure by "purpose" (output) instead of by "nature"; pointed out the possibility of keeping commercial accounts for the Army; and maintained that "vast savings . . . might have been made in the South African War if generals had been accustomed to exercise financial authority." Although he considered the scheme to be "hardly practical politics," it found some support.<sup>5</sup>

The war changed political possibilities. In 1918, Parliament's National Expenditure Committee recommended the adoption of a similar scheme of financial reform suggested to it by Sir Charles Harris. The Treasury agreed to begin by introducing the scheme in the War Office, and it accepted Harris' further proposal that all Army expenditure should form a single vote (appropriation).

Concurrently with the change in parliamentary accounting, the War Office began to prepare for decentralization by introducing commercial accounting for individual units and establishments. By 1920, "cost accounts" showing the value of the resources used in each unit in relation to its level of activity had been introduced in all Home Commands. Accounts of the value of stores and property were started, and although a complete valuation was never achieved, changes from year to year were measured. A new Corps of Military Accountants was formed to keep these accounts, though during the experimental period the Pay Corps continued to keep accounts in the old form.

The new appropriation accounts built up on this basis were far more informative than the old accounts. For instance, they showed separately the numbers and costs of troops in each major station, subdivided according to arms (infantry, artillery, etc.), and frequently gave the costs of individual units. For supporting arms, they showed total and average costs and numbers employed in establishments such as schools, transport companies, and hospitals. The new estimates and accounts provided important information for policy de-

cisions and opened up useful lines of administrative inquiry. For instance, they revealed great variations in the costs of maintaining beds in different hospitals, and they showed that the cost per mile of running military vehicles was very high by civilian standards.

The next step was to prepare for decentralization. Committees on this question were set up under Major General F. S. Robb and General Sir Herbert Lawrence. The Robb report was not published, but is said to have favored the aims of the new system. The Lawrence Committee,<sup>6</sup> which was composed of experts of high standing, took the same view. It recommended the virtual abolition of free issues of stores and the substitution of cash allowances on the German model. Unit commanders were to be given considerable discretion to divert savings from one purpose to another. The division of financial responsibility in the Army was to be reorganized, commanders of formations and services being made responsible for procuring their requirements from central purveying departments. Finally, the two sets of accounts and accountants were to be amalgamated.

The Army Council now appointed another committee under J. B. Crosland, Deputy Under-Secretary for Finance, War Office. Its report, submitted early in 1925, is unpublished, but it is known to have concluded that the expense of keeping cost accounts for all units could not be justified in the absence of decentralization, except in the case of "productive establishments such as factories, bakeries and powerhouses."<sup>7</sup> Sir Charles Harris had retired from the Army Council in March 1924, and it now rejected decentralization, and therefore cost accounting. At the same time it was decided to return to the "cash" form of estimates and accounts and the subdivision of parliamentary grants into votes and subheads. The decision was announced to Parliament on July 30, 1925, and by December orders for the abandonment of the accounting system had been issued and the accountants were being demobilized or transferred to the Pay Corps.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See the articles by Major H. A. Young, "Army Finance and Management" and "Efficiency and Economy" in the *Army Review*, vol. III (1912) and vol. VI (1914). The latter article, especially, stressed the possibility of economies at unit level and discussed ways of making commanders responsible for achieving them.

<sup>6</sup> Cmd.2075/1925.

<sup>7</sup> Committee of Public Accounts, 1925, Ev.7373 & Appendix no. 51.

<sup>8</sup> Same, *Report*, Para.56 *et seq.* & Ev.7041 *et seq.* An interesting, but bitter, account of these events ap-



Soon little remained of the experiment except the (unpublished) cost accounts of the Army's productive establishments.

It will be instructive to review some of the arguments presented to the Public Accounts Committee on the three main issues: whether it was wise to decentralize; whether in the absence of decentralization it was worth while to keep cost accounts; and whether in the absence of both it was desirable to revert to the old system of classification and voting.

The Army Council, according to the evidence, had four main reasons for refusing to decentralize.<sup>9</sup> They were: (1) The loss of control by the Accounting Officer (which advocates of decentralization would have favored to the extent that it merely meant delegation of detail). (2) The loss of homogeneity in the Army. (There would have been some difficulties connected with the movement of units and their combination into formations, though it must be remembered that discretion was to extend only to the use of funds and not to the standards of performance or equipment.) (3) The loss of expertise of the central regulating departments (though they could have given advice on matters about which they previously issued regulations). (4) That in fighting units the scope for profitable delegation was very small, and that in any case it would be necessary to revert to free issues in wartime. However, in Germany the system of supply changed on mobilization, and in peacetime a large proportion of expenditure was delegated to units. The rough similarity between units in the two Armies suggests that one or the other was probably wrong on this issue. One's view depends on the estimate one forms of the possibilities of economy in units and of the relative ability of unit officers and central planners to realize them.

The main reason for abandoning the unit cost accounts in nonproductive establishments was the cost of costing. This measure saved be-

tween £100,000 and £200,000 annually. It seems unlikely that, in the absence of decentralization, costing for fighting units would have been worth while, although the case of "service" units such as supply depots and transport companies seems more doubtful.

It seems virtually to have been taken for granted that there would be a return to the old system of classification and of voting. It is probable that in the absence of decentralization Parliament would prefer to divide Army expenditure into several votes; but "commercial" accounts and estimates classified by outputs could still have been presented. However, only Harris pointed out their importance for parliamentary control. The War Office merely stated that other departments submitted conventional accounts and that they were simpler and more convenient to prepare. It offered to publish information as to the costs of individual units, establishments, or garrisons if required, but nothing came of this suggestion.

Since 1926, British military finance has been conducted on conventional lines in peacetime. The military aspects of the experiment have faded out of public controversy, but in recent years two Select Committees of the Commons have favored classification of expenditure by outputs and the adoption of commercial accounting. They met with resistance from the Treasury and in 1950 the Crick Committee on the Form of Government Accounts rejected both measures. In any case its terms of reference and composition were not such as to make it likely to produce any radical scheme of reform. Once again, any major change is "not practical politics."

#### *Relevance to American Problems*

THE two systems of financial administration which have been described are in many respects similar to that which some critics wish to introduce in the United States. In fact, several changes have been made since the appearance of the Hoover reports, although they have not gone so far as the British experiment. Thus a "program budget" has been adopted, but "military personnel" and "production and procurement" (which are groups of inputs) are still separate appropriations. There are fewer appropriations, but no general power of transfer

appeared in the last issue of *The Balance*, the journal of the Corps of Military Accountants. Published after the return of its editorial staff to civil life, it contained observations upon the Secretary of State, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and the Comptroller and Auditor-General which must make it unique among regimental journals.

<sup>9</sup> See for instance Ev. 7157, 7371, and 7513.

is granted. Cost accounting for "service" units such as motor pools and supply depots has been developed; free issues have been reduced, e.g., for transport and printing services and for the issue of clothing to troops; and more use is made of circulating funds, which are free from some of the rules of appropriation. But quite recently there was still criticism under all the heads mentioned in the first section of this article, and the system did not appear to be in a final form.<sup>10</sup> This raises the question whether British and German experiences throw any light on current American problems, and in particular whether they help to indicate probable limits to reform.

The emphasis on legislative control in United States budgeting makes the need for an informative classification by program or outputs greater than in Britain. At the same time it would be more difficult to classify appropriations consistently on such a basis, because estimates are made so far in advance and relate only to obligations to acquire resources whose ultimate use may be quite uncertain. Congress is unlikely to vote all Army funds in a single appropriation, or to exercise detailed control only over the consumption of resources and not over their acquisition—to control both would be to hamper administration more than ever. Of course, this does not mean that supplementary information classified by alternative methods could not be prepared.

The classification by inputs favors administration by specialist regulating departments, though a system of cash grants can be used for internal allocation. The need to keep within appropriations would, however, limit the possibility of allowing commanders to transfer funds among major purposes. On the other hand, decentralization is less hampered than in Britain by the requirements of central control of finance, and the recent development of comptrollership should also be a favorable factor. Subordinate comptrollers can assist commanders in the exercise of their extended finan-

cial powers, perhaps somewhat in the manner of the Prussian intendants and paymasters.<sup>11</sup>

The use of cash grants in place of free issues requires a system of "administrative" budgeting, separate from the legislative budget, together with "commercial" cost accounts and, probably, property accounts in terms of value. Such a system may be costly. On the other hand, it can yield additional information for Congress, allow the removal of detail from the legislative budget, and expedite its preparation.

It would be hazardous to forecast how far central regulation and free issues will ultimately be superseded in the United States military departments by a system of decentralization and cash grants; but certain limits can be suggested: (1) The power of transfer would have to be restricted. (2) The system is most appropriate for productive activities and for units rendering "services" (like motor pools, hospitals, and depots), but is unlikely to be extended either to combat units or even to the military (as distinct from the technical) administration of service units. (3) The system is likely to be most successful in the case of static units performing fairly regular functions. (4) It will only be useful in the case of items over whose consumption subordinate commanders can be allowed to exercise some control. For instance, there may be difficulties where items are of high individual value (e.g., artillery); where it is undesirable to encourage excessive economy (e.g., medical services); or where central allocation in kind is unavoidable (e.g., barracks) or more economical because standardization of unit activities makes bulk procurement or delivery possible (e.g., where all units in an area eat a standard menu). Finally, there would probably be opposition by central departments to any measure permitting units to acquire their own supplies from civilian sources.

#### *In Conclusion*

IT WOULD appear that there are definite limits both to the reclassification of the military budget and to the introduction of a decentral-

<sup>10</sup> These remarks are based on the works by Smithies and Mosher mentioned above. Since writing this paper I have learned that during the last two years the Army's budgetary system has been further reformed along the same lines; but as I have no detailed information, I have let the argument stand.

<sup>11</sup> However, intendants were permanent specialists, while military personnel appointed as comptrollers are not. If their functions were considerably extended specialization might be necessary. But see Mosher, *op. cit.*, ch. VI for reasons to the contrary.

ized system of financial administration and cash grants. The limit is set in the first case by constitutional factors which are more serious in the United States than in Britain. In the second case it is set by administrative factors which are similar in both countries, though differences in the systems of financial control may make decentralization easier in the United States. The nature of these factors was clearly indicated by the British experiment.

It is not claimed that any of the points made are novel, or could not be seen without making these international comparisons. But this method does bring out some points which American critics of existing procedures do not always emphasize. At the same time it illustrates how constitutional differences account for the use of varying techniques to deal with problems which from the military point of view are substantially similar.

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### Human Relations in Perspective

In this article, I have pointed out the important influences upon human relations exercised by the pay system, the technology, the organization of work, and the formal structure. Does this mean that face-to-face relations are unimportant? Does this mean human skills and understandings do not really count for much?

The answer to both questions is *no*. However, research and experience have placed face-to-face relations in a new perspective. Both the morale and the productivity of an organization are tremendously influenced by the nature of face-to-face relations in that organization, but we have come to recognize that the relations we observe tend to be channeled within certain limits by the organization's structure, technology, and so on.

And yet these limits are not so narrow as to deprive the individual of any opportunity to influence the world around him. Man's behavior is not completely predetermined by these impersonal forces, for we have seen striking changes in human relations in some situations where there have been no substantial changes either in the form of organization or in the manner of performing the work. Furthermore, organization structure and technology should not be considered as superhuman forces—they are determined by mere human decision.

In the past, management has characteristically thought only in terms of technical efficiency in planning structure and technology. Human relations entered into the picture only when disturbances arose out of technological and structural changes. Severe losses in efficiency as well as in morale have resulted from this mental separation of human relations from structure and work organization. Now that we recognize the intimate connection between the two, and as research begins to trace out the human relations patterns that go with different structural and technological arrangements, we can look for greater achievements through applying a human relations knowledge to industrial problems.

—William Foote Whyte, "Human Relations Theory—a progress report,"  
34 *Harvard Business Review* 132 (September-October 1956).

# China's Imperial Bureaucracy: Its Direction and Control

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**B**ECAUSE historic example helps give perspective to contemporary problems, current administrative theory might do well to examine the administrative system of Imperial China. That was a civil service of great longevity, existing with relatively fixed form and function for some one thousand years; and, equally important, it was an administrative system designed to meet problems of striking modernity. The Chinese civil service was structured to recruit men of undeniable talent into the bureaucracy and to retain these "talented few" for a lifetime of service within the bureaucratic ranks. It was also concerned with, and made provision for, insuring the loyalty of those within the administrative system, not only to the then-existing governmental structure, but to the ideals and ethics of the greater society as well. And finally, the imperial service was organized to insure a system of centralized direction and control while at the same time offering scope for discretion and policy-making throughout the administrative ranks.<sup>1</sup>

All of these accomplishments, of course, are of concern to present-day administration; but of the three, perhaps most important is the last: the working out of an accommodation between bureaucratic policy-making and the existence of a centralized control over the administration. A search for this accommodation, in proper

proportion, has provided one of the basic reference points for contemporary administrative theory. Present-day writers, recognizing that policy and its execution ("administration") are not separable entities, but are inextricable occurrences in any ongoing administrative process, have been greatly concerned with adjusting the theory of democratic government (with its postulate that policy-making is a "proper" function of the representative branches) to this fact of administrative life.

The terms of this adjustment, however, have varied widely, and, in fact, they have been at the heart of some of administration's liveliest controversies. For some writers, the policy-making function of the bureaucracy has loomed as a threat to democratic government, and the advocated adjustments would take the form of an increased degree of centralized direction over the bureaucracy by the representative branches of the government. For other writers, the needed adjustment would take the form of centralized controls within the administrative branch, so as to offer the electorate an executive answerable for the conduct of the entire bureaucracy. For a third group of analysts, the needed adjustment would involve a lessening of external controls over the bureaucracy, accompanied by measures to insure a broadly recruited bureaucracy (in terms of social class, political predispositions, etc.) so that its policy decisions could be presumed to vary but little from those that might be made by the elected (and therefore "representative") officials. And for still others, the key to a successful democratic operation lies in much the same decentralization of controls, but largely for the reason that a loosely organized policy-making

<sup>1</sup> The structure and activities of the imperial civil service became fixed fairly early in Chinese history; and it existed with little modification from the days of the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) down through the last dynasty, the Ch'ing (Manchu) 1644-1912. The T'ang administrative organization is described in Robert des Rotours, *Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de l'Armée* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études chinoises 1947), vol. 6.

bureaucracy could serve as a check upon any dangerous centralization of authority.<sup>2</sup>

Most of these analyses, however, do more than prescribe an ideal, or model, of accommodation. They move beyond prescription to a discussion of the techniques by which this ideal accommodation is to be enforced. In this context, the techniques of enforcement appear, at least upon the surface, as means to given ends. But as is usual in a theoretic enterprise, a means-ends relationship creates a self-correcting thought process in which means help mold and shape the final ends. The form of the final goal is often dependent upon the suitability and efficacy of the techniques by which the final goal is to be achieved; and in the context of administrative theory, the various "models of accommodation" would seem, in significant measure, to have been shaped by their creator's canvass and estimate of the techniques that are available for accommodating bureaucratic policy-making to centralized direction and control. Thus, the writers who advocate a centralized control of the bureaucracy would seem to be those who feel that techniques are available which could successfully enforce that centralized direction; and obversely, those who feel that centralized direction is impossible of achievement, seem to be among those who plan for decentralization, accompanied by controls of other sorts, such as the fostering of a "democratic morality" within the bureaucratic ranks.

Given this relationship between model (of

accommodation) building and empirical data (techniques for control), and, given further, the fact that almost all of the empirical data thus far used in administrative theory have come from contemporary and Western administrative systems, there are sound methodological reasons for examining an administrative system such as that of Imperial China. Not only does this system offer data that can affect the models of accommodation currently being built by administrative theorists; it offers data for other models as well: those concerned with maximizing the recruitment of able men or the loyalty of those within the administrative system.

### *Social and Governmental Organization*

THE society in which the Imperial civil service operated was a mixture of governmental absolutism and freedom from restraint. In principle the government, and hence the society, was built upon a system of absolute rule, with an emperor at its head and a civil service as the chief instrument of that rule. But in practice, the hand of government rested rather lightly upon the society that it controlled. The chief activities and concerns of the government were centered around the tasks of tax collection, the preservation and adjudication of land titles, and the protection of the empire from internal violence and external invasion. Welfare activities were beyond the concern of the government; and the regulation of interpersonal conduct, of the sort practiced, say, by the American states on the basis of their police powers, was largely left to nongovernmental organizations such as the guild, the clan, and the council of village elders.<sup>3</sup>

Though limited in its scope, the imperial government nonetheless touched the vital center of Chinese life. China was a nation of small farmers and of marginal productivity. A precarious balance existed between numbers and food supply, and out of this Malthusian matrix came widespread poverty and an ever-present threat of famine. As a result, there was

<sup>2</sup> For statements of the various positions in this "controversy" see: Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (Harper & Bros., 1950); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Ginn & Co., 1946); Paul Appleby, *Big Democracy* (A. A. Knopf, 1954); V. O. Key, "Politics and Administration," in Leonard D. White, ed., *The Future of Government in the United States* (University of Chicago Press, 1942); Robert M. Dawson, *The Principle of Official Independence* (London, 1922); Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review* 335 (1941); Norton E. Long, "Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility," *Public Administration Review* 22 (1954); and Harvey C. Mansfield, "Political Parties, Patronage, and the Federal Government Service," in *The Federal Government Service*, report of The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1954.

The phrase, "direction and control," a central concept of this essay, has been taken from Charles S. Hyneman, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the most comprehensive survey in English of life in Imperial China is to be found in S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (Scribner's, 1898). More readily available in K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese; Their History and Culture* (Macmillan Co., 1946).



an intense competition for land ownership and occupancy. Equally important, the national wealth was so limited that tax collection was a matter for evasion and resistance; for the poorer farmer it often made the difference between a marginal existence and physical privation. Under these circumstances, the taxing and adjudicative functions of the government were of such vital concern to the society that oftentimes the security of the throne against popular rebellion depended upon the equity and honesty with which the civil service carried out these functions.

The Chinese economy did more, however, than clothe the activities of the civil service with importance. It also affected the educational and social background of its members, and these, in turn, affected the ability of the emperor to make the bureaucracy do his bidding. To unravel this skein of relationships, it is necessary first to note that China's marginal economy could support only a tiny fraction of the total population in the leisure necessary to acquire literacy in a language whose written form, ideographic and nonphonetic, was completely divorced from the spoken word. These few whom the society did educate were, for the most part, recruited into the civil service; for the skills of literacy are the mortar and bricks of the administrative operation. Moreover, with education a private function, it was generally only the wealthiest of the landlord class that could afford an education for its members. In this fashion, the civil service came to be dominated by the landed gentry, the group upon whom every emperor was most tempted to let fall the burdens of government. As a result, the civil servant was oftentimes less than a willing instrument of the emperor's rule: he was often a man of divided loyalties, concerned with serving the head of the nation and also with protecting from governmental burden the social class whence he had come.

The emperor's concern for controlling his bureaucracy had roots that ran in several directions. Ministerial honesty in collecting revenues affected the emperor's ability to provide for the army that secured the safety of the throne and the tranquillity of the empire. Ministerial tyranny, if unchecked, could provoke the populace into open rebellion, and Chinese history is marked with instances in which cruel and re-

pressive civil servants goaded an economically depressed population into crossing the line that separates rebellion from mere disaffection. And ministerial defection, if not carefully watched, might result in usurpation of the throne. A managerial revolution was never beyond the bounds of possibility; in 9 A.D., one group of civil servants did succeed in capturing the throne and crowning a minister emperor. Their action came to be a warning to subsequent rulers.

But however much the emperor was concerned with controlling his civil service, his ability to achieve this end was colored by the pattern of relationships between minister and throne that had grown up over the centuries. Geographic distances, difficulties of communication, and the monopoly of the ministerial class over education, often to the exclusion of the emperor, produced a pattern of government wherein:

1. The emperor acted almost exclusively upon the advice of his officials. The civil servants proposed and the emperor, by and large, limited himself to accepting or rejecting these proposals.<sup>4</sup>

2. Officials, especially in the provinces, acted with a large measure of discretion. Direct initiative in conducting the affairs of government lay with them. The central administration was content to register, and if need be, reverse the actions they had taken.<sup>5</sup>

Given these patterns of government, attempts at directing and controlling the bureaucracy sought to make certain (1) that no power group capable of rivaling the emperor would spring up within the bureaucracy; (2) that the information submitted to the emperor upon which he based his decisions, was truthful and complete; (3) that imperial orders would be carried out faithfully; and (4) that the discretion exercised by the bureaucracy would lie within the broad confines of imperial policy.

Not every emperor, of course, was successful in achieving these goals. Those that did, however, especially in the Manchu, or Ch'ing, dynasty (1644-1912) employed five basic tech-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Types and Uses of Ch'ing Documents," 5 *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 1 (1940-41).

<sup>5</sup> W. F. Mayers, *The Chinese Government* (Kelley & Walsh, 1878), p. 12.

niques.<sup>6</sup> Their description will constitute the remainder of this essay. In brief, they were as follows: The conduct of civil servants was prescribed and regulated by a comprehensive legal code. A far-reaching network of communications between emperor and civil servant was maintained. A system of checks and balances internal to the bureaucracy was constructed. A regularized system of promotion and demotion was established. Opportunities were maximized for achieving an internal (self) discipline within the administrative corps.

#### *Regulation of the Civil Service*

ALTHOUGH there was no dearth of laws governing the conduct of officials—especially those that dealt with malfeasance in office—none were enforced with greater regularity than those that attempted to prevent the formation of a power group capable of rivaling the emperor.<sup>7</sup> Outright suppression of power groups is perhaps an impossible task within any organization, for they seem to be a universal by-product of the forces—centrifugal and centripetal—that keep an organization functioning. What was done in China toward this suppressive goal, therefore, was to make legal provision for controlling the power potentialities of factions within the bureaucracy and preventing officials from obtaining a base of popular support.

The first of these provisions, quite obviously, was aimed at preventing a revolution from within the government; the second was aimed at preventing one from without. To these ends, the law exploited the potentialities of two of

the constants in Chinese life: supremacy of family loyalties and the geographic dispersion of the empire.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, cliques were controlled by the frequent shifting of personnel from one part of the empire to another. Members of the bureaucracy belonging to the same family were likewise dispersed throughout the empire; and, further, no official could be appointed to a post in the censorate (of which we shall say more later) if he were related to any official of the three highest ranks.<sup>9</sup>

Officials were prevented from acquiring too great a popular following by this same policy of post rotation<sup>10</sup> and also by the laws that forbade any official from being assigned to his native province—lest the members of his family provide him with the nucleus of a power base.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, the law worked to play existing cliques off, one against the other. Officials of the third rank and above were allowed to recommend lesser officials for promotion. Since every official was subject to being promoted or demoted triennially, the pressure for favorable recommendation was never ending. It became a form of patronage that was necessary to use if one were to build up a following. It became even more necessary if loyalties already in existence were to be maintained.

All recommendations, however, were duly noted and recorded in the Department of Civil Service; and in this way the formation of *secret* cliques was minimized. Moreover, the official was at all times held legally responsible for the actions of those whom he had successfully recommended, and this responsibility applied even though the recommended official was serving a tour of duty in a far-distant province. This provision tended to limit most sharply the number of recommendations any one official might make; for a prerequisite to recommendation was a complete confidence in the integrity and morality in the man being vouched for. As a result, factions were kept to a moderate size; and, since great numbers of officials exercised

\* Administrative practices and institutions varied, of course, from dynasty to dynasty. Basically, however, they differed but little from those of the Manchu dynasty, which has been selected as the standard upon which to base terminology etc. The reasons for selecting this dynasty as the basing-point for this essay are two: First, practices in the Manchu dynasty, because it was the last dynasty, can be regarded as reflecting the greatest amount of experiential adjustment in Chinese administration. Second, the need for giving the bureaucracy centralized direction and control was especially strong in the Manchu dynasty, for it was an alien dynasty, resented by Chinese society. As a result, the ability of the emperors to control the civil service was put to its severest test during this period that ran from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.

<sup>7</sup> Mayers, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Outright dismissal from the service was, of course, still another method of control.

<sup>9</sup> P. C. Hsieh, *The Government of China, 1644-1911* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1925), p. 98. In all there were nine ranks, with two divisions to each, in the civil service.

<sup>10</sup> A three-year assignment was the norm.

<sup>11</sup> Latourette, *op. cit.*, p. 528; also, Williams, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 353.

their right of recommendation, the resulting cliques got distributed more or less evenly throughout the bureaucracy, with the final result that in the aggregate they tended to balance each other off.<sup>12</sup>

#### *The Communications System*

THE lifelines of any administrative organization are its channels of communication. But where occidental administration has tended to emphasize the transmission of orders downward through the hierarchy, Chinese administration stressed the transmission of information upward, from base to apex. In this way, decisions made in the provinces could be scrutinized and, if need be, reversed. And in this way, too, the emperor and his chief advisers received the information and advice upon which their policy-making depended.

The low rate of literacy in China worked to prevent the rise of private means for disseminating information. The government was completely dependent upon its own resources for ascertaining conditions throughout the realm and attempted to extend its lines of communication to the furthest reaches of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, since policy-making is generally a product of the range of alternatives suggested to the policy-maker, as well as of the completeness of his information, it was especially important that no group in the bureaucracy be allowed to stop or distort this flow of information—for by doing so it would have been able to bend imperial policy to its own ends. Thus, the emperor's chief advisers acted to make certain that information would flow freely to them, and the emperor acted to make certain that this information was transmitted to him.<sup>13</sup> In short, he had to be constantly on guard lest he be made a "prisoner" of his own bureaucracy.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of the power of recommendation, see Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-185, *passim*. One of the hallmarks of the breakdown of the administrative structure in the late nineteenth century was the coalescence of these cliques.

<sup>13</sup> In T'ang (618-907 A.D.) and Ming (1368-1644 A.D.) times, these advisers were constituted into the Grand Secretariat. In Ch'ing times they were assembled in the Supreme Council.

<sup>14</sup> The emperor was not always successful in his attempts; history is filled with examples of *de facto* power passing into the hands of the upper levels of the bureau-

The techniques that were used to safeguard the decision-making process were, in the main, the censorate, special envoys, direct audience with the emperor, and special devices of organizational structure.

The censorate was an institution that has aroused great interest among Western observers of the dynastic government. In brief, the censors were a body of high-ranking officials attached directly to the imperial court who were entrusted with acting as the "eyes and ears" of the emperor, helping him to maintain "the integrity and honesty of the officials throughout the empire."<sup>15</sup>

No function of government was beyond their powers of investigation. They were empowered to inspect and make copies of all documents coming to the Grand Secretariat (or Council of State) and in this fashion to make certain that the emperor was apprised of their content; to investigate all officials in the performance of their duties; and to make their observations known both to the emperor and to the bureaucracy at large by publishing their findings in the government record, the *Peking Gazette*.<sup>16</sup> Their numbers were never very large (about one hundred served the Manchus), but their influence upon the functioning of the administration would be difficult to overestimate.

From time to time special envoys were dispatched to the provinces. They were usually officials of high rank, but as the direct representatives of the imperial power they were, for that occasion, considered to be second to none in rank. These envoys were used by the central administration to make certain that imperial directives had been faithfully carried out; they were also used in much the same way as the censorate, being required to send to Peking an account of conditions within the province being visited. Thus, they were instruments both of information and of policy implementation.<sup>17</sup>

racy because they were able to isolate him from the rest of the empire.

<sup>15</sup> R. L. Walker, "The Control System of the Chinese Government," *Far East Quarterly* 14 (1947); also H. F. Li, *Les Censeurs . . . Mandchoue* (Paris, 1936).

<sup>16</sup> This publication also made these findings known to the social group with which the bureaucracy was in closest contact, the landed gentry, in many respects China's most powerful social class. See, Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

<sup>17</sup> C. Gutzlaff, *China Opened* (London, 1838), p. 271.

Another technique used to promote the free flow of information was that of imperial hearings, institutionalized in the device of audience with the emperor and his advisers. On these occasions the official would be questioned upon matters pertaining to his domain, and not infrequently his advice upon problems would be sought. In addition to hearings ordered at the emperor's pleasure, officials of the third rank and above were required to meet with the emperor at least every three years and whenever they received a change of assignment. Lesser officials conferred with the emperor only upon the occasion of a new assignment.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, the Chinese employed, in broad outline, a scalar type of administrative organization, but for purposes of communication officials were encouraged to by-pass their immediate superior in sending messages to the highest authorities. Thus we find that, from time to time, the emperors—to secure themselves against bureaucratic encroachment upon their powers—gave orders that those who had the privilege of memorializing them were to do so directly, without first routing the message through the chief advisers. And those who possessed the privilege of addressing them were to do so equally directly: "They shall not notify the Council of State when they are to report to me in person."<sup>19</sup>

In the provincial administration this by-passing procedure existed as a matter of course. Because of it, the treasurer and the judge in each province were entitled to communicate with the capital directly, without obtaining permission from the provincial governor or revealing to him the contents of their communications.<sup>20</sup>

#### Checks and Balances

ALTHOUGH the major administrative aim of the Chinese was to ensure the upward flow of information, it must not be thought that the counterpart of this aim—securing administrative compliance with policy decisions—was at all neglected. Each of the techniques referred

to in the previous section also served to enforce administrative accountability; and, in addition, two others also served this end. The first was a system of checks and balances internal to the bureaucracy. The second was the system by which civil servants retained office.

Pitting one section of the bureaucracy against another, on the principle that rival officeholders "may be one another's best critics" was a device long used by the Chinese.<sup>21</sup> From it came a well-developed system of checks and balances around which the entire bureaucracy was structured. The censorate and the laws concerning recommendation were two institutions within this system. Another, equally important, was that no single official was allowed to control any important office; each was forced to share power with an administrative counterpart or number of counterparts. Thus, as early as the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) a practice was instituted in the central administration whereby two secretaries were placed in charge of each bureau within the six existing administrative departments.<sup>22</sup> The Ming emperors (1368-1644 A.D.) extended this practice of rival officeholding still further by abolishing the post of chief minister and replacing it with a collegiate body, the Grand Secretariat.<sup>23</sup>

With the accession of the Manchus, this practice was extended throughout the central and provincial administrations.<sup>24</sup> Each department in the central administration was headed by two presidents and subheaded by four vice presidents, and each bureau continued to be headed by two secretaries. In the provincial administration, the viceroy, who was nominally the overseer of two provinces, was balanced off

<sup>18</sup> See Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* (Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 133. Mannheim, apparently unaware of Chinese practices, extols this device as a newly discovered principle of administrative control.

<sup>19</sup> See des Rotours, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 33 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> One reason for the extension of rival officeholding under the Manchus was their desire as alien rulers to place Manchus in positions of authority equal to the Chinese. As a largely illiterate people, the Manchus could not hope to staff completely the administrative posts; hence they resorted to a system of dual-officeholding (one Chinese, one Manchu), which one reader of this essay describes as being akin to the Bolshevik device of using "political commissars" in key administrative positions.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 272.

<sup>20</sup> Edict of Emperor Chia Cheng, 1799, reported in Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> T. T. Meadows, *Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China* (London, 1847), p. 82.



by the governor of each of these provinces. As one observer described the situation:

Although the viceroy's "button" [e.g.: his symbol of rank] is a shade higher than the governor's, he is in no way the superior official, and in most cases neither of the two can move without [first] "moving" for the consent of the other.<sup>25</sup>

Check and balance did not end here, however. In addition, use was made of the principle of dual officeholding whereby an official who was a vice president of one board (department) was quite often one of the presidents of another board. In this way not only were the gears of the administration meshed, but nothing that occurred within one department could long be hidden from other members of the bureaucracy.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, check and balance was applied interdepartmentally, with one department responsible for checking the work of another. Thus, the Imperial Chancery received all communications coming to the central government, while the function of "drafting replies to such communications, preparing manifestoes, and issuing ordinances was in the hands of the Grand Secretariat." And "as a final check, all outgoing documents had to pass through the Chancery to receive the official seal, without which they were invalid."<sup>27</sup>

#### *Promotions and Demotions*

NO LESS important than the system of checks and balances were the principles by which offices were held. The cardinal principle of the civil service was that every official served at the emperor's pleasure. And while the official usually held office for a term of three years before being reassigned or given leave to remain at his post, the central government retained at all times the power of immediate removal and demotion of any official whose conduct could "be found irregular or considered dangerous to the stability of the state."<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, at the end of the three-year period of service, every official was subjected to an in-

service evaluation. A catalogue of his merits and demerits was compiled by his immediate superior and forwarded to the Board of Civil Office. This catalogue contained an evaluation of the official's personal conduct, executive ability, and service record and a notation upon his age. The Board of Civil Office scrutinized the catalogue, made comment upon it, and passed it on to the emperor. The emperor, in turn, rendered a final judgment according to which the official was retired, kept in rank, promoted, or demoted.<sup>29</sup> On the whole, it is generally said that this in-service evaluation proved an extremely effective instrument for keeping the bureaucracy properly directed and controlled.

#### *Administrative Self-Discipline*

OF ALL the controls upon the bureaucracy, perhaps the most effective was the one that might be termed the bureaucratic ethic. This ethic involved the integrity, sense of public obligation, moral standards, and value systems of the members of the civil service. It existed as a personally internalized discipline and, as such, there was little that the government could do to manipulate it directly.

What the government could and did do, however, was to use its powers to maintain and guide the force that produced much of this ethic—the educational system that trained the bureaucracy.

It was, for example, during the course of his education that the future official learned the patterns of obedience and deference to superiors that were bound to result from long years of extensive memorization, physical punishment, and unquestioned obedience to his teachers.<sup>30</sup> And it was during this education that the official acquired a body of knowledge so standardized that he could find himself in complete ideological accord both with his fellow officials and with the general belief system of his entire society. The results of this obedience and ideological accord were to make it possible for the official to be entrusted with a large measure of discretionary power without an overriding fear on the part of those who

<sup>25</sup> E. H. Parker, *China, Her History, Diplomacy and Commerce* (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1901), p. 162.

<sup>26</sup> Williams, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 343.

<sup>27</sup> P. M. A. Linebarger, *Government in Republican China* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938), p. 133.

<sup>28</sup> Mayers, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>29</sup> Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>30</sup> See A. H. Smith, *Village Life in China* (Fleming H. Revell & Co., 1899), pp. 70-135, and W. A. P. Martin, *Han Lin Papers* (London, 1880), p. 126.



stood at the head of government that he would transgress by far the bounds of common governmental endeavor.

While it is difficult to summarize briefly the ideological content of an educational pattern that knitted together both educated classes and the general society, a few remarks will give some idea of this pattern. It was, first of all, an education grounded upon a system of ethics and ethical relationships. These relationships were rooted in the teachings of China's most revered philosopher, Confucius, of whom it is generally said that he did not so much invent as crystallize and give order to the general belief system of his society. The pivotal center of Confucius' teachings was China's most valued ethical principle: the supremacy of family loyalties, especially those involving filial piety and honor to ancestors. From this basing point, Confucius set down a series of ethical postulates involving the "proper" relationship between father and family, between family member and family member, between emperor and subject, and between friend and friend. Extended outward by later philosophers, the corollaries of these basic postulates eventually encompassed the entire range of social, political, and economic activities of Chinese society. Thus, education in China was basically an education in ethics, rather than technology, and the civil servant that this education produced was imbued with a moral code that he shared not only with fellow officials but with his entire society.<sup>31</sup>

The government's general goal in educational matters was to keep education exclusively oriented to training for government service. By so doing it would be assured of a steady supply of the best talents in China. Furthermore, incorporating these talents into the government would go far toward preventing the

growth of rival leadership groups that might aspire either toward separatism in an empire as large as China or toward replacing the existing government with one of their own. Moreover, an "administrative orientation" of this sort made it far easier to promote, within the content of education, the Confucian orthodoxy that was so highly valued. By making orthodox knowledge the key to the successful government examination, it followed almost as a matter of course that the schools would largely confine themselves to teaching what was acceptable to the government authorities.<sup>32</sup>

This process of keeping education administratively oriented and filled with orthodox content served still another very important purpose. It made certain that the educated who remained out of government service (by and large scholars who had never made the grade) were one in ideology with those in power. This served not only to tie the goals of government and people together but also to keep the educated who were not in power from becoming ideological malcontents.<sup>33</sup>

The technique that the government used to maintain the orientation of the schools was a simple one. It consisted of keeping up an adequate demand for new officials and of making the reward of acceptance into government service commensurate with the effort needed to acquire the proper education.

While the government could not, of course, keep up demand by expanding the bureaucracy indefinitely, there is some evidence to suggest that not all those in the administration were operationally necessary. It may be, for example, that the extreme to which rival officeholding was pushed was a sort of "make work" policy. And the same might be said of the practice of placing in the Imperial Academy those who

<sup>31</sup> For insight into the meaning and nature of Confucianism the reader is referred to: L. S. Hsu, *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism* (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1932); Lin Yutang, tr., *The Wisdom of Confucius* (Modern Library, Inc., 1938); Arthur Waley, tr., *The Analects of Confucius* (Macmillan Co., 1939); James Legge, tr., *The Chinese Classics* (Oxford, 1893-1895), 5 vols.

The political ramifications as well as the expanding nature of the Confucian system are treated in J. K. Shryock, *The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius* (Century Co., 1932); R. F. Johnston, *Confucianism and Modern China* (D. Appleton Century Co., 1935).

<sup>32</sup> One criticism of this practice is that it tended to discourage original thought. A contemporary observer, commented on the civil service examinations: "How splendid soever the originality, it would be considered a blot upon the memory of the sages if an inexperienced youth should strike out on another path and subvert the whole system of thought of the wisest of men." Gutzlaff, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

<sup>33</sup> In our own day, Schumpeter credits popular loss of faith in the capitalistic ideology to educated malcontents—"the scribbling set"—who hold no office but miss no opportunity to assail the existing system. J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 2d ed. (Harper & Bros., 1947), ch. 13.

passed the examinations with high honors for whom no administrative post was available.<sup>54</sup>

What the government was unable to do by way of keeping up demand, it compensated for by attempting to make the reward for education commensurate with its effort.<sup>55</sup> The traditional Chinese reverence for scholarship in general and for the scholar bureaucrat in particular would in themselves probably have offered sufficient reward.<sup>56</sup> So, too, would the fact that the bureaucracy provided the most readily available path to political power. The government augmented these incentives, however, by promoting still further the social prestige of the successful candidate: it exempted him from corporal punishment and from work on the *corvée*. It allowed him a distinction in dress akin to that worn by members of the bureaucracy<sup>57</sup> and it flattered members of his family by allowing them to display banners that said: "Here resides a successful candidate of the government examinations!" It invited the families of the most successful candidates to have audience with the emperor.

So great did public interest in the qualifying examinations become that one European observer commented:

The public attention at the approach of the triennial examination is as intense in China as the interest of the English people in elections.<sup>58</sup>

Educational orthodoxy was a tool of control important to the emperor; but it was the officials, far more than the Imperial Family, who were concerned with the guidance of education. They had a vested interest in the system because it helped assure them of their monopoly of power. By limiting the bureauc-

racy to persons with a traditional training, they made certain that persons with skills they did not possess (as, for example, technical skills) could not become competitors for power. Because they determined the content of orthodoxy, they could inculcate in future officials a code of ethics that would bring forth opposition to the imperial power whenever it attempted to encroach upon bureaucratic domains.<sup>59</sup> And finally, by being in a position to inject their brand of orthodoxy into the content of all education, they could better secure a popular acceptance of their monopoly of power.

### Some Evaluations

IF THIS essay has achieved its intent, it has provided a canvass of the techniques used by a now-vanished Chinese government to ensure a measure of control and direction over its bureaucratic apparatus. And here matters might easily rest, except perhaps for a further note that the techniques described might serve as data for comparative administrative studies, especially those that seek a solution to the problem of providing adequate control and direction for present-day, democratic bureaucracies.

But in dealing with a governmental system that has failed to survive into the present day, there is felt a certain impatience with a conceptual scheme that leaves no room for some over-all summary, some measure of the successes and failures of the vanished government. "Historical curiosity" demands some further casting of the conceptual net; and, if there be laid down the usual warning of the difficulties that inhere in seeking causality within a highly complex situation, then these few final things might be set down.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>54</sup> The Imperial Academy might best be described as an institute for advanced study. Among its functions was that of expounding the classic texts and rendering authoritative comments on them. See Martin, *op. cit.*

<sup>55</sup> The government was aided in its attempts to balance demand for scholars and supply by the facts of Chinese life. As was noted earlier, the total number that the society could afford to educate, no matter what the incentive, was relatively small.

<sup>56</sup> On this point generally, see Max Weber, "The Chinese Literati," in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, tr., *Essays in Sociology* (Oxford University Press, 1946).

<sup>57</sup> S. Cammann, "The Development of the Mandarin Square," *8 Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 70 (1944-45).

<sup>58</sup> Gutzlaff, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>59</sup> The classic texts, for example, are filled with stories of heroic censors who refused to be silenced even by imperial threats. On this point, see R. L. Walker, *op. cit.*

<sup>60</sup> A methodologically-oriented reader will probably see that a central concern of this essay has been with the rationality of the Chinese civil service as regards direction and control, viz., the relationship between techniques and sought-for ends. Another inquiry into rationality might be one that attempted to examine a means-ends relationship as regards survival of the governmental system. But because the test of rationality varies according to the goal that is to be maximized, sound method requires different data for each means-ends problem and thus does not permit ready jumping

If a civil service is to be measured by its ability to create an orderly, peaceful, want-satisfying government, then it might be said that the imperial civil service was a successful enterprise. A thousand years of Chinese history attest to this success. But if a civil service is also to be measured by its ability to adjust the patterns of government to changing social and technological patterns, then the Chinese bureaucracy might be adjudged a failure. For the response of the Chinese civil service to the intrusion of the West in the latter half of the nineteenth century was marked first by arrogance, then by indifference, and finally by paralysis. The government could come to no satisfactory terms with the nations of the West and, as a result, the entire society repudiated the government's claims upon its allegiance.

To search the pages of history seeking to pin down cause and effect is, of course, a risky undertaking. It may be that the Chinese government would have been repudiated no matter what its response to the intrusion of the West. But the evidence of history makes it difficult to

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from one rationality test to another. As a result, an excursion into the over-all failures of the Chinese bureaucracy requires a different order of data from that presented here. What is done in the final paragraphs of this essay is simply to provide for a *coda* that helps satisfy a concern for these problems that the method of this essay was not designed to treat.

discount the role played in this repudiation by the civil service and the educational system upon which it was based. Not only did this system inculcate in the leaders of this society a firm belief in the society's superiority to all other nations and cultures, but it so trained these leaders that they could have no comprehension of the ways of a technological world. The best brains of China were sharpened upon a whetstone of ethical philosophy, not mechanics; and they were trained to believe that a concern for mechanical enterprise was beneath the dignity of the cultured man. As a result, they could not cope with, let alone master, one branch of technology that decides the fate of nations: the technology of armaments. China was helpless in the face of Europe's guns, and when Europe wrung from the government a series of humiliating concessions there was more at stake than territorial integrity. The prize was a society's continued allegiance to a system of education and a pattern of governmental life. The profound shock of seeing these patterns as inferior to those of other nations set off a wave of unrest from which China still has not recovered. More, that wave of unrest culminated in the first of a series of revolutions that brought down in complete collapse China's traditional governmental system and the imperial bureaucracy that gave it meaning.

# Reviews of Books and Documents

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## BOOK NOTES

**Perspectives on Administration**, by Dwight Waldo, University of Alabama Press, 1956. 143 p. \$2.50.

Each of the five chapters of this book was originally presented as a lecture, in a series given to the group participating in the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration, in November, 1954. Their theme is "perspectives." "How does administration fit into the entire human enterprise? How does administration look to other disciplines? How do other disciplines look to the student of administration? What are the conceptual lenses or spectacles available to us in scrutinizing our administrative world?"

**The Office of Governor in the United States**, by Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., University of Alabama Press, 1956. 417 p. \$6.00.

Based in large part on data collected by the author in interviews with governors, members of their staffs, legislators, state officials, politicians, and newsmen in twenty-five states, this book describes the activities of the governor in the areas of policy formation, public relations, and management. Preliminary chapters are concerned with the political setting in which the governor functions, and a concluding chapter examines the long-time quest for accountability.

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EDITORIAL NOTE: With this issue the editors of *Public Administration Review* are instituting on a trial basis a book notes section. This section is designed to supplement, not displace, the essay-type reviews that have been a feature of this journal since its beginning. By an unfortunate coincidence, we have no essay reviews for this current issue, a situation we hope will not occur again. We solicit comments and suggestions from readers relating to the book notes, both on the items selected for notice and the kind of notice given.

**Intergovernmental Relations at the Grass Roots; A Study of Blue Earth County, Minnesota, to 1946**, by Paul N. Ylvisaker, University of Minnesota Press, 1956. 186 p. \$3.00. *Intergovernmental Relations in the United States as Observed in the State of Minnesota*, Research Monograph No. 7.

This study is a revision of the author's doctoral dissertation at Harvard University in 1948, which in turn grew in part from his work as research assistant for the Blue Earth County Council on Intergovernmental Relations. He has adapted the study to the purposes of the monograph series in which it appears by emphasizing the intergovernmental relations aspects of what originally was an inquiry into the general workings of American government at the local level. He has also stressed the human element in the relations between governments in order to recapture the atmosphere within which intergovernmental relations take place. The study is concerned especially with the functions of agriculture, health, highways, and finance.

**Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations**, by William Anderson, Waite D. Durfee, Jr., and others. University of Minnesota Press, 1956. 131 p. \$3.00. *Intergovernmental Relations in the United States as Observed in the State of Minnesota*, Research Monograph No. 8.

This monograph is concerned "with taxes, expenditures, and borrowing in a broad sense, and with those major financial transactions, like grants-in-aid from nation to state and from state to local governments, that significantly affect the total amounts available for expenditure by the different governments . . . the emphasis is upon the amounts of money, where the money comes from, and where it goes, and not upon the official human beings who handle funds or upon their relations with each other.

**The States and the Metropolitan Problem: A Report to the Governors' Conference.** Council of State Governments. 1956. 153 p. \$2.50. Paper bound.

This report, prepared under the direction of John C. Bollens, reviews the experience with and appraises six major devices by which citizens have attempted to alter governmental patterns to solve the problem of government in metropolitan areas: annexation; city-county consolidation; city-county separation; federation; functional transfers and joint efforts; and metropolitan special districts.

A suggested program for the states includes five basic and closely related steps for the consideration of state governments as means of obtaining appropriate organization and development in metropolitan areas:

1. Establish legal authorizations for the creation of general metropolitan units that can be adequate in functions, financing ability, and structure. These units may be of one or more of three types: multi-purpose metropolitan district, federation, and urban county.
2. Determine which method is preferable for putting the selected type or types of unit into effect: legislative action, local voter decision, or administrative or judicial determination.
3. Provide suitable legal provisions relating to two supplementary procedures: annexation and inter-local agreements.
4. Appraise the adequacy of local governments in terms of area, financial ability, administrative organization, administrative methods, and amount of discretion in the exercise of powers. Make necessary changes in accordance with the results of the appraisal.
5. Create or adapt an agency (1) to aid in determining the present and changing needs of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the state and (2) to analyze the effects in such areas of current and contemplated policies of national, state and local governments and major private organizations. (p.128)

**TVA: The First Twenty Years; A Staff Report,** edited by Roscoe C. Martin. University of Alabama Press and University of Tennessee Press, 1956. 282 p. \$4.50.

In a series of sixteen essays, based upon lectures originally delivered at Florida State University, staff members of the Tennessee Valley Authority report on achievements of the au-

thority in the period 1933-53 and the procedures by which those achievements have been earned. A number of essays are concerned primarily with problems of public administration—administrative foundations, personnel administration, financial administration, and TVA and state and local government. Others, describing the physical and the social and economic development of the valley, also discuss organizational and procedural questions of interest to the administrator. A concluding essay by the editor, "Retrospect and Prospect," highlights some of the principal administrative decisions that have been made in the TVA and points to some basic choices yet to be made.

**Public Administration and Policy Formation: Studies in Oil, Gas, Banking, River Development, and Corporate Investigations,** edited by Emmette S. Redford. University of Texas Press, 1956. 319 p. \$5.75.

Each of the five studies that constitute this volume is based on a dissertation written under the supervision of the editor at the University of Texas. Common assumptions underlying the studies are that each deals with a set of experiences in policy and the means of their development and execution, that the focus of the analysis is the development of a public program within an administrative agency, and that the primary interest is in what the agency does for society and how.

The authors and studies are: York Y. Willbern, "Administrative Control of Petroleum Production in Texas"; Ralph K. Huitt, "National Regulation of the Natural-Gas Industry"; Guy Fox, "Supervision of Banking by the Comptroller of the Currency"; Comer Clay, "The Lower Colorado River Authority"; and Hugh M. Hall, Jr., "The Investigatory Function of the Federal Trade Commission, 1933-1952."

**Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints,** by Walter Gellhorn. Louisiana State University Press, 1956. 215 p. \$3.75.

This book consists of the Edward Douglass White Lectures on Citizenship, at Louisiana State University, in 1956, in which the author



discusses how recent developments in three areas encroach on the freedom of the individual. In the first lecture he cites the transfer of judicial responsibilities from the traditional courts to administrative agencies and traces the growing power of the administrator in areas of vital importance to individuals. In the second, he describes how federal, local, and private censorship have severely affected the individual's freedom to read, while doing nothing to encourage good reading. In the third, he discusses the extremes to which occupational licensing is being carried, with the risk of departing from a cherished tradition—the rights of the individual to change his job and to aspire to another status of life.

**The Federal Loyalty-Security Program**, Report of the Special Committee on . . . of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Dodd, Mead & Co., 1956. 301 p. \$5.00.

This report is concerned with the civilian personnel security programs that apply to the more than two million federal civilian employees, to over three million employees of private industry, and to Americans employed by international organizations. Classification of information is also given attention. The committee endeavored to canvass all shades of informed opinion and to gain an understanding of all sides of this complex subject.

The committee finds that the personnel security system should be maintained to help counter the continuing Communist threat, but programs should be modified in important respects to correct weaknesses.

Principal recommendations include reduction of the scope of the program to sensitive positions; clarification of the standard that employees must meet; improvement in procedure to assure efficiency and fairness; and appointment of a director to coordinate and review the operation of the program.

The project was made possible by a grant from the Fund for the Republic, Inc.

**American Defense and National Security**, by Timothy W. Stanley. Public Affairs Press, 1956. 202 p. \$3.25.

This book tells the story of developments in the national security structure during the

past ten years and treats the framework within which solutions to major defense problems must be sought.

Part I, titled "Coordinating for National Security," discusses political-military relations; the President and the Executive Office, the National Security Council, and responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs and international security affairs.

Part II, "The Department of Defense," is concerned with the problems of defense organization and unification of the military services and the history of unification in the early stages and during the Korean War. A concluding chapter describes the organization and functioning of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The study was prepared while the author was a research fellow at Harvard University and is based primarily on research conducted under the auspices of the Harvard Defense Studies Program.

**Executive Performance and Leadership**, by Carroll L. Shartle. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. 302 p. \$4.50.

This book is one of the publications resulting from a ten-year interdisciplinary program undertaken in 1946 at Ohio State University to study the behavior of persons assumed to be in leadership positions in business, educational, and governmental organizations. It was written to give a point of view, provide assumptions and hypotheses, and present pertinent research findings. It does not present a comprehensive theory of executive performance; rather, it invites the reader to be eclectic and look at various aspects. Each administrator has his own background of education, training, experience, values, attitudes, and problems from which he selects the things he believes will be helpful.

**Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital**, by Ivan Belknap. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956. 277 p. \$5.50.

The author reports a three-year case study of the social environment and administrative structure of a state mental hospital. This is

the kind of hospital that houses 85 per cent of the mental patients in this country.

Considering the organization from the points of view of administrators, professional staff, and patients, the study shows how the state mental hospital has become a large, centralized, geographically isolated, and impersonal institution of a kind that in itself is a major obstacle to the application of modern psychiatric techniques to the treatment of mental illness.

Problems posed by the state hospital suggest that the ideal mental health organization should be kept in the local communities, financed jointly by state and community. An alternative would be a redefinition of the function of these hospitals to prevent their use as a solution of welfare and mental deficiency problems in the local communities, thus reducing their population, and a change in their internal administrative structure from a *scalar* to a *parallel* organization. This change "involves running the hospital as a system of linked auxiliary services under over-all medical supervision, rather than as a simple line and staff organization, in which these services are discharged by delegation of commands to subordinates."

**Community Organization; Action and Inaction**, by Floyd Hunter, Ruth Connor Schaffer, and Cecil G. Sheps. University of North Carolina Press, 1956. 268 p. \$5.00.

This study is the report of a research team from the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, of the city of Salem, Massachusetts, as that community conducted a self-study of its needs in the health field. Represented on the team were the disciplines of sociology, medicine, public health, anthropology, and social work.

"The general objective of the research . . . has been to locate a community in which people were active in relation to health needs and to observe systematically and record the processes by which decisions were reached, plans were formulated on the basis of these decisions, and action programs were initiated and carried out to meet health problems of a community."

**Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy; A Case Study**, by Roy G. Francis and Robert C. Stone. University of Minnesota Press, 1956. 201 p. \$4.00.

" . . . the concept of bureaucracy plays a central role in sociological theory. Because of this central importance, the concept needs constant scrutiny and testing by application in research studies.

"Of the observations most frequently made about modern bureaucracies, one is that they are impersonal, and another that the personnel of such organizations become 'rule-followers'—that they substitute the following of rules for the specified purpose of their organization. This study was designed primarily to explore these two propositions. The attempt to test these hypotheses in an empirical study led down a long path which culminated in certain major modifications of the concept of bureaucracy." (p. 4) A unit office of the Louisiana Division of Employment Security is the organization studied.

**Pioneer Public Service; An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867**, by J. E. Hodgetts. University of Toronto Press, 1956. 292 p. \$5.50.

This study has three objectives: (1) "to provide a description of the evolution and structure of the administrative machine which, with few fundamental changes, still serves the Canadian nation" and "to . . . appraise the . . . contributions of the public servant to the welfare of a pioneer community"; (2) "to disclose the presence in the pioneer public service of certain basic administrative issues which today still rise to perplex both the student and practitioner of public administration"; and (3) to "reveal a neglected aspect of the winning of responsible government in Canada." Each of the later chapters dealing with specific departments describes the features of the environment that have a bearing on policy, assesses the policy decisions in response to these environmental problems, and examines the efficiency of the administrative machine in relation to the policies it was supposed to implement.

**Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain**, by Samuel H. Beer. Oxford University Press, 1956. 138 p. \$2.40.

The author considers first the control of expenditures by the British Treasury, comparing the various facets with processes in the United States government. He then describes the development of the machinery of economic planning during the postwar years, which resulted in the emergence of the Treasury as the center of economic planning and coordination. Following a discussion of the control of the investment and import programs of the country, he turns to the broader phases of economic policy-making, emphasizing the framing of the budget, which has become increasingly the principal instrument of economic planning and control.

In a final chapter Mr. Beer analyzes the nature of the Treasury's power, concluding:

As we might expect, there proves to be no single factor which we can isolate and identify as the source of the Treasury's power. Administrative machinery has its importance. So also have the Gladstonian financial reforms and the case law of Treasury control of expenditure, reinforced by the professional standards and conditions of service of the unified Civil Service. Not least important are the effects of the structure of the plural executive, shaped in distinctive ways by Britain's monarchic past. From the thrust and counter-thrust of forces which build up from many sources, the architecture of British government produces the balanced power of the Treasury and its style of co-ordination. (pp. 130-31)

**British Government Inspection as a Dynamic Process; The Local Services and the Central Departments**, by John S. Harris. Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 196 p. \$4.25.

The author describes and analyzes the British experience with the administrative device of inspection employed by the central ministries in London to achieve supervision, guidance, and control over poor relief, health, edu-

cation, police, fire, and highway local services. Although the historical development of the various types of inspection is presented, major emphasis is on how the inspectors today organize their work and the procedures and techniques they employ.

**New Sources of Local Revenue; Report of a Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration**. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1956. 260 p. 25 sh.

The Royal Institute, in embarking on a series of major research projects, chose as one of the first subjects an investigation into the possibility of finding new sources of local revenue for local authorities. This topic was chosen because of the institute's growing concern with the trend in Great Britain in which "local authorities have come to receive a progressively smaller proportion of their income from revenues under their own control, such as rates, and a correspondingly larger proportion from central government grants. . . . Increased financial aid from the central government leads to greater administrative control from the centre, with the result that local autonomy is reduced and the responsibility of local authorities to their electorate diminished."

For making this study and report, the institute set up a study group reflecting the experience and points of view of both central and local government. It also included representation from the universities.

After analyzing the situation in Great Britain and studying the methods of financing local government in eleven other countries, the group recommended as practicable three sources of additional local revenues, in the following order of preference: (1) a local income tax; (2) an entertainment tax; and (3) motor vehicle and licensing fees.

The book contains a 90-page supplement on financing local government in Sweden, which describes especially the local income tax in that country.

# Research Notes

Compiled by John C. Honey,  
Director, Government Studies Program,  
National Science Foundation

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## Resources Studies

Selected aspects of the research programs of Resources for the Future, Inc., have already been described in "Research Notes" (Spring, 1956, *Review*, p. 149, and Autumn, 1956, *Review*, p. 313). This note summarizes certain research projects of the Energy and Mineral Resources Program and the Regional Studies Program of RFF.

**Energy and Mineral Resources.** The energy studies under way have as their object the development of a comprehensive view of how these resources affect and are affected by the developing national economy. The program is geared to four areas of study: (1) the role of energy in the United States economy, 1900-1955; (2) energy demands and supplies, 1955-1975; (3) public policies affecting the energy industries; and (4) the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In particular, the third area of study is directed toward the understanding of existing federal and state power policies. The research currently being pursued is concerned with federal electric power policies, including an examination of the economic, technological, and political factors which appear to explain their

origin and subsequent development, and the results they were expected to achieve. The electric power policy study will be followed by an examination of federal policies on other energy resources. This phase of the energy and mineral resources program is being conducted by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr.

**Regional Studies.** During 1956 a program of regional studies was designed and inaugurated by RFF under the leadership of Harvey S. Perloff. Recognizing that the link would be close between specific resource studies and regional investigations, it was determined that a unique contribution could be made by dealing with projects in which several of the resources were studied jointly and in which the regional element was dominant.

Three types of inquiry make up the program of regional studies:

1. Those in which the main object is better understanding of the resource problems and possibilities of a particular region—e.g., the preliminary survey of the North American Arctic and Subarctic which is discussed below;
2. Those in which the immediate subject of study, while important in its own right, is believed to be a prototype of similar problems in other areas—e.g., the studies of urban growth problems in California, discussed below; and
3. A broad inquiry concerning the general nature and effect of regional forces as they relate to economic growth and resource development. At present, since there is no adequate framework of theory to underpin studies of particular areas or other specific problems involving regional development, considerable staff research is being directed to this matter, as indicated below.

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NOTE: Readers of *Public Administration Review* are invited to report items of research in progress through Research Notes. A report on any one project should not exceed 300 words and should include information on such matters as the conceptual framework of the study, its aims, tentative conclusions, anticipated uses, sources of information, principal investigators, and expected date of completion.

Research Notes are compiled by three members of the staff of the National Science Foundation: Mrs. Kathryn S. Arnow, John C. Honey, and Herbert H. Rosenberg. Reports should be addressed to John C. Honey, Director of Governmental Studies, National Science Foundation, Washington 25, D. C.

All three lines of inquiry are ultimately directed to the same fundamental question: how can the development, conservation, and use of natural resources contribute the most to the welfare of individuals in all of the regions of the country? This question also underlies the anticipated future inquiries into regional problems and practices with respect to resources policies and resources administration.

Selected specific projects of the Regional Studies program are as follows:

*Development of Arctic and Subarctic Resources.* Development of the vast area of northwestern North America—Alaska and the Canadian territories adjacent—is undergoing a new appraisal by both private and public groups in the light of the region's growing importance to both the United States and Canada. If accelerated economic development, already under way, is to take place in an orderly fashion, there is need for reliable information on the resources of the Arctic and Subarctic, on comparative costs and benefits of alternative patterns of development, and on logical sequences of development.

A \$25,000 grant was made last June to the Arctic Institute of North America, a scientific organization concerned with northern development. The grant underwrites a year-long pilot study which is being conducted by George Rogers, former special assistant to the Governor of Alaska. An advisory committee has been set up to assist the institute in furthering the project.

The task of conducting the preliminary research is twofold: (1) working out improved methods of studying resource problems that may be unique to a region still largely undeveloped; (2) making an inventory of the data and research facilities already available and, in so doing, seeking to identify those areas that appear to need further research.

The method of handling the pilot study aspect of the project involves an intensive survey of a limited section of the region, probably southeastern Alaska and adjoining British Columbia. Here, within a land area of approximately 120,000 square miles inhabited by some 49,000 people, the scale of activity during the past several years foreshadows the nature of

future expansion. Much of the present discussion and planning for this area is taking place against a background of only partial knowledge. The impact of the proposed developments upon the region and the effect of the regional environment upon the proposed developments, and the role of government and private enterprise in the cooperative development of the fullest potentials of the area, are not well enough known. It is expected that study of these problems on a local basis will provide a key to the scope and direction of future study for the region as a whole.

The project should be of value both as a regional study per se and as an examination of the development of land, water, and mineral resources under relatively isolated, north-country conditions.

*Urban Growth in California.* Urban growth has generated many resource problems all over the United States, but particularly in California, which is about 80 per cent urbanized. More than 60 per cent of California's population is in two major urban complexes which seem likely to continue their rapid rate of growth for some time to come.

While much exploratory work has been done on various aspects of California's urban problems, such as the reduction in waste of agricultural assets in urban fringe areas, the solutions to these problems are still largely unrelated. More systematic, broad-based research and integrated analyses are needed to provide effective answers.

Toward this end, a grant has been made to the University of California for a research project, divided into two parts, to be conducted by research teams centered at the Los Angeles and Berkeley campuses of the university.

The Los Angeles research team, headed by Ernest A. Engelbert of the university's Department of Political Science, will focus upon the land-use aspects of the impact of urbanization on natural resources, particularly as related to the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay regions, and with special attention to problems of the rural-urban fringe. Areas of research include:

1. An examination of the trends of urban growth and dispersal and their effect upon land and water use in areas affected.
2. A study of the character and degree of sta-



bility or change of urban and nonurban activities—industrial, agricultural, residential, transportation, and recreational—under conditions of a shifting land and water resources base.

3. An analysis of major problems and areas of conflict in resource use between rural and urban needs and activities.

4. An analysis of private and public controls, employed or employable, which might promote a more efficient land and water resource-use pattern in rural-urban regions.

5. An evaluation of the usefulness of, and gaps in, current knowledge and methods of analysis of the total problem.

At Berkeley the research group is led by Melvin M. Webber, assisted by Donald L. Foley and Catherine Bauer, of the university's Department of City and Regional Planning. The group will endeavor to analyze spatial structures of metropolitan regions and to identify the causes and the values associated with each. It is anticipated that results of this type of analysis will permit a broader and more systematic approach than has hitherto been followed with problems involving the relationship of natural resources to urban expansion.

General direction and sponsorship of the research project is given by a universitywide coordinating committee. While the two segments of the project are essentially independent, a continuous interchange of information and opinion is planned. Both are assisted by a single over-all technical advisory committee composed of faculty members who have an active working interest in various aspects of the project.

The grant for the project is for a 15-month period, beginning in July 1956.

*RFF staff studies* are under way on (a) major causes of regional differentials in per capita income; (b) underlying reasons for shifts in the location of economic activities in the United States, the manner in which such shifts give rise to differentials in regional development, and the changes taking place in the resource orientation of industries; and (c) the changing regional components of the national supply and demand of resources during the period 1870-1950.

In addition, an *ad hoc* group set up by RFF to review techniques of analysis applicable to a

region and to regional interrelationships is examining principles and procedures for organizing and conducting regional research programs that bear on resource development. The group is under the leadership of Morris E. Garnsey, professor of economics at the University of Colorado.

### **Southern Regional Nuclear Energy Research Project**

To evaluate the place of nuclear energy in the southern economy and to suggest what might be done regionally or by individual states to take advantage of this means of developing the South's resources, a four-day work conference was held by the Southern Regional Education Board in August 1956. Antecedent to the conference, the SREB, aided by a grant from Resources for the Future, prepared regional survey data and technical background reports on the relationships for the southern economy between nuclear energy and agriculture, power, medicine and public health, and manpower and education.

Preparations for the conference included a series of meetings of panels of technical and nuclear energy specialists and state representatives concerned with each field in order to obtain a continuous interchange and mutual education between the two groups. To this end, one of the technical panelists or state representatives in each field, in addition to preparing the background report, was assigned to guide the planning in his field and later served as chairman or co-chairman of a conference working committee in that field.

The procedure used in this conference may serve as a guide to other groups that contemplate similar work in evaluating the role of nuclear energy against the background of specific state and regional problems and capabilities.

The report embodying the recommendations of the work conference was accepted by the Southern Governor's Conference at its annual meeting in September and is available from the Southern Regional Education Board, Atlanta, Georgia. The Governors recommended the establishment of a nuclear energy advisory committee within each state, the chairmen of which should constitute a regional advisory council.

These bodies would carry out the recommendations of the work conference for individual state action and for unified regional action.

### **Industrial Dispersal and Civil Defense**

Trends in industrial dispersal are being analyzed in a project now under way at The Brookings Institution. Legislative and administrative efforts to encourage the dispersal of new factory buildings as part of the nonmilitary defense program of the United States are being examined under the working hypothesis that, contrary to published estimates, there has been little industrial dispersal in recent years. In explanation of this situation, the study will essay a theory of "nonprogrammed decision-making" with particular attention to such concepts as efficiency, feasibility, apathy, and public interest.

Proceeding from a discussion of the factors which make dispersal necessary, the study will describe existing apathy and the nature and effect of government and nongovernment efforts to overcome it. Theories of economic location will be studied to assist in evaluating the relative strength of economic, social, and governmental forces as determinants of industrial location. Recent changes in the pattern of location, as indicated by a comparison of the 1947 and 1954 Censuses of Manufactures, will be analyzed in the light of these theories.

The study offers an opportunity for examination of certain public and private patterns of behavior: legislative-executive and federal-state-local relationships on the public side, and in the private sphere, the decisions of industrial executives, influential private citizens, and others. It is hoped that suggestions on appropriate ways of encouraging desired action on the part of such nongovernmental decision-makers will emerge.

Scheduled for completion in 1957, the project is being conducted by Frank B. Cliffe, Jr., formerly assistant to the director, Public Administration Clearing House, and now research fellow, The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place, Washington 6, D. C.

### **Local Civil Defense Organization**

A comprehensive study of local civil defense in the United States and how it is operating has

recently been conducted by a group of four faculty members of the Department of Political Science of Michigan State University under a contract between the university and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The objective of the study is to "analyze and develop findings and recommendations as to the organizational structure (including statutory arrangements as they relate thereto) of civil defense at the community level of government, and determine the relative effectiveness of the local civil defense operations studied."

A pilot field study of civil defense operations in an important industrial city which had been designated as a critical target area by the Federal Civil Defense Administration was first undertaken. On the basis of data obtained from the pilot study, two questionnaires were developed by the team, one for target cities and the other for counties. The questionnaires were sent to all 253 target area cities in the United States, and to a sample of the 961 counties within or adjacent to target areas as well as of other nontarget counties.

The team also conducted field studies in four major critical target areas which included five critical target cities. On the basis of data secured from interviews conducted in the field and from the questionnaire survey, a 1150-page report to the Federal Civil Defense Administration was prepared during the fall of 1956. The report consists of four case studies, each of which describes in detail the organization and administration of civil defense in one of the selected target areas, and six analytical chapters which deal with the organization, financing, and staffing of city and county civil defense; intragovernmental relations; intergovernmental relations; political leadership; the relationship between civil defense and local communities (civic leaders, organized groups, and the general public); and an analysis, largely statistical, of regional variations and relationships among governments within target areas. A concluding chapter presents findings and recommendations. Appendixes discuss problems of methodology, significant data obtained from the questionnaire responses, and a comparative analysis of state civil defense legislation.

The study was directed by Glendon A. Schu-

bert, Jr., associate professor of political science, Michigan State University.

### **Hospital-Community Relationship**

The Social Research Service of Michigan State University has launched a five-year study of hospital-community relationships with a grant of \$125,587 from the United States Public Health Service. The purpose of the study will be to (1) examine the significant relationships which exist between the hospital and the community, (2) establish typologies of hospital-community relationships based upon the range of relationships found between the hospital and its community, and (3) establish criteria to improve the relationships between the hospital and its community.

The survey project, under the leadership of Walter E. Freeman and Jay W. Artis, will have two main phases. The first year the research group will examine hospital-community relationships, choosing and classifying those which appear significant. In the second and succeeding years, the staff will scrutinize selected hospitals and compile a series of case studies. Scheduled for study are the sociological aspects of the hospital financing and building program and the roles of auxiliary organizations, volunteer and part-time hospital workers, aides, nurses, doctors, administrators, and civic and governmental agencies.

It is hypothesized that the hospital deals with social structures that differ significantly from the social structures with which schools, the churches, the government, and industry deal. Yet the hospital's public is determined by the same type of complexities in social organization as are found in other institutionalized patterns of relationship. The lack of any systematic research dealing with the hospital's public points to the necessity for more analysis in hospital-community relations and to the essential problem of this study. Mr. Freeman is on the Community Services staff of the Michigan State University Continuing Education Services, and Mr. Artis is in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

### **Organizational Effectiveness Study**

An appraisal of certain phases of the field operations of the Bureau of Old-Age and Sur-

vivors Insurance, Social Security Administration, was attempted in a pilot research project recently completed at the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. The first phase of the study examined the administrative effectiveness of the bureau's district (field) offices, with the basic objective of identifying types of administrative actions which appeared to be crucial in determining the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of these offices. The second part of the project scrutinized the bureau's effectiveness in its relations with the public. Here, the purpose was to determine types of bureau actions which appeared significant or "critical" in the eyes of the public.

Both phases of the study utilized the "critical incident" technique, which relies on obtaining descriptions from observers of specific incidents in which especially effective or ineffective behaviors or actions occurred.

In the administrative effectiveness phase, the "critical incidents" consisted of descriptions of especially effective or ineffective administrative actions in operating situations as, for example, the account of a new employee of the excellent treatment and orientation he received in his first day on a job, or the account of a clerk-stenographer of the woefully inadequate supervision provided her on a new job.

The "critical incidents" in the public relations section involved specific actions by bureau employees which caused the employees or offices to appear especially effective or ineffective in dealing with the public.

Over 2,300 of these "critical incidents" were collected, analyzed, and grouped into categories, which were then grouped into major areas of administrative and public relations behavior. Frequency distributions revealed patterns of similarity, indicating categories of incidents which reoccurred most frequently. Such patterns appeared to be clues to which types of actions might be "critical" or especially significant in determining effectiveness or ineffectiveness in field office administration and public relations.

The 1,371 "critical incidents" in the administrative effectiveness phase of the study were classified into nine broad areas of administrative behavior which appear "critical" or crucial in determining whether bureau district offices are

administered effectively or ineffectively. Their rank order in the study were as follows:

1. Techniques of administrative organization.
2. Relations with the public.
3. Group and interpersonal relations among staff—getting along with others.
4. Personnel administration.
5. Training of the staff.
6. Motivating employees and promoting morale.
7. Communications.
8. Providing administrative leadership.
9. Procurement, maintenance, and utilization of office space, equipment, and supplies.

In the public relations phase, as a result of examining the "critical incident" data, tentative hypotheses were formulated which could serve, in part, as guide lines in identifying "critical" types of actions with the public, and which could also suggest effective approaches in fostering and maintaining public support in bureau operations. Some of these hypotheses were:

1. Members of the public frequently make an over-all judgment of the bureau's efficiency on the basis of individual services they receive.
2. The quality of personal interviews often appears to be more important than the actual results of such contacts.
3. The public's initial impressions of "over-the-counter" service tend to remain lasting impressions.
4. The bureau's reputation often depends upon how good its administrative practices are.
5. The bureau is often judged by the adequacy of information it furnishes.
6. Apparent shortages of staff—particularly at contact stations—create an unfavorable attitude toward the bureau in the eyes of the public.
7. Good or bad impressions of the bureau are often formed by individual contacts.
8. A cooperative attitude by bureau offices and personnel fosters public confidence and support.

John M. Pfflner, professor of public administration, University of Southern California, directed the study under a contract with the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance. He was assisted by Frank V. K. Mason and

Robert B. Callahan, graduate students who are also bureau employees.

### Training for Overseas Public Service

Adequacy of facilities for preparing Americans for overseas public service is being surveyed at Syracuse University. Purpose of the Syracuse project is to outline a program for education and training which will enable this country more fully to meet overseas public service personnel requirements. The study is being made under a \$175,000 grant from Carnegie Corporation.

The survey will extend to personnel needs of all United States government agencies conducting programs overseas. It will also deal with American personnel requirements of international and private agencies carrying on overseas activities essentially similar to foreign programs of the national government.

Project phases include a cataloging of present and projected commitments for overseas public service personnel and an inventory of existing educational and training facilities. Also to be made is an analysis of the kind of training that has proved most valuable for career personnel in overseas public service assignments. Conclusions for the latter portion of the project will be based on extensive interviews of American personnel now serving in representative overseas missions and will be used as a basis for suggesting educational curriculums and special training programs.

While project focus is on education and training, data developed by the survey will also have other important applications. Identification of those qualities that make for effective public service overseas, for example, will provide useful recruitment and selection guides.

The survey is scheduled for completion in 1958 and is under the direction of Harlan Cleveland, Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Gerard J. Mangone is serving as chief of staff for the project.

# Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Opal D. David and William B. Shore

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## International Meetings of Administrators in 1957

Three international conferences of administrators are scheduled for Europe next summer.

The Round-Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, held two years of every three between the triennial Congresses, will be held in Opatija, Yugoslavia, June 19-25. The three subjects for discussion are: "Delegation of Authority and Decentralization of Operations," "Automation in the Public Service," and "Promotion and Compensation of Higher Civil Servants". Arrangements have been made for instantaneous translation of the proceedings in three languages.

All members of the American Society for Public Administration are eligible to join the United States Section of IIAS, which is a committee of ASPA. All IIAS members are invited to attend the Round-Table.

The International Union of Local Authorities will hold its Thirteenth Biennial Congress at The Hague, June 12-18. The main theme is "Problems of Expanding Cities, Viewed Generally and in Relation to Rural Areas." "Traffic" is a secondary topic. A report on metropolitan problems, based on information from more than 25 national leagues of municipalities, will be presented. The 1955 congress attracted some 1,000 officials and experts in municipal affairs from 30 countries.

Orin F. Nolting, executive director, International City Managers' Association, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, is secretary of the United States Committee for International Municipal Cooperation, affiliated with the International Union.

The International Federation for Housing and Town Planning will hold a Council meeting in West Berlin, August 25-30, to discuss "Urban Land Policy: Condemnation, Land

Assembly, Replotting for Urban Redevelopment and for Large Housing Projects." The International Exposition for Housing and Planning will be in progress, revolving around the demonstration rebuilding of the Hansa district of Berlin.

For information, write Charles S. Ascher, Secretary, International Committee, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 684 Park Avenue, New York 21, New York.

## Some New Directions Proposed for International Institute

At the request of the outgoing president, René Cassin, Donald C. Stone has prepared some "Reflections on the Past and Future of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences," based on nine years of participation in the affairs of the institute, and particularly as chairman of the IIAS Committee on Administrative Practices. Mr. Stone is president of Springfield College, Massachusetts.

The drawing together of the theorists and practitioners within IIAS is noted in the paper. In general, the administrators concerned about methods have worked in the Committee on Administrative Practices and representatives of universities and research organizations have been active in the Scientific Committee. However, recent conferences have brought all members together for discussion of topics important to both, Mr. Stone feels.

More of the institute's work should focus on the two committees, but their names and functions should be clarified. They should, Mr. Stone suggests, help in planning publications, identifying problems for research, collecting data, determining subjects for consideration at round tables and congresses, and identifying methods that have proved effective in promoting exchange of information, subjects for cov-



erage in the publications of the institute, and special cooperative projects.

A regional meeting in the Far East or Latin America should be attempted in 1958 in place of the usual worldwide round table, always held in Europe. Europe might hold its own regional meeting that year, Mr. Stone suggests.

#### **Progress on Hoover Commission Recommendations**

An interim report on progress in carrying out the recommendations of the second Hoover Commission has been submitted to President Eisenhower by his special assistant Meyer Kestnbaum. Mr. Kestnbaum has been reviewing and coordinating the reports and comments of the executive agencies on commission recommendations applicable to their operations.

The commission made 479 separate recommendations; 189 have been accepted wholly or almost wholly; 124 have been accepted partially at least as to basic objective. Almost two-thirds of these accepted recommendations have been put into effect or are in process of implementation. Twenty-nine recommendations require statutory change; 22 have been drafted into bills and submitted to Congress by the executive branch. Of the 166 recommendations not yet accepted, only 57 are reported to be unacceptable to the agency affected; 33 involve future developments or future study; 76 are under review by the White House staff.

Mr. Kestnbaum warns that counting the number of recommendations accepted is not a clear indication of the degree of administrative progress, since many Hoover Commission recommendations concerned policy as well as administration.

Unlike the first Hoover Commission, the second commission made no estimate of possible tax savings inherent in its proposals, but the Kestnbaum report expresses confidence that in many cases substantial savings and in other cases improved service will result.

The Bureau of the Budget, in October, issued to heads of federal agencies a booklet, *Improvement of Financial Management in the Federal Government* (U.S. Government Printing Office, \$0.35) which brings together the pertinent laws, the Hoover Commission recommendations on budget and accounting, and

the main objectives of the improvement program. A "planned program for improvement of financial management" in each agency must be submitted to the Budget Bureau not later than March 31, 1957. This program would involve plans for:

1. Maintenance of accounts on the accrual basis, including use of adequate inventory and property records.
2. Development of cost-based budgeting practices.
3. Review and appropriate revision of budget and accounting classifications for consistency and synchronization with organization units to the extent possible.
4. Development of supporting information by organizational unit where budget classifications do not coincide with the organization of the agency.
5. Simplification of allotment structure.

These recommendations generally follow the direction set by the Hoover Commission.

#### **Rulings on In-Service Training**

In four recent cases the comptroller general of the United States refused to approve training and research arrangements proposed by federal agencies for employees.

1. The Rural Electrification Administration selected an employee to attend a series of courses in nuclear reactor technology, conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, extending over a period of seven months. The agency proposed to use funds from its salaries and expense appropriation to pay the \$1,500 tuition for this special training, considered of value to the future operations of the REA.

2. The General Services Administration assigned an employee to the ten-month Economic Mobilization Course of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which offers highly specialized and concentrated training to prepare selected military officers and civilian officials for important command, staff, and planning assignments in economic management in the federal government. GSA proposed to continue the employee's regular salary during this training period.

3. The Interior Department proposed that an employee of the Geological Survey who had

received a Rockefeller Award should continue to receive his salary during the period he would be away from his position, his travel and living expenses to be paid under the provisions of the awards program. As justification for this arrangement, it was stated by the agency that this study "is actually an essential part of the scientific program of the Geological Survey and would enable the employee to give more effective leadership in his highly complicated field."

4. A physicist employed at the Ordnance Materials Research Office of the Army in Woburn, Massachusetts, received a Rockefeller Award for ten months of research in Europe. The Secretary of the Army had determined that the employee's pursuit of this course of study would be "in the national interest," and the department proposed to augment the amount of the award by continuing the employee's salary or by paying his travel and other expenses.

Rulings on this subject go back as far as January 26, 1932, when a decision of the comptroller general concluded that "in the absence of specific statutory authority the payment of expenses of an employee incident to his attendance at a course of instruction conducted by a Government agency would not be authorized." Since then a number of agencies have secured congressional approval for provisions in their appropriation acts allowing their employees to attend training courses at government expense, but the authority is not general.

In the absence of specific statutory authority, the comptroller general may waive the general rule against the use of government funds for training when certain criteria which he has established are met. Generally speaking, these require that the training be (1) no more than one or two weeks long; (2) specialized in nature (which has been interpreted repeatedly to exclude administrative and management training); (3) of a type which the employee would not normally be expected to obtain at his own expense; and (4) essential to fulfillment of the purposes for which the appropriation involved was made—meaning generally to meet a "specific and existing administrative need as distinguished from general training of expected future benefits to an agency."

The Defense Department's 1957 appropri-

ation act included specific authority to cover "all necessary expenses" connected with the training of civilian employees, but the comptroller general ruled that award winners could not receive tuition, travel expenses, or living expenses from a source other than government while in a regular duty and pay status without violating "conflict-of-interest" statutes enacted in 1914 and 1917.

#### **Evaluation of Personnel Executives' Conference**

The first of a contemplated series of conferences for federal personnel executives arranged by the Civil Service Commission was held in Washington, September 12-21, 1956. (See Summer, 1956, *Review*, p. 238.) At the conclusion of the program, participants were asked to fill out an evaluation form to guide the commission staff in planning future conferences.

The conference directed its efforts toward four main objectives:

1. Increasing understanding of the relationship of personnel management and general management.
2. Providing opportunity for exchange of information and intensive study of personnel management developments and problems.
3. Fostering the development and application of better personnel policies, programs, and practices.
4. Developing proposals and materials for adaptation and use in field personnel management training.

In evaluating the extent of progress toward these objectives, participants gave their highest rating to the first. A frequent criticism (and one about which little can be done under existing training legislation) was "insufficient time" for work shops and the development of field training materials.

#### **Federal Procurement Policies under Review**

The General Services Administrator has established an interagency task force to review the procurement policies, procedures, and statutes of all federal executive agencies.

Paul A. Barron of the general counsel's office, GSA, will chair the task force. The Vet-

erans' Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission and Departments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Interior, and Post Office are represented. A report will be submitted to the President by the end of 1957, and some recommendations may be implemented prior to that time. A principal aim is to make it easier for small businesses to submit bids by simplifying procedures and eliminating inconsistencies and inequities.

#### **Survey of Negro Employment in the Federal Government**

Nearly one-quarter of the federal employees in Washington, D. C., Chicago, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Mobile, Alabama are Negroes, according to a survey recently completed by the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy.

Of these, 43 per cent were under the Classification Act, 31 per cent in Wage Board (blue-collar) jobs, and 26 per cent in other jobs, primarily in the Post Office Department.

Of the Negroes in classified positions, only 15 per cent were in grades 5 and above whereas 67 per cent of the white classified employees were at this level.

Committee Chairman Maxwell Abbell announced that the committee would analyze the figures by cities and agencies to determine whether the nondiscrimination policy is being "diligently pursued."

#### **Career Planning Publications**

Two recent publications of the U. S. Civil Service Commission deal with different aspects of the same subject—competent personnel.

*Career Staffing—A Method of Manpower Planning* is designed to aid federal administrators in developing long-range plans for meeting future manpower requirements. The pamphlet points to the increased shortages in critical occupational areas and the greater need of government today for superior talent.

Two basic staffing patterns are compared: career staffing, based on entrance-at-the-bottom and in-service development, and program staffing, based on recruitment for specific jobs of persons already qualified by training and experience. Program staffing is adaptable to sudden or unanticipated demands, and under

emergency conditions of war or other disasters it is generally necessary. For the federal service as a whole, however, career staffing is recommended as "the more direct way to assure a future supply."

Basic steps for developing a career staffing program are included in the pamphlet, which may be secured from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price \$0.15.

*Federal Careers—A Directory for College Students* was developed in response to requests from college officials and students for more specific information on federal careers and entrance requirements. Part I is a commentary on federal employment in general, hiring methods, student training programs, pay scales, and promotions. Part II is a word-and-picture story of the activities of agencies and career opportunities in each agency for college graduates. In Part III, the major federal career occupations are arranged alphabetically and described briefly with their qualifications and future career opportunities.

The directory has been sent to all universities, colleges, and professional schools in the United States. Copies are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. Price \$0.60.

#### **Survey of Business Executives in the Federal Government**

The Harvard Business School Club of Washington, D. C. is making a survey of business executives in the federal government under a grant-in-aid from the Committee for Economic Development and the Fund for Adult Education. A salaried executive director is in charge of the project. Technical consultants will be used, but Harvard Business School alumni will do a great deal of the work on a volunteer basis. Further help is being provided by an advisory board of prominent business and government executives throughout the nation and by the faculty committee of the Graduate School of Business Administration.

The survey is seeking information from the largest possible number of business executives who are now in government jobs, from those who have held them in past years, and from others who have been asked to serve but de-

clined. A large number of these individuals have been asked to fill in a mailed questionnaire. Comprehensive personal interviews will be held with a representative sample of these people.

An inventory of government managerial positions of the sort that businessmen would usually be considered qualified to fill is also being made. Most of these positions are in categories ranging from head of a division through Cabinet posts. A broad sample of these jobs will be chosen and an attempt will be made to interview all the men who have held them since 1940.

### **Fellowships for Army Civilian Employees**

Army civilian employees can benefit from a new Research and Study Fellowship Program, under which between 25 and 40 outstanding Army career civilians in science, engineering, and administration will be selected for annual fellowship grants. They will be freed of regular duties for six months to one year to work on special research or advanced study "of particular concern to the Army and the national defense."

### **Decentralization of Responsibility**

Division engineers of the Bureau of Public Roads, United States Department of Commerce, recently were authorized to approve state programs involving use of federal-aid secondary funds. Previously, bureau headquarters in Washington had to approve these projects.

### **Three State Model Laws Would Affect Administration**

Proposed state legislation to provide for executive reorganization, a state agency concerned with local government, and cooperation among local units of government are included among model laws recently approved by the Council of State Government's Committee on Suggested State Legislation. The committee is made up of executive and legislative representatives of state governments.

The executive reorganization draft bill follows the federal law in allowing the chief executive to effect reorganizations unless his proposals are vetoed by the legislature. (The

committee takes no stand on whether reorganization should be achieved by executive initiative, but offers the draft bill as a guide for states that wish to use it.)

A second bill would establish a state agency "to provide a continuing means of assisting local governments and citizens in the determination of present and changing governmental needs . . . by . . . collecting information and making evaluations about metropolitan and local conditions and relations," particularly with regard to:

1. Adjustments in area, organization, functions, and finance of local governments.
2. Interstate metropolitan areas.
3. State advisory and technical services for local government.
4. Supervision of local government.
5. Effects on local areas of present and proposed national, state, and local government programs.
6. Coordination of policies of many levels of government and private associations.

A third bill would allow local units of government to exercise powers they already have in concert with other local units, with the state maintaining some controls in the agreements.

### **State-Municipal Highway Cooperation**

The American Municipal Association and the American Association of State Highway Officials have set up a continuing joint committee to help guide and coordinate the new multibillion dollar federal aid highway program and to encourage state-municipal cooperation in highway building in urban areas.

The first meeting of the committee, held in St. Louis in November, was addressed by an official of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads who emphasized that highway planning can encourage or prevent sound urban development.

A series of statewide meetings will be sponsored by the two organizations to inform state and local officials about plans for the new highway program and to discuss implementation. The Automotive Safety Foundation has contributed funds for these meetings.

The federal-aid Highway Act of 1956 leaves



many key decisions to state and local governments and the decisions may be blocked by poor intergovernmental relationships, according to an article in the December, 1956, issue of *Public Management*, magazine of the International City Managers' Association. The authors, Richard M. Zettel and Norman Kennedy, of the Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, believe that states and municipalities must solve many planning and public education problems in order to spend highway funds efficiently. They list, among others, problems of rural bias against cities, urban opposition to highways skirting cities, and right-of-way acquisition.

#### **Interdepartmental Cooperation between Health and Welfare**

Staff cooperation and reciprocal services between departments of health and welfare have been proposed in a joint statement by the Governing Council of the American Public Health Association and the Board of Directors of the American Public Welfare Association. The statement was developed by a Joint Committee on Medical Care of the two associations.

The statement calls for "acceptance of a policy in each agency which permits and encourages the establishment of planned administrative relationships between the agencies." While recognizing that the same patterns of cooperation are not suitable for all such agencies, the associations suggest areas in which mutual assistance and coordination of programs can be achieved, illustrating each with examples of successful relationships already existing:

1. Informal relationships between top administrators in welfare and health departments, on questions of legislation and budgets, as well as on procedural and specific program questions.

2. Interdepartmental committees, either permanent or addressed to a specific question, similar to the New York Interdepartmental Health Resources Board, a permanent body composed of representatives of eight state agencies dealing with such problems as alcoholism, mental retardation, and the mental and physical health of the aging.

3. Assignment of staff on a full or part-time basis from one agency to the other. Such assignments have been successful in California and New York states.

4. Use of the staff of one agency in orientation and in-service training in the other. A number of public health agencies have provided training programs in nutrition for welfare workers, for example.

5. Case conferences at the field and supervisory levels. Such conferences have been successfully carried out by health and welfare workers of Suffolk County, New York.

6. Joint studies. Such studies have been made, for example, on preventive medicine for public assistance recipients (New York State) and on the food program in children's institutions (Illinois).

7. Joint planning for policy and procedures. In Illinois, a committee representing many state agencies advises on formulas for setting hospital rates to be paid by the state.

8. Advising the health department of health needs observed in the work of the welfare department. This information can be secured through ex-officio representation of welfare workers on the board of health or health advisory committees or through more informal devices.

9. Licensing of such private services as child care facilities and nursing homes. For example, a joint committee of four state departments establishes standards for child day care facilities in Massachusetts.

10. Provision of social work or medical consultation for the other departments lacking such expert staff. In a survey of 187 local health departments, selected for participation in a study of chronic disease services because of their forward-looking policies, 125 indicated they receive such consultative service from the local welfare department. On the other hand, many local health departments provide clinical services to meet welfare department needs.

#### **In-Service Training Solves Some Personnel Shortages**

To meet shortages of certain skills a number of government agencies now hire unskilled persons and train them.

New York State, for example, soon will select



recent college graduates as bank examiners. The trainees will spend the first year working in a bank as regular bank employees, but will be paid by the state. During the second year they will work in district offices of the state banking department.

Detroit provided in-service training for more than one-third of its employees last year, training young people in the skilled trades and highly specialized fields.

Santa Monica, California, trained employees of the Public Works Department to operate a new incinerator as it was being built, after discovering that staffing the new plant would be difficult.

Milwaukee, finding it impossible to hire draftsmen at the middle and supervisory levels, began recruiting inexperienced draftsmen directly from high school. Those hired since 1954 have progressed to three higher levels.

Of the 1,860 classified civil servants in the Colorado Highway Department, only 34 have civil engineering degrees. Through in-service training programs, subprofessionals are taught mathematics, surveying, drafting, and designing, partly by the department's own staff, partly by outside teachers brought into departmental courses, partly by a special four-week intensive course put on by the University of Colorado. Some subprofessionals have been promoted to junior engineers following the university course.

#### **Report Published on Philadelphia's Centralized Public Information Office**

A report on the first four years of an experiment which put all of Philadelphia's public information and ceremony programs under a single Office of City Representative has been published privately by the first city representative, Walter M. Phillips. (*Toward a New Program of Public Information and Ceremony by the City Government of Philadelphia; Four Year Report*, October, 1956, 40 p. offset.)

Before 1952, each segment of Philadelphia's government handled its own public information. The centralized agency, according to Mr. Phillips, allows a coordination and timing of news breaks and puts various city programs in proper perspective. Previously, many city agencies competed for publicity while others main-

tained excessive silence; thus, the whole picture of governmental programs was distorted.

Skilled information personnel were assigned to specific city agencies to keep track of activities that the public should know about. An average of 20 stories a week were sent out to radios and newspapers. About 90 per cent were used by at least one news outlet.

The mayor also had two television programs, described in the report, one a spontaneous question and answer interchange between citizens and the mayor. A number of other city departments had their own TV and radio shows.

A billboard on City Hall was continually used to promote public service programs. The office also did educational work on the legislative program presented by the city to the state legislature.

During the first four years of the centralized public information program, the city won two awards for public relations—the American Public Relations Association's "Silver Anvil" for the best governmental public relations program for the year 1952, and the Governmental Public Relations Association's first annual Certificate of Merit for "outstanding performance" in the field. Other civic promotion campaigns on fire prevention, city cleanliness, noise abatement, and get-out-the-vote also won national recognition.

#### **First Information from Census of Governments: School Organization**

Considerable consolidation of school districts is the salient point in the first release of preliminary figures from the 1957 Census of Governments being conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Additional preliminary reports from the Census of Governments will be issued as soon as available, although figures may need later revision. The advance releases are for sale by the Bureau, Washington 25, D. C. The first one costs \$6.10.

The number of school districts, according to the report, has been cut 23 per cent from the school year 1951-52 to 1956-57, to 51,881, primarily owing to consolidation of rural school districts. Minnesota, Illinois, Idaho, and New York show the greatest percentage reduction in number of school districts.

Schools are operated by independent school

districts in 28 states, by other units of government in 5 states, and by both independent school districts and other units in the rest of the states, the survey indicates.

Future reports from the census will include data on number, characteristics, taxable value, public employees and payrolls, revenues, expenditures, debt, and financial assets of governmental units.

### **Public Housing Management Faces Up to the "Problem" Family**

Since 1949, more and more public housing tenants are problem families, families with members who break the law or are a nuisance to neighbors. As a result, the early assumption of public housing administrators that decent housing alone could raise standards of cleanliness and civic cooperation has changed.

Housing agencies have three choices, Elizabeth Wood told the 1956 annual conference of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials. (Her address is published in 13 *Journal of Housing* 424, December, 1956.) They can reject problem families, they can accept them and drive away other families leaving public housing a large social hospital, or they can try to change the problem families.

After conducting a study of the interrelationship of New York City's public housing and social welfare programs, sponsored by the Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York, Miss Wood feels these families can be helped. She established a pilot program through which housing management and a family counseling agency are working together to conduct a persistent visiting campaign, seeking to arouse the family to want help on deeper problems of alcoholism, drug addiction, and other emotional disturbances, but first working on simple goals of raising neatness in housing and clothing, and nutrition in meals.

The pilot program will be evaluated by a case review committee composed of professional staff members of a number of social agencies.

### **Study of Transportation Administration in Cities**

A study of transportation administration in 30 or more cities will be made soon by the Yale

Bureau of Highway Traffic in cooperation with the Subcommittee on Managerial Patterns and Integrating Procedures of the National Committee on Urban Transportation. (See Spring, 1956, *Review*, p. 159.) The Automotive Safety Foundation has approved an initial grant for the study.

### **Employees Provide Citizen "Feed-Back"**

Employees of Richmond, Virginia, and Kansas City, Missouri, have received forms to encourage their reporting defects the municipality should repair, like holes in the streets, damaged or badly placed traffic signs, or broken parking meters. Many governmental agencies emphasize the outward public relations role of employees, but not many have encouraged employees to alert officials on a continuing basis to defects as seen from the outside.

### **Planners to Consider Administrative Problems**

The National Planning Conference of the American Society of Planning Officials will include three panels concerned with administrative problems of planners: "Public Hearing Procedures and Practices," "Metropolitan Planning Administration," and "Urbanism and the County." Another topic of broad interest is "Implications of New Sources of Energy." The conference will be held at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel, San Francisco, March 17-21, 1957.

### **Employees Association Public Relations Program**

The U. S. Navy Underwater Sound Laboratory Association, New London, Connecticut, for the past five years has presented awards of \$25 savings bonds to five or six high school graduates in the greater New London area for achievement in the field of science. After winning awards, many students have worked in the laboratory during the summer and some have indicated interest in full-time employment following their university work.

The awards are part of "a planned publicity program . . . familiarizing the public not only with the award winners but also with the work and objectives of the Laboratory," according to the association.

### Selection Methods for Promotion Studied

A comparison of the results of two methods of selecting personnel for promotion to foreman, made in a large British firm, is reported in the July, 1956, issue of *Works Management*, publication of the British Institution of Works Managers.

The old method consisted of a short interview with the candidate and with managers who could have known him. The new method included intelligence tests, a recommendation form filled out by his immediate superior, carefully planned interviews, and a group oral examination.

There was disagreement on ratings of nearly half the candidates on the basis of the two methods.

After two years and again after four and one-half years, the 44 candidates selected by the two methods were rated on their success as foremen. The new method of selection predicted the results in the case of 25 of the 44 correctly, whereas the old method predicted only 15 of the 44 correctly.

Of the 20 foremen rated not really successful after the trial period, the new method would have rejected 12 and the old method of selection would have rejected only 2. Of the successful foremen, the new method would have rejected 3 and the old method would have rejected 5.

The new method, however, required three and one-half hours of the candidate's time and three hours of management time compared to 20 minutes and 30 minutes for the old method.

The National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 14 Welbeck Street, London W.1, would like to continue the experiment in other situations and is seeking firms who hire a large number of foremen to participate in the comparison.

### Budgeting Study

A study of budgetary practices in public authorities is being undertaken by the British Royal Institute of Public Administration. R. S. Edwards, chairman of the North Eastern Gas Board since 1948 and former director of the Cooperative Wholesale Society, chairs the research group. The P. D. Leake Trust, a subsidiary of the Institute of Chartered Account-

ants of England and Wales, will provide financial backing.

### AAAS Committee Calls on Scientists to Take Social Action

A changing attitude toward public affairs among scientists—which may affect relationships between scientists and government administrators—is reflected in a committee report to the council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in late December. The council voted to expand the work of the committee.

The Committee on the Social Aspects of Science warned: "There is an impending crisis in the relationships between science and American society. This crisis is being generated by a basic disparity: At a time when decisive economic, political and social processes have become profoundly dependent upon science, the discipline has failed to attain its appropriate place in the management of public affairs."

While the committee strongly recommends "that scientists concern themselves with social action," the specific program is left for further discussion.

The committee notes that other organized groups in the country make their views known and felt on social questions, but scientists generally have refrained from pressing their opinions through group action.

Some of the results of the unwillingness of scientists to push for social action in fields affecting or affected by science, according to the committee, are:

1. Unbalanced scientific development, with applied physical and chemical investigation far outstripping applied biological and social sciences, and pure scientific investigation.
2. Indifference of public leaders to facts known by science which could prevent natural disasters and dissipation of natural resources.
3. Possible dangers of new physical and chemical discoveries being put into use before their biological and social effects have been studied, e.g., food additives and radiation from nuclear weapons and from X-rays.
4. Secrecy imposed by government and business which limits the flow of scientific information.
5. Poor communication systems among scien-

tists in rapidly changing fields, particularly across language barriers.

#### **Need for Facilities for Higher Education**

A recent study of the Association of American Colleges indicates that liberal arts colleges in all types of institutions of higher education will be able to expand capacity in the next five years only half as fast as the expected increase in applications for enrollment. The study predicted an increased demand of 58 per cent with a potential expansion of only 19 per cent. The association called for "a speedy and substantial increase in financial support," but also questioned the efficacy of accepting all of the applicants in the four-year colleges.

A description of financial grants from foundations to universities is published in the *American Foundation News*, September 15, 1956, of the American Foundations' Information Service, 527 Madison Avenue, New York 22, New York.

President Eisenhower's committee to study education beyond the high school plans to hold regional meetings next spring to consider steps to expand college facilities.

In November, 1956, the National Conference of Canadian Universities held a conference for representatives of government, business, and labor organizations on imminent problems in higher education. The conference was underwritten by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

#### **"The Federal Accountant" to Resume Publication**

The Federal Government Accountants Association is resuming publication of its quarterly journal, *The Federal Accountant*, after a year's lapse. Beginning with the third issue, in the summer of 1957, the magazine will be a co-operative project with the Cornell University Graduate School of Business and Public Administration.

# Public Health Education Technics in Administration\*

By HOLLIS S. INGRAHAM, M.D., F.A.P.H.A.

*First Deputy Commissioner  
New York State Department of Health*

IN administration the need for prompt and full flow of two-way information has long been felt and there has been increasing recognition of the desirability of relying less on authority and more on persuasion. This tendency can best be illustrated by specific example: the poliomyelitis vaccine program beginning on April 12, 1955. In New York State this task was under the immediate direction of the state Commissioner of Health. The description of this administrative problem will be confined almost solely to the processes of informing, motivating, and guiding those persons outside the Commissioner's immediate staff who were responsible for executing the program in New York State.

In the days immediately after April 12, we were dealing with an eager public, willing physicians, enthusiastic health departments, and what appeared to be a large and growing supply of vaccine. Unfortunately, the Cutter episode, which supervened within two weeks after the announcement, changed attitudes of entire communities, drastically reduced the supply of vaccine, and introduced the necessity for a number of grave policy decisions.

There had been much advance planning before April 12. On the day of the announcement the Governor was given a summary of the Ann Arbor report and its implications. The afternoon and evening of April 12 was given over to a meeting with full-time health officers of the entire state. Within the week a meeting was held with the council of the New

York State Medical Society where there was agreement on priorities on state purchase of vaccine for completing the third and fourth grade, following the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis program, and on the state purchase of vaccine for epidemic situations. There was also agreement that doctors would be expected to adhere to age priorities, would assist in clinics, and would make immunization available to all persons regardless of ability to pay.

The pharmacists' association of the state agreed that pharmacists would be asked to handle vaccine at cost in the immediate future and would work against any possible black-marketing. School authorities were consulted, the program outlined to them, and their assistance solicited and received.

The Governor then met with leaders of the legislature and together they agreed to set aside one million dollars for state purchase of vaccine.

A nation-wide meeting, called by the Surgeon General, was attended in Washington, D. C., during which the matter of priorities, methods of distribution, and administration of vaccine were discussed, and at which an estimate was given of the likely production within the months immediately ahead. Immediately thereafter the Cutter episode occurred which called a halt to material progress for a two-week period. During this time consultations were held with experts within and without the department and the decision was made to continue the immunization program with all vigor as soon as vaccine could be made available.

An advisory committee was promptly ap-

\* Condensed from the *American Journal of Public Health and The Nation's Health*, Volume 47, No. 1, pages 67-71, (January 1957). Reprinted by permission of the *Journal* and the author.



pointed on which there were representatives of the State Medical Society, State Pharmaceutical Association, Surgical Trade Association, health officers' associations, Academy of General Practice, the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, and the Parent-Teacher Associations of both public and parochial schools. This advisory committee met monthly to review the situation regarding the availability of vaccine and to advise the Commissioner as to the age groups to whom it should be given, to determine the proportion of vaccine for commercial channels, and on other such details.

#### *Keeping Participants Informed*

THROUGHOUT the weeks following the April 12th announcement, a series of weekly or more frequent conference-type, long distance phone calls were made to the regional health directors of the department, following which they called all the full-time health officers within their regions. At these conference calls, matters of policy were discussed, advice sought, and decisions made. All during this time, Polio Vaccine Bulletins kept all public health personnel in the state informed.

In May a series of letters on the poliomyelitis situation addressed by the Commissioner to all the physicians in the state was instituted. These, after discussion by conference call with the regional health directors, were premailed to the full-time health officers prior to sending to the physicians. Subsequent to mailing to the physicians, a press statement built around the letters was issued. In these letters, the basis for decisions and recommendations regarding the program were given in considerable detail. Newspapers, radio and television stations eagerly sought and used these statements.

As the poliomyelitis season itself approached, there were additional meetings with the Technical Advisory Committee appointed by the State Medical Society and numerous conferences with leading epidemiologists and virologists to arrive at decisions concerning the wisdom of the continuance of immunization during the poliomyelitis season. The decision was made to push vaccinations forward with all possible speed.

A booklet for health education in the field of poliomyelitis immunization containing

questions and answers was prepared and widely distributed as was a health education kit for use by local health officers. Beginning in the fall of 1955, score sheets on distribution and administration of vaccine were prepared and distributed to each full-time health officer so that he might compare his standing with that of the rest of the state.

#### *Some Conclusions*

THE program had strength enough to enable it to survive the shock of the Cutter episode; met with good public response; and has been attended with a minimum of misunderstandings and complaints on the part of the public, physicians and pharmacists, school authorities and health officers. Above all, it was successful in utilizing all available vaccine. Further, it appears, although not fully proved, that the very low incidence of poliomyelitis in New York State during this year may be associated with the great number of children who have been vaccinated.

The ability of the New York State Health Department to cope successfully with situations such as occurred with the April 12th announcement, was greatly facilitated by the administrative arrangement whereby the Office of Public Health Education is a part of the executive division. The Director of the Office of Public Health Education is directly responsible to the executive office. Throughout the entire vaccine program, the staff of the Office of Public Health Education was a part of each activity taken to develop and interpret the plan of administration and of every important operational step taken to effect the plan.

Centered within the office are the entire specialized health education resources of the department which can be used where needed most at any particular time. This fluidity of resources is especially important in these days of scarcity of professional public health educators, to assure that their skills are used to the best advantage.

We in the New York State Department of Health are convinced that public health education is a part of public health administration and that its technics are indispensable to successful executive management of public health activities.

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